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Abstract 
During the past decade, Greece faced an unprecedented economic crisis and signed 
an economic adjustment programme (EAP) that brought about changes and reforms to the 
Greek health system. Comprised of three empirical studies, this thesis focuses on the 
impact of the Greek crisis on the health sector, with a particular interest in the responses to 
and implications of the crisis across socioeconomic groups.  
The first paper studies how household spending behaviour and responses towards 
health care have changed across socioeconomic groups in the face of an economic shock 
and the relevant health policy measures. Our analysis suggests that the income elasticity of 
household health expenditure (HHE) is below unity and exhibits a significant increase after 
the introduction of the EAP. Thus, households exhibit greater health care consumption 
responses to changes in their income. Contrary to high socioeconomic status (SES) groups, 
lower SES households did not become more sensitive to income changes in the post-EAP 
period, and have been more “protective” about their health care consumption.  
Focusing on the older population, the second study concentrates on the potential 
changes and implications in terms of financial protection against health payments during 
the Greek recession. We find that the headcount and overshoot of catastrophic health 
expenditure (CHE) increased during the crisis, with low-income and households with 
multimorbid patients being disproportionately affected. Prior to the crisis, CHE was mainly 
due to inpatient and nursing care. During the recession, however, the contribution of 
pharmaceutical spending to CHE substantially increased. Our analysis also reveals that 
there are widening inequalities in the risk of CHE across socioeconomic groups after the 
onset of the crisis.  
The third paper mainly focuses on population health status. It studies how 
economic climate and uncertainty influence fertility decisions and responses across 
population groups, and further investigates whether economic conditions during pregnancy 
impact newborn health. Our findings generally suggest that birth weight and pregnancy 
length are procyclical. We also report heterogeneity in the relationship between economic 
conditions during pregnancy and newborn health across socioeconomic groups, with the 
birth outcomes of high-SES newborns being responsive to economic volatility only in the 
first trimester of pregnancy. Further, economic adversity during the preconception period 
increases the probability that women who conceive are highly educated and married. After 
	 8 
accounting for selection, we find that newborns exposed to the crisis while in utero tend to 
be lighter, with the effect being more detrimental for low-SES children. 
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Chapter 1 
Background and Motivation 
1.1. The Greek crisis  
Since the late 2000s, economic recession in Europe and the relevant policy 
responses have dominated the public dialogue and the political agenda. Europe 
experienced a multifaceted crisis, uncovering the Eurozone’s structural and design 
problems and threatening its stability1  (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015; De Grauwe & Ji, 
2012). In particular, the European economy faced three interlinked crises: a sovereign debt 
crisis due to the rising government bond spreads and the concerns about sovereign debt 
sustainability, a banking crisis due to liquidity constraints, and a macroeconomic crisis 
associated with the moderate growth outlook and the lack of competitiveness, especially 
among the peripheral countries (Blundell-Wignall, 2012; Shambaugh, 2012).  
The debt crisis broke out during the autumn of 2009, when the Greek government 
announced the revision of the fiscal deficit that was significantly higher than the previous 
estimate, exceeding 15% of the GDP (Gibson, Palivos, & Tavlas, 2014; Honkapohja, 
2014). This announcement, along with Greece’s high public debt and mediocre growth 
projections, raised concerns about the economic environment in Greece and decreased 
market confidence (Ardagna & Caselli, 2014). Creditors, rating agencies and financial 
markets questioned the solvency of the government bonds and the country’s ability to 
refinance its debt, and also challenged the sustainability of the public debt (Featherstone, 
2011; Gourinchas, Philippon, & Vayanos, 2016). Between the autumn of 2009 and July 
2011, the ‘big three’ agencies downgraded Greece’s credit rating 19 times (Ardagna & 
Caselli, 2012), with one them putting Greece on ‘selective default’ category at the end of 
February 2010 (Gibson, Hall, & Tavlas, 2014). In light of these developments, the spreads 
and sovereign credit risk dramatically increased, with Greece being the first Eurozone 
country to be excluded from the bond market. 
Being unable to borrow from the private capital markets, Greece agreed to 
implement a large-scale economic adjustment programme (EAP) in exchange for financial 	1 Back in the 2000s, the economic and financial environment was, however, quite different. The sovereign 
debt spreads between Germany and other Eurozone countries were relatively low, reflecting the solvency and 
the close substitutability of bonds among the Euro Area countries, and the low perceived risk of default 
(Ardagna & Caselli, 2012; Favero, Missale & Beck, 2012). 	
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assistance from the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (the so-called ‘Troika’) (European Commission, 
2010). In this context, Greece received the largest bailout package in history, partly due to 
increasing concerns about the systemic risks and contagious effects of the Greek debt crisis 
on other European countries (Gourinchas et al., 2016). In contrast to the other countries 
that successfully graduated from their adjustment programmes, Greece signed three 
successive programmes, all of which adopted a tight fiscal stance, included large-scale 
reforms and imposed substantial conditionality (Pagoulatos, 2018). In the first programme, 
signed in May 2010, Greece received a bilateral loan of 110 billion euros through the 
Greek Loan Facility, with 80 billion euros coming from Eurozone countries and the 
remaining provided by the IMF (European Commission, 2010). To put it in context, the 
loan amount approximated 44% of Greece’s GDP in 2010 (Gourinchas et al., 2016). In 
March 2012, Greece signed a second EAP, with the total amount of financial assistance 
eventually rising to 240 billion euros (European Commission, 2012). In order to deal with 
public debt sustainability issues, the second programme also included a debt restructuring 
for the government bonds held by private creditors. These bonds thus incurred a voluntary 
haircut of 53.5% on their nominal value, resulting in debt relief of approximately 106 
billion euros (European Commission, 2012). The Greek debt restructuring is generally 
regarded as the largest debt relief in modern history, and was the first to take place across 
European countries in the post-war period (Dreger, 2012; Forni, Palomba, Pereira, & 
Richmond, 2016; Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, & Gulati, 2013). After a turbulent period of 
negotiations in the first half of 2015, Greece agreed to the third successive EAP in August 
2015 and to a new loan of up to 86 billion euros, conditional upon the adoption of a large-
scale set of structural reforms and the continuation of fiscal discipline (European 
Commission, 2015b). In August 2018, and after eight years of financial assistance 
programmes, Greece finally completed the last EAP. Overall, the loans to Greece 
amounted to 288.7 billion euros, with almost 89% of them provided by the Eurozone, the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), and the remaining being disbursed from the IMF (European Stability Mechanism, 
2018).   
There are several underlying reasons that explain why Greece was at the epicentre 
of the Eurozone crisis. Notwithstanding Greece’s high GDP growth performance during 
the 2000s (almost 4% compared to an average of 2% in the Eurozone), the growth model 
largely relied on domestic consumption and borrowing (Tsakloglou & Anastasatou, 2014). 
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In the decade before the breakout of the crisis, the Greek economy was far from exhibiting 
fiscal discipline and did not meet the fiscal targets, with the general government and 
primary deficit exceeding 15% and 10% respectively (Eurostat, 2019b), and the public 
debt approximating 130% of GDP in 2009. Following a considerable deterioration of 
Greece’s external competitiveness over the 2000s, the current account deficit also 
exceeded 10% in 2009. Apart from the twin deficits and the precarious and problematic 
growth model, Greece’s capacity to promote and implement structural reforms was rather 
poor, not only in labour and product markets but also across various public policy domains 
including public administration, taxation, business environment, and the welfare state 
(Davaki & Mossialos, 2005; Featherstone, 2008). In this context, the EAP aimed to deal 
with these chronic deficiencies and weaknesses of the Greek economy, and thus focused 
on three main objectives: fiscal consolidation, external rebalancing and the implementation 
of large-scale structural reforms.  
 
Table 1. 1: Main macroeconomic indicators in Greece (2008-2017) 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Real GDP 
per capita 
(in euros) 
22600 21500 20300 18500 17200 16800 17000 17100 17100 17400 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
(% change) 
-0.3 -4.3 -5.5 -9.1 -7.3 -3.2 0.7 -0.4 -0.2 1.5 
GG gross 
debt (% 
GDP) 
109.4 126.7 146.2 180.6 159.6 177.9 180.2 177.8 181.1 179.3 
GG 
expenditure 
(% GDP) 
50.8 54.1 52.5 54.1 52.8 51.6 50.2 50.6 48.9 47.3 
GG 
revenue (% 
GDP) 
40.7 38.9 41.3 43.8 46.2 47.9 46.2 47.9 49.5 48.3 
GG balance 
(% GDP) 
-10.2 -15.1 -11.2 -10.3 -6.6 -3.6 -4.0 -2.8 0.6 1.0 
GG 
primary 
balance (% 
GDP) 
-5.4 -10.1 -5.3 -3.0 -1.5 0.4 -0.1 0.8 3.8 4.1 
Cyclically 
adjusted 
balance (% 
of potential 
GDP) 
-12.1 -15.0 -8.9 -4.4 1.9 4.8 2.8 3.0 5.6 4.8 
Cyclically 
adjusted 
primary 
balance (% 
of potential 
-7.1 -10.0 -3.3 2.0 6.2 8.2 6.2 6.1 8.4 7.6 
	 19 
GDP) 
Exports (in 
million 
euros) 
56,533 45,089 49,958 52,866 54845 54,835 57,837 55,931 53,059 59,455 
Imports (in 
million 
euros) 
87,040 68,319 69,452 66,889 63353 59,915 62,130 55,840 54,317 61,292 
Current 
account 
balance (% 
GDP) 
-15.1 -12.3 -11.4 -10.0 -3.8 -2.0 -1.6 -0.8 -1.7 -1.8 
HICP 
inflation 
rate (% 
change) 
4.2 1.3 4.7 3.1 1.0 -0.9 -1.4 -1.1 0.0 1.1 
Output gap 
(% of 
potential 
GDP) 
8.7 4.1 -0.8 -8.8 -14.0 -15.5 -13.9 -13.7 -13.7 -12.6 
Private 
debt (% of 
GDP) 
126.3 130.1 141.2 144.4 147.3 145.8 143.1 140.8 139.3 131.2 
Household 
debt (% 
GDP) 
56.6 59.3 68.4 71.8 75.6 74.5 71.9 69.5 66.7 62.8 
Unemploy
ment  7.8 9.6 12.7 17.9 24.5 27.5 26.5 24.9 23.6 21.5 
Long-term 
unemploye
d 47.1 40.4 44.6 49.3 59.1 67.1 73.5 73.1 72.0 72.8 
Youth 
unemploym
ent 21.9 25.7 33 44.7 55.3 58.3 52.4 49.8 47.3 43.6 
Source: Eurostat, IMF World Economic Outlook, Eurostat, OECD 
 
During the period of the EAP, Greece achieved a remarkable improvement in some 
key macroeconomic indicators and gradually returned to positive growth rates after a 
prolonged recession, as shown in Table 1.1. The general government primary balance 
gradually ameliorated and turned into a surplus in 2014. In this context, the fiscal 
consolidation programme has been arguably characterized as the largest and fastest 
adjustment in the OECD, with the cyclically adjusted fiscal consolidation exceeding 20% 
of potential GDP during 2009-2016 (Giannitsis & Zografakis, 2018; Tsakloglou, 2019). 
Besides the unprecedented fiscal adjustment, Greece managed to rebalance its external 
position, achieved a considerable adjustment in unit labour costs and boosted 
competitiveness (European Commission, 2019). According to Table 1.1, the current 
account deficit, for example, decreased from 12.3% in 2009 to less than 2% during the last 
four years (OECD, 2018a).  
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Table 1. 2: Main social indicators in Greece (2008-2017) 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
At-risk-of-
poverty 
rate (%) 
20.1 19.7 20.1 21.4 23.1 23.1 22.1 21.4 21.2 20.2 
At-risk-of-
poverty 
rate 
(anchored 
in 2008) 
(%) 
20.1 18.9 18.0 24.9 35.8 44.3 48.0 48.0 47.8 46.3 
At risk of 
poverty or 
social 
exclusion 
(%) 
28.1 27.6 27.7 31.0 34.6 35.7 36.0 35.7 35.6 34.8 
Mean 
equivalized 
net income 
(in euros) 
12,766 13,505 13,974 12,626 10,676 9,303 8,879 8,683 8,673 8,800 
Median 
equivalized 
net income 
(in euros) 
10,800 11,496 11,963 10,985 9,513 8,371 7,680 7,520 7,500 7,600 
S80/S20 
income 
quintile 
share ratio 
5.9 5.8 5.6 6.0 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.1 
Gini 
coefficient  
33.4 33.1 32.9 33.5 34.3 34.4 34.5 34.2 34.3 33.4 
Gini 
coefficient 
(before 
social 
transfers) 
35.2 34.8 34.9 35.6 36.6 37.0 37.0 36.5 36.8 36.0 
People 
living in 
households 
with very 
low work 
intensity 
7.5 6.6 7.6 12.0 14.2 18.2 17.2 16.8 17.2 15.6 
Severe 
material 
deprivation 
rate (%) 
11.2 11.0 11.6 15.2 19.5 20.3 21.5 22.2 22.4 21.1 
Households 
with 
arrears (%) 
24.4 28.7 30.9 31.9 39.0 45.3 46.4 49.3 47.9 44.9 
Making 
ends meet 
with great 
difficulty 
(%) 
20.0 22.3 24.2 25.6 35.0 39.6 39.5 38.2 40.6 39.9 
Social 
expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
21.3  24.0  24.9  26.0  26.9  25.1  25.2  25.4  25.7  24.8  
Social 
expenditure 
51,481  56,945  56,171  53,904  51,392  45,325  44,973  44,828  Ν/Α Ν/Α 
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(in million 
euros) 
Source: Eurostat (EU-SILC), OECD 
 
Along with the positive macroeconomic developments, the economic adjustment 
came at an unprecedented cost. First, the cumulative GDP decline amounted to more than a 
quarter during the decade-long recession, with the Greek crisis being the most severe and 
protracted economic downturn among developed countries in the post-war period 
(Andriopoulou, Karakitsios, & Tsakloglou, 2017; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014). Second, the 
unemployment rate peaked at 27.5%, and was consistently higher than 20% until 2017, 
with three out of four unemployed persons being long-term unemployed. With the 
exception of Spain, the corresponding figures were substantially lower among European 
countries during the same period, with the EU average peaking at 10.8% in 2013 and 
gradually returning to the pre-crisis levels. Besides unemployment, there are also some 
additional implications of the economic crisis on the labour market. For instance, the 
percentage of individuals living in households with very low work intensity was 7.5% in 
2008, and rose to 17.2% in 2016. Third, the implementation of a strict programme entailed 
heavy conditionality, and rapid and front-loaded fiscal adjustment (Meghir, Pissarides, 
Vayanos, & Vettas, 2017), having significant implications in terms of household 
disposable income and living conditions (European Commission, 2019; OECD, 2014). 
During 2009-2016, for instance, the mean equivalized income decreased by almost 36%. 
Based on a subjective non-monetary indicator, Eurostat data also reveal that the share of 
households making ends meet with great difficulty escalated from 20% to more than 40% 
during the same period. Fourth, several studies show that poverty, inequality and other 
social indicators have dramatically deteriorated in the wake of the crisis, suggesting that 
the social consequences and the distributional effects of the crisis have been strong 
(Kaplanoglou & Rapanos, 2016; Matsaganis & Leventi, 2014). For example, the severe 
material deprivation rate increased from 11.2% to 22.4%, while the percentage of the 
population at risk of poverty or social exclusion went from 28.1% to 35.6% during 2008-
2016. The poverty rate, anchored in the 2008 threshold, also climbed from 18.9% to almost 
48% over the same period. As shown in Table 1.2, inequality measures, such as the Gini 
index and the S80/S20 index, indicate that income inequality rose during the economic 
recession (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2018). Last, the gross value of non-performing 
loans amounted to 106 billion euros in 2017, corresponding to approximately 47% of total 
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loans (OECD, 2018b). In the same spirit, EU-SILC data reveal that the share of households 
in arrears increased from a quarter to almost 48% during 2008-2016.  
1.2. Economic crisis, health system performance and health outcomes 
Being exogenous and unexpected, the breakout of the economic crisis in Europe 
has been characterized as a “health system shock” (Mladovsky et al., 2012). Understanding 
how such a shock influences health status and health system performance is a complex 
exercise, since it induces various changes in government resources and households’ 
behaviour and financial situation, resulting in increased pressure on health system 
spending and revenue (Hou, Velényi, Yazbeck, Iunes, & Smith, 2013; Musgrove, 1987; 
Thomson et al., 2015a). Figure 1.1 shows the main transmission mechanisms through 
which an economic downturn influences health outcomes and the health sector in general.2 
On the demand side, an economic crisis, manifested in household disposable income 
decrease and rising unemployment, increases household financial difficulties and strain. 
Household financial distress is in turn expected to increase psychosocial stress and 
influence health behaviours, such as nutritional habits, and alcohol and tobacco 
consumption (Brinkman, De Pee, Sanogo, Subran, & Bloem, 2010; Nandi, Charters, 
Strumpf, Heymann, & Harper, 2013). In addition, household financial distress may erode 
insurance coverage, increase unmet medical needs and lead to lower levels of health care 
utilization (H. Waters, Saadah, & Pradhan, 2003a). Demand for health care may also shift 
from private providers to public services (World Health Organization, 2009; Yang, 
Prescott, & Bae, 2001). On the supply side, an economic crisis results in lack of fiscal 
space, with the fiscal contraction having implications for the public financing of the health 
system (Karanikolos et al., 2013; Morgan & Astolfi, 2015). In this spirit, the reduced 
public resources and the diminishing capacity of the public sector may reduce the 
availability of services, restrict access to health care and compromise the quality of care 
(Cylus, Mladovsky, & McKee, 2012; A. E. Kentikelenis, 2017; Nolan, Barry, Burke, & 
Thomas, 2014).   
 
 
	2 This framework relies on previous work (Hou et al., 2013; Musgrove, 1987; H. Waters et al., 2003a). Given 
the complexity of this link and the multiple pathways, Figure 1.1 is by no means exhaustive but it presents 
the main and most policy-relevant mechanisms. In addition, the presence of these reactions and mechanisms 
generally varies in terms of timing; some are evident in the short run, while others are particularly relevant in 
a longer-term horizon. 
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Figure 1. 1: Explaining the effects of the economic crisis on the health sector and health 
status 
 
Source: Adapted from Musgrove (1987); Waters et al. (2003); Hou et al. (2013) 
 
Despite its theoretical interest, the framework presented in Figure 1.1 does not fully 
capture all potential pathways, since government policy responses and household financial 
situation are often interlinked. In particular, fiscal space and public policy priorities largely 
determine the degree to which economic turmoil affects public expenditure on health and 
social care, whereas social spending and policy influence a recession’s impact on the 
household financial situation (Hou et al., 2013; Thomson et al., 2014). Figure 1.2 presents 
a complementary framework for the factors that aggravate fiscal pressure in health systems 
during periods of recession. In this context, both public budget cuts and worsened 
household financial situation tend to generate additional financial pressure on the health 
system, threatening its sustainability (OECD, 2015). As Figure 1.2 shows, factors other 
than fiscal constraints and policy may also exacerbate the fiscal burden in health systems. 
In particular, financially distressed households may shift to public providers during 
economic recessions for various reasons, increasing the health system’s fiscal pressure 
from the expenditure and demand perspective (H. Waters et al., 2003a; Yang et al., 2001). 
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There are some potential mechanisms that explain the demand-oriented pressure. First, 
population health status may deteriorate during economic recessions, suggesting increased 
needs and demand for health care (Kondilis, Giannakopoulos, et al., 2013; Modrek, 
Stuckler, McKee, Cullen, & Basu, 2013). Second, some household members may abolish 
the employment-related entitlement to health coverage or be unable to afford the insurance 
contributions, having access only to some specific services of the public sector 
(Economou, Kaitelidou, Karanikolos, & Maresso, 2017; van Gool & Pearson, 2014). 
Third, there is a direct “affordability effect”, with households being less likely to spend for 
privately provided services due to reduced household income and purchasing power (H. 
Waters et al., 2003a; Yang et al., 2001). Fourth, an increasing share of households may be 
eligible for means-tested health coverage for the health services provided by the public 
sector through the use of social protection mechanisms. Last, some patients may also face 
unmet needs, compromise their adherence to treatment and prevention, and delay health 
care utilization, with potential implications on future hospitalizations, health outcomes and 
costs (A. Reeves, McKee, & Stuckler, 2015; World Health Organization, 2003). 
 
Figure 1. 2: Fiscal pressure in health systems during an economic crisis 
 
Source: Adapted from Thomson et al. (2015)  
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The aforementioned suggest that fiscal adjustment and pressure within the health 
system may influence some elements of health system performance beyond health 
outcomes, such as access to health services, quality of care, efficiency, financial protection 
and equity in financing (A. E. Kentikelenis, 2017; Mitropoulos, 2019; OECD, 2010; 
Peabody, 1996; Thomson et al., 2015a). However, the effects of recession on the health 
sector are generally contingent on various factors, such as the country context, the extent 
and severity of the recession, the existence of strong welfare state and social protection 
mechanisms and the relevant health policy responses (Kaplan, 2012; Suhrcke & Stuckler, 
2012; Toffolutti & Suhrcke, 2014). 
Evidence from European countries suggests that health policy responses to the 
recent crisis were quite heterogeneous, reflecting not only the variation in the extent of the 
economic decline but also the different public policy priorities across countries 
(Karanikolos et al., 2013; Maresso et al., 2014). Generally speaking, the policy responses 
can be classified into three broad categories (Thomson et al., 2015b). The first health 
policy domain focused on public financing of the health system. In particular, almost half 
of the European countries introduced measures regarding public resources devoted to the 
health sector during the crisis, with many of them following retrenchment policies in 
health care due to fiscal constraints and the implementation of adjustment programmes 
(Aaron Reeves, McKee, Basu, & Stuckler, 2014). Evidence, however, suggests that some 
countries were more resilient and protected, to some extent, their public budget for health, 
possibly due to higher fiscal space and the implementation of countercyclical policies 
(Karanikolos et al., 2013; Morgan & Astolfi, 2014). A relatively smaller number of 
countries confronted the inefficiencies and waste in public spending or raised additional 
resources for the health sector (Stuckler, Reeves, Loopstra, Karanikolos, & McKee, 2017). 
Second, most countries adopted changes to the core dimensions of health coverage, as the 
economic crisis unfolded. The majority of the coverage modifications concentrated on cost 
sharing strategies and the scope of coverage, with some European countries expanding 
health coverage and others aiming to restrict it due to the fiscal constraints (van Gool & 
Pearson, 2014). On the other hand, only a few countries implemented measures affecting 
population entitlement to health care. The third set of policy responses included changes 
and reforms in health planning, purchasing and delivery, with a handful of countries 
focusing on the reduction of administrative costs and organizational restructuring 
(Mladovsky, Thomson, & Anna Maresso, 2015). On the supply side, the policy responses 
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concentrated on cuts in hospital funding and health professionals’ payments, and price 
reductions for pharmaceuticals and medical technology (Carone, Schwierz, & Xavier, 
2012; Correia, Dussault, & Pontes, 2015; Stuckler et al., 2017). A relatively smaller 
number of countries adopted long-term, complex and efficiency-enhancing policies, such 
as hospital sector restructuring, reduction of unnecessary inpatient admissions, changes in 
the doctor reimbursement system, and greater emphasis on public health and prevention 
strategies (Clemens et al., 2014; Mladovsky et al., 2015) 
1.3. Policy responses and implications of the Greek crisis 
1.3.1. Health policy responses: a brief overview 
Over the past decades, and long before the breakout of the crisis, the Greek health 
system has been generally characterized by numerous chronic distortions, which have 
mitigated its dynamics and worsened health system performance. In terms of financing, it 
is a mixed system with high out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE), which leads to high 
regressivity, unmet needs and inequity in access (Economou & Giorno, 2009). In 
particular, Greece’s OOPE is significantly larger than that of its EU and OECD 
counterparts; it historically and consistently exceeds 30% of total health expenditure, 
whereas the EU average is only 15% (OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems 
and Policies, 2017). Historically, coverage has been fragmented, resulting in further 
inequity. Delivery of health care has also suffered from several deficiencies, such as poor 
allocation of human resources, lack of incentives for health care providers, limited 
emphasis on prevention and public health, inefficient hospitals, and heavy reliance on 
expensive medical technology (C. Economou, 2010; Mossialos, Allin, & Davaki, 2005). 
Further, the Greek health system is highly centralized and exhibits poor allocation of 
resources, which does not rely on performance-based indicators and equity considerations 
(Davaki & Mossialos, 2005).  
Given that the dysfunctions and deficiencies of the health and welfare system were, 
to some extent, responsible for the poor fiscal performance in Greece (Matsaganis, 2011; 
Petmesidou, Pavolini, & Guillén, 2014), health system reforms were inevitably among the 
main priorities in the public policy agenda during the crisis (OECD, 2014; Pagoulatos, 
2018). With this in mind, there are at least four aspects that should be considered when 
analysing the measures and policy responses adopted during the economic downturn in 
Greece (Economou, Kaitelidou, Kentikelenis, Maresso, & Sissouras, 2015; WHO Regional 
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Office for Europe, 2019). First, the deep structural and operational problems of the health 
and social protection system have diminished its resilience, ability and preparedness to 
absorb and cope with external shocks, such as an economic crisis (OECD, 2014). Second, 
Greece adopted a series of important and necessary structural reforms, aiming to deal with 
the chronic health system challenges and shortcomings. Third, some of these changes, 
proposed and specified in the EAP (Economou et al., 2017; Fahy, 2012), led to significant 
fiscal retrenchment within the health system. Last, Greece implemented a large set of 
reforms and changes in a short period under the pressure of the recession and the limited 
fiscal space. Table 1.3 summarizes the main policy measures implemented during the 
economic crisis in Greece, the most important of which are further analysed in this section.  
 
Table 1. 3: Summary of the main health policy measures during the Greek crisis 
Policy area Year (s) Policy/reform 
Health 
financing 
 
2010 Cap of 6% of GDP in public spending for health, leading to 
significant budget cuts  
2011-2015 -Increased co-insurance rates for pharmaceuticals  
-User changes for inpatient and outpatient care (later revoked) 
Health 
insurance 
 
2011 Merger of insurance funds, introduction of the single insurer 
(EOPYY), and standardization of the benefits package 
2014-2016 Measures for ensuring health insurance coverage for the 
uninsured population 
Health care 
management 
and provision  
 
2010-2012 Changes in accounting procedures and methods in hospitals 
2011- Restructuring of the hospital sector 
2013 Changes in the reimbursement system from a per diem basis to a 
prospective payment method (based on DRGs) 
2014 Restructuring of primary care and establishment of the National 
Primary Health Care Network (PEDY) 
2015- -Further reorganization of the primary care structure, with 
greater emphasis on gatekeeping,  
-Introduction of local health units with health professionals 
from various disciplines 
Pharmaceuticals 2010- -Cap on public spending, and introduction of clawback and 
rebate for pharmaceuticals 
-Introduction of an electronic prescribing system to control 
prescribing behaviour and costs 
-Reintroduction of updated positive/negative reimbursement 
lists for pharmaceuticals 
-Changes in pricing and reimbursement process and price 
reductions 
-Generic substitution mandate and measure to promote generic 
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penetration 
-Decreased profit margins for pharmacists and wholesalers 
Source: Adapted from Economou et al. (2017) 
 
The first set of policy responses to the crisis focused on public financing of the 
health system, with the public spending on health being capped at 6% of GDP. 
Approximately 61% of the total health expenditure in 2017, public expenditure fell by 
more than 40% over the period 2010-2017. As Table 1.4 shows, it has been well below the 
cap of 6% of GDP since 2011, corresponding to only 4.9% of GDP in 2017. Public 
spending for health, as a share of GDP, is thus among the lowest in Europe (OECD & 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2017). The public budget reduction 
mainly emanated from major cuts in hospital and pharmaceutical spending. For example, 
public spending for hospital care decreased by more than 40% during 2010-2017, through 
a series of cost-containment measures in medical supplies and equipment, hospital 
medicines, and the health workforce (Xenos et al., 2017). Having peaked at 5.1 billion 
euros in 2009, public pharmaceutical expenditure dropped by almost 62% over the period 
of the economic turmoil and fell to less than 2 billion euros after 2015, partly due to the 
introduction of rebate and clawback (Greek Foundation for Economic and Industrial 
Research, 2018; Vandoros & Stargardt, 2013).  
 
Table 1. 4: Public expenditure on health in Greece (2008-2017) 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Health 
expenditure 
(in million 
euros) 
22,707  22,491  21,609  18,836  16,985  15,201  14,203  14,340  14,616  14,492  
Health 
expenditure 
(% GDP) 
9.4  9.5  9.6  9.1  8.9  8.4  8.0  8.1  8.3  8.0  
Public 
expenditure 
(in million 
euros) 
13,248  15,412  14,921  12,425  11,287  9,446  8,267  8,312  8,924  8,816  
Public 
expenditure 
(% GDP) 
5.5  6.5  6.6  6.0  5.9  5.2  4.6  4.7  5.1  4.9  
Public 
expenditure 
(% THE) 
58.3  68.5  69.1  66.0  66.5  62.1  58.2  58.0  61.1  60.8  
Curative 
and 
N/A 9,013  8,659  6,644  6,630  5,789  4,964  4,825  5,362  5,308  
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rehabilitati
ve care3 (in 
million 
euros) 
Inpatient N/A 7,254  6,858  5,013  5,289  4,215  3,784  3,665  4,019  3,962  
Outpatient N/A 1,608  1,658  1,478  1,288  1,518  1,066  1,064  1,214  1,209  
Long-term 
care 
N/A 86  116  67  156  125  83  177  163  221  
Anciliary 
services (in 
million 
euros) 
N/A 520  473  491  299  422  414  464  273  270  
Medical 
products 
(in million 
euros) 
N/A 5,159  5,116  4,685  3,690  2,612  2,212  2,408  2,689  2,580  
Preventive 
care (in 
million 
euros) 
N/A 274  271  218  176  168  211  169  167  160  
Governanc
e and 
health 
system and 
financing 
administrat
ion (in 
million 
euros) 
N/A 360  285  321  336  330  383  269  269  277  
Source: OECD, Greek Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research 
 
Second, economic recession and the relevant policy measures brought significant 
changes in health coverage. The rising unemployment rate had a devastating effect on the 
breadth of coverage, with the uninsured population rapidly increasing to approximately 
2.0-2.5 million in Greece (European Commission, 2015a; Greek Ministry of Health, 2016). 
Despite the standardization of the benefits introduced with the establishment of the 
EOPYY, there was a decrease in the range of services covered by the benefit package, 
affecting the scope of health coverage (Economou, Kaitelidou, Kentikelenis, Sissouras, & 
Maresso, 2014; WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2019). In order to generate additional 
revenue and reduce demand for unnecessary care, the government also enacted several 
changes in cost sharing, with subsequent implications on the depth of coverage. These 
changes primarily focused on outpatient prescription drugs and diagnostic tests (Economou 
et al., 2014; Thomson et al., 2014) and, along with the internal reference pricing for 	3  According to the OECD definitions, the expenditure on curative and rehabilitative care is further 
disaggregated into the following types of expenditure: inpatient care, day care, outpatient care, and home-
based care. In this Table, we only include inpatient and outpatient care, which correspond to the bulk of the 
spending for curative and rehabilitative care. 
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medicines, shifted the health costs to patients4 (Kentikelenis, Karanikolos, Reeves, McKee, 
& Stuckler, 2014; World Health Organization, 2018). Furthermore, the government 
introduced user charges for inpatient admission in the public sector, and increased the 
corresponding fees for outpatient care. However, these changes were later revoked due to 
increasing concerns about their implications for equity in access to health services.  
Third, there were several changes and reforms in health planning, purchasing and 
delivery, with the introduction of a mix of efficiency-enhancing and cost-control measures. 
A major structural reform stipulated the reorganization of the fragmented social health 
insurance system in 2011, with the establishment of the National Organization for the 
Provision of Health Services (EOPYY). In doing this, the government merged the social 
health insurance funds and established a single purchaser, aiming to gradually equalize 
benefits and contributions, enhance bargaining power and provide coverage to the whole 
population (European Commission, 2018). As shown in Table 1.3, another health system 
reform, legislated in 2014, focused on restructuring the primary care system, with the 
establishment of a primary health care network (PEDY) consisting of health centres, 
outpatient services of the insurance funds and contracted physicians. Primary care was 
further reorganized and defined as the first point of contact with the health system in 2017, 
following the establishment of local health units staffed by a multidisciplinary health 
workforce (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2019). Several reforms also focused on 
procurement and the efficiency of inpatient care, including hospital sector restructuring, 
changes in operational, managerial and accounting procedures, improvement of the 
procurement process for health supplies and technologies, and adoption of a prospective 
hospital reimbursement method based on DRGs (Kastanioti, Kontodimopoulos, 
Stasinopoulos, Kapetaneas, & Polyzos, 2013; Polyzos, Karanikas, Thireos, Kastanioti, & 
Kontodimopoulos, 2013). Last, the Greek authorities adopted various measures aiming to 
control pharmaceutical expenditure and consumption, the most important of which 
concentrated on pricing and reimbursement, generic substitution and promotion, rebates 
and clawback (Vandoros & Stargardt, 2013; Yfantopoulos & Chantzaras, 2018).  	4  The authorities introduced a coinsurance rate of 10% for some medicines that were previously fully 
reimbursed (e.g. for type 2 diabetes, Alzheimer, dementia, epilepsy). The coinsurance rate also rose from 
10% to 25% in various diseases, including coronary heart disease, hyperlipidemia, osteoporosis, arthritis, 
cirrhosis and COPD (Economou et al., 2014). In addition, patients may also need to bear the cost between the 
retail and the reimbursed price of medicines, due to the introduction of an internal reference pricing system 
(Greek Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research, 2018).  	
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1.3.2. Implications for health status and health system performance 
Against this background, a strand of the literature has examined the trends in some 
selected health outcomes and indicators during the crisis. Generally speaking, the potential 
consequences of an economic crisis on population health are lagged; it takes time for the 
impact to be completely revealed. Based on aggregate data, evidence suggests that all-
cause mortality continued to decrease following the Greek crisis, but the rate of decline 
was significantly lower (Laliotis, Ioannidis, & Stavropoulou, 2016). Moreover, self-rated 
health trends have also deteriorated during the period of recession (Kentikelenis et al., 
2011; Vandoros, Hessel, Leone, & Avendano, 2013). 
Apart from population health, some other dimensions of health system performance 
might have been affected by the prolonged recession. First, access to health care has been 
significantly compromised in Greece, with the percentage of the population reporting 
unmet health needs and barriers to accessing health services or pharmaceutical care being 
significantly higher during the crisis (Economou, 2015; Filippidis, Gerovasili, Millett, & 
Tountas, 2017; Tsiantou, Zavras, et al., 2014). For example, Eurostat data shows that the 
share of the population reporting unmet needs increased from 4.0% to 12.0% during 2008-
2016 (Eurostat, 2018d), while the lower socioeconomic groups have been more severely 
affected (Kentikelenis et al., 2014; I.-I. Kyriopoulos et al., 2014). Apart from households’ 
financial difficulties, the unfavourable trends in access to care can be attributed to the 
reduced capacity of the public system, which should cover the increasing health needs with 
reduced financial and human resources (Economou, 2015; Kentikelenis & Papanicolas, 
2012). Second, there are signs of erosion in financial protection mainly due to the 
introduction of user charges, coupled with the traditionally low and inequitable financing 
of the public health system (Chantzaras & Yfantopoulos, 2018). For instance, the effective 
co-payment rate for prescription medicines has been, on average, somewhat higher than 
20% during the crisis (Gouvalas, Igoumenidis, Theodorou, & Athanasakis, 2016; Kanavos 
& Souliotis, 2017), while recent estimates show that it rose from 9% to 30% over the 
period 2009-2016 (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2019). Third, the relevant policy 
responses may have a positive impact on the efficiency and productivity of public 
hospitals, mainly for those of large and medium capacity (Mitropoulos, Mitropoulos, 
Karanikas, & Polyzos, 2018; Xenos et al., 2017). However, it appears that there are 
significant grounds for improvement since less than a third of Greek hospitals are 
considered as efficient (Kaitelidou et al., 2012), whereas mergers and further restructuring 
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could generate additional efficiency gains (Flokou, Aletras, & Niakas, 2017). Fourth, 
despite the Greek authorities’ adoption of various measures, such as the introduction of 
clinical protocols and the establishment of an organization for quality assurance, there are 
increasing concerns regarding the potential consequences of the crisis for the quality of 
health services (Keramidou & Triantafyllopoulos, 2018). The combination of extensive 
budgetary cuts, higher needs for medical care and the increasing number of admissions 
may have overwhelmed the health system5, resulting in a deterioration in the quality of 
care (Kaitelidou & Kouli, 2012). In addition, a body of evidence suggests that shortages of 
health workers, medical equipment, consumables and pharmaceuticals may have also 
worsened the quality of services (Economou et al., 2014; Karamanoli, 2015; Karidis, 
Dimitroulis, & Kouraklis, 2011; Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). Last, the adverse 
implications of the economic decline on the Greek health system and services are also 
manifested in the changes in amenable mortality. Contrary to the trends in most European 
countries, amenable mortality increased in Greece during the recession, reflecting a 
potential deterioration in the health system’s ability to avoid deaths through the provision 
of effective and timely health services (Karanikolos, Mackenbach, Nolte, Stuckler, & 
McKee, 2018) 
 
1.4. Focus and structure of the thesis 
This thesis comprises of three studies on the impact of the Greek economic crisis 
on the health sector, and its main focus is presented in Figure 1.3. These studies employ 
empirical analysis to generate evidence and provide answers to policy-relevant topics, with 
a particular focus on the responses to and implications of the crisis across different 
socioeconomic groups.  
Chapters 2 and 3 concentrate on out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE), which has 
traditionally been a major financing source for the Greek health system (Economou et al., 
2017; Thomson, Foubister, & Mossialos, 2009). Apart from the high reliance on OOPE 
over the past decades, the Greek authorities implemented various policy responses related 
	5 Several studies have reported evidence of an increase in the number of admissions in Greece (Economou et 
al., 2015; Ifanti, Argyriou, Kalofonou, & Kalofonos, 2013; Kaitelidou & Kouli, 2012; Kentikelenis et al., 
2011; Kentikelenis & Papanicolas, 2012; Kounetas & Papathanassopoulos, 2013). The reduced spending for 
inpatient care could be attributed to a “pricing effect”, as there has been a decrease of wages of health 
workforce, as well as the significant reduction in the unit prices of medical supplies and of the medicines 
used during hospitalizations.  
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to health financing, which further stimulate interest in the study of private health financing 
in Greece.  
In light of these remarks, Chapter 2 examines how household spending behaviour 
towards health care has changed across different household types and socioeconomic 
groups in the face of an economic shock and the relevant health policy responses. Using 
data from the Household Budget Surveys (HBS) and various regression techniques, this 
study identifies the determinants of household health expenditure (HHE) and explores 
potential changes in consumer behaviour and the income elasticity of HHE following a 
severe economic crisis and the introduction of a large-scale EAP. In particular, it examines 
the following hypotheses:  
In periods of economic downturn, households often reduce HHE and shift towards 
public services because of their lower ability to pay out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE) (H. 
Waters et al., 2003a; Yang et al., 2001). In Greece, this is depicted by the significant 
increase in hospital admissions, outpatient visits, and laboratory tests in public health 
services after the introduction of the EAP (Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine, 
2016; Kentikelenis & Papanicolas, 2012). Moreover, households may decide to reduce 
non-essential health care expenses in response to economic distress (Yang et al., 2001) and 
private health care payments might become less “necessary” given the alternative of using 
public services in a period of severe financial hardship. On that basis, we formulate the 
first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: HHE became more sensitive to income changes (income elastic) in the post-
EAP period. 
The composition of HHE may differ across households of different socioeconomic 
status (SES). For instance, the HHE of less-privileged households primarily comprises 
OOPE for pharmaceuticals, while they tend to incur lower expenses at hospitals, as 
outpatients, and for dental care. In this context, a different mix of health care goods and 
services might result in heterogeneous consumption changes in response to altering income 
since expenses for some types of health care (e.g. cost-sharing for medicines) are more 
essential and cannot be easily avoided or postponed. Hence, the second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Health care consumption responses to income changes (different income 
elasticities) differ across household types. 
As mentioned above, households have the option to shift to public services and 
avoid OOPE for some types of health care. Moreover, they may reduce OOPE for non-
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essential goods and services because of financial constraints. However, there is no 
substitute for user charges, which constitute a prerequisite for gaining access to some types 
of health care. For instance, cost-sharing schemes in pharmaceutical care imply that 
individuals should pay user charges to receive and adhere to their therapy. In this context, 
one could expect that those households whose HHE primarily consists of payments for 
user charges would not become more sensitive to income changes after the introduction of 
the EAP because their HHE is relatively rigid, consists of payments for essential goods and 
services, and cannot be substituted by shifting towards public services. We thus develop 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Contrary to privileged households, vulnerable households did not become 
more sensitive to income changes in the post-EAP period. 
Our last hypothesis largely relies on the notion of permanent income. In particular, 
several formal and informal mechanisms for borrowing, saving, and selling assets allow 
households to smooth their consumption over time (Damme, Leemput, Por, Hardeman, & 
Meessen, 2004). In this context, consumption responses to current income changes may be 
more modest, since one could expect that consumers will alter their behaviour and respond 
strongly to more permanent income changes (Hall & Mishkin, 1982). We thus test such a 
hypothesis for the case of HHE: 
Hypothesis 4: HHE responses to permanent income changes are greater than those arising 
from current income changes (i.e., permanent income elasticity is higher than current 
income elasticity). 
Chapter 3 focuses on the heavy users of health services with high need and costs 
for medical care, who have also faced a greater health and financial burden during the 
crisis. In particular, this study investigates the extent to which financial catastrophe due to 
OOPE has changed among the older households during the Greek economic crisis, thus 
studying the implications in terms of financial protection.6 Apart from estimates for the 
whole sample of older population, this study further examines the respective changes in 
financial protection across different household types, aiming to identify potential 
socioeconomic differentials and inequalities in the risk of financial catastrophe due to 
OOPE during the crisis. The relevant hypotheses we examine are formed as follows: 
	6 It is a core element of health system performance assessment and a major consideration for household 
welfare that may have been significantly influenced over the period of the crisis, especially for households 
with older members. 
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The recent health policy responses to the Greek crisis may have significant impact 
on the scope, breadth and depth of health coverage. First, the benefits package became less 
comprehensive, having potential implications for the scope of coverage (Economou et al., 
2014). Second, given that entitlement to health insurance is contingent on employment 
status, the uninsured population rapidly increased due to rising unemployment rate during 
the recession (European Commission, 2015a; Greek Ministry of Health, 2016). Third, user 
charges substantially increased, especially for outpatient prescription drugs and diagnostic 
tests (Kanavos & Souliotis, 2017; Thomson et al., 2014). However, whether the incidence 
of household financial catastrophe due to health payments increases during periods of 
economic hardship cannot be easily answered a priori (Palladino, Lee, Hone, Filippidis, & 
Millett, 2016). Some studies, for example, show that households tend to curtail OOPE and 
shift towards public services or do not even seek health care during economic recessions 
resulting in lower reliance on OOP payments (H. Waters et al., 2003a; Yang et al., 2001). 
On the other hand, policy responses to the crisis have been expected to decrease disposable 
income and have presumably eroded health coverage, resulting in weakened financial 
protection mechanisms and potentially higher incidence of catastrophic health payments 
(Stuckler et al., 2017). The concerns about the risk of CHE and financial protection during 
recessions are more pronounced for the older people who tend to have greater needs for 
health care, encounter greater financial strain, struggle to cope with the negative financial 
changes and are also more prone to health shocks and the adverse impact of recession 7 
(Bloom et al., 2015; Hwang, Weller, Ireys, & Anderson, 2001; Quintal & Lopes, 2016). 
On that basis, we formulate the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Financial protection has eroded among older households during the 
economic crisis. 
Despite the increased financial hardship, worse-off households should still pay out-
of-pocket for some types of health care due to the erosion of the depth of insurance 
coverage during the recession, especially in pharmaceutical care (Gouvalas et al., 2016; 
Siskou et al., 2014). Additionally poorer have worse health status and greater needs for 	7 There are various reasons that explain the increasing concern for older people. First, older people tend to 
suffer from multiple conditions, and have greater needs for and utilization of health services but fewer 
resources to cover them (Goldman & Zissimopoulos, 2003; Jayawardana et al., 2019; Lehnert et al., 2011). 
Second, they encounter greater financial strain and struggle to cope with the negative changes in their 
financial situation (Bierman, 2014; Fenge et al., 2012; Lyberaki & Tinios, 2018). Both these factors are 
expected to result in a further reduction in households’ ability to pay for medical care. Last, older people are 
more prone to health shocks and more vulnerable to the adverse effects of recession (Cutler et al., 2002; 
Laliotis et al., 2016). 
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health care (Marmot, 2005), and these gaps in depth of coverage would thus leave them 
exposed to the financial consequences of ill health. Having higher ability to pay, better-off 
households are expected to better cope with the gaps in depth of coverage, as those costs 
are only a modest proportion of their health payments. We thus test the following 
hypothesis for older households in Greece: 
Hypothesis 2: The erosion of financial protection was relatively more detrimental for the 
poorer households.   
Several reforms in cost-sharing policy were implemented during the Greek 
recession, with the user charges for medicines being at the core of these changes 
(Economou et al., 2014; Kanavos & Souliotis, 2017). Apart from the increase in co-
insurance rates for several therapeutic areas, older patients may also bear the additional 
financial burden of the difference between the retail and the reimbursed price of outpatient 
medicines, due to the introduction of an internal reference pricing system. In contrast to 
medicines –for which paying user charges is a prerequisite for gaining access- patients can 
shift to public services due to affordability reasons and avoid excessive health payments 
for inpatient and outpatient care. In this context, the changes in cost-sharing policy are 
expected to influence the extent to which household pharmaceutical payments contribute to 
CHE after the onset of the crisis. Hence, the second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The contribution of household pharmaceutical expenditure to the overall 
catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) increased after the onset of the economic crisis 
 
Figure 1. 3: Overview of the studies 
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As shown in Figure 1.3 above, Chapter 4 focuses on newborn health and fertility 
responses during the economic crisis. Apart from health measures themselves, newborn 
health indicators are also linked with future health, cognitive and socioeconomic outcomes 
(Almond, Chay, & Lee, 2005; S. E. Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2007; Gluckman, 
Hanson, Cooper, & Thornburg, 2008). Their study is thus interesting from both public 
health and socioeconomic perspectives, especially in the context of an economic crisis. 
Moreover, examining differential fertility responses during the crisis is particularly 
important, since business cycle volatility might influence fertility decision differently 
across population groups, having potential implications on the cohort composition of 
women who become pregnant.  
Taking these points into consideration, Chapter 4 employs data from a large 
administrative dataset and has a twofold objective. It first studies how economic climate 
influences fertility decisions and responses across different population groups. Moreover, 
it concentrates on the potential link between economic conditions during pregnancy and 
newborn health across different socioeconomic groups, testing whether inequalities in 
newborn health have widened during the economic crisis. In doing so, it examines the 
following hypotheses:  
During economic recessions, the prevalence of depression and psychosocial stress 
tends to increase (Economou, Madianos, Peppou, Patelakis, & Stefanis, 2013; Frasquilho 
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et al., 2016; Hamilton, Broman, Hoffman, & Renner, 1990), with both of them being risk 
factors for adverse perinatal outcomes (Grote et al., 2010). Additionally, household 
financial distress is expected to change the quantity and quality of maternal nutrition and to 
impede access to nutritious food, resulting in food insecurity during pregnancy (Brinkman 
et al., 2010; Studdert, Frongillo, & Valois, 2001). Increased level of maternal stress and 
poor maternal nutrition during pregnancy may adversely affect gestational length, and 
intrauterine growth respectively (Bernabé et al., 2004; Hedegaard, Brink Henriksen, & 
Jørgen Secher, 1996), both of which are, in turn, expected to influence birth outcomes 
(M.S. Kramer, 1987). On this basis, we formulate our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Birth outcomes are sensitive to business cycle fluctuations during 
pregnancy, and the relationship varies depending on the stage of gestation.  
During economic recessions, low-SES households are more likely to compromise 
food quality and quantity, as they are more likely to experience severe financial hardship 
(Bonaccio et al., 2017; Brinkman et al., 2010). This might not apply to the families of 
higher SES, who possess more assets, have access to various coping mechanisms and 
credit and can smooth consumption without resorting to unhealthy dietary changes. 
Additionally, low-SES individuals are more susceptible to stress and mental health 
problems while also facing more limited access to mental health services during economic 
contraction (R. A. Catalano & Bruckner, 2005; Hauksdottir, McClure, Jonsson, Olafsson, 
& Valdimarsdottir, 2013; Wahlbeck & McDaid, 2012; World Health Organization, 2011). 
Considering this range of impacts, we develop the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is heterogeneity in the relationship between prenatal business cycle 
fluctuations and birth outcomes across socioeconomic groups. 
Evidence suggests that fertility declines during periods of economic crisis, while 
economic contraction and uncertainty is generally associated with fertility postponement8 
(Chevalier & Marie, 2017; Sobotka, Skirbekk, & Philipov, 2011). However, economic 
adversity might influence differently the decision to conceive across household types and 
groups. In particular, less-privileged families may have faced credit constraints and 
reduction in their already low income, and may thus be unable to afford the costs of 
childbearing (Schneider & Hastings, 2015). They also have fewer savings and financial 
reserves to confront negative income shocks (Lusardi, Schneider, & Tufano, 2011).  In this 	8 Economic distress leads to two effects that have opposite direction. In particular, it is associated with a 
negative income effect that reduces the demand for children, and a positive substitution effect which shifts 
demand towards the opposite direction. Given that empirical studies show a fertility decline during 
recessions, income effect is generally larger than the substitution effect (Gronau, 1977). 
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context, low-SES mothers may be less likely to conceive during recessions. The 
characteristics of women who conceive during economic recession might be thus different 
compared to those of women who conceive during periods of normality. However, 
evidence on this topic is rather contradictory (Aparicio & González, 2014; R. Dehejia & 
Lleras-Muney, 2004). Given that these relationships are complex, and largely depend on 
the country setting, we examine the following hypothesis in the context of the Greek crisis:  
Hypothesis 3: Economic fluctuations influence the fertility decision differently across 
different population groups.  
Economic distress might be associated with fertility postponement and changes in 
the types or characteristics of women who conceive during periods of economic adversity 
(Chevalier & Marie, 2017; R. Dehejia & Lleras-Muney, 2004). This implies compositional 
characteristics in the type of women who give birth (or selection into pregnancy during an 
economic downturn). Hence, we form our fourth hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: After accounting for compositional changes in the type of women who give 
birth during recessions, an economic crisis affects BW, with the impact being greater for 
children born to low-SES mothers 
Last, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and main contributions of this thesis, 
elaborates on the limitations of each study, and identifies potential areas for further 
research.  
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Chapter 2 
The impact of the Greek economic adjustment on household health 
expenditure 
Abstract 
In late 2009, Greece faced an unprecedented sovereign debt crisis and shortly after signed 
a large-scale economic adjustment programme (EAP) that brought about several changes 
and reforms to the Greek health care system. As a result, households experienced the 
“triple hit” of decreased availability and capacity of the public health system, increased 
user charges, and lower ability to pay for health care. This study examines how households 
behaved in the face of such an economic shock and the aforementioned “triple hit”. It also 
focuses on how household payments for health care responded to income changes before 
and after the introduction of the EAP. By using data from the Greek Household Budget 
Surveys over 2008–2015, we employ a modified two-part model to identify the 
determinants of household health expenditure (HHE) and estimate the corresponding 
income elasticities before and after the introduction of the EAP. Our analysis shows that 
the income elasticity of HHE is consistently below unity and exhibits a statistically 
significant increase after the introduction of the EAP. Thus, households appear to exhibit 
greater consumption responses to changes in their income during the post-EAP period. In 
addition, we report heterogeneity in income elasticity across household types and over the 
HHE distribution. Lastly, our analysis suggests that the magnitude of income elasticity is 
sensitive to the household welfare indicator used. In other words, we show that HHE 
responses to permanent income changes are greater than the ones arising from current 
income shocks. Our findings can inform policymakers about household health care 
behaviour and provide useful evidence for health financing and the design of social safety 
nets. 
 
Keywords: household health expenditure, out-of-pocket payments, economic adjustment, 
austerity, income elasticity, consumer behaviour, Greece 
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2.1. Introduction 
After notable growth in the 2000s, the Greek economy faced an unprecedented 
sovereign debt crisis in late 2009. In particular, the budget deficit for 2009 was 
significantly larger than that initially stated (reaching approximately 15% of GDP), and 
this adverse announcement along with the country’s high debt-to-GDP ratio and moderate 
growth prospects triggered concerns about the solvency of the Greek economy, with 
several agencies subsequently downgrading Greece’s credit rating9 (Ardagna & Caselli, 
2012). In this context, Greece was at the epicentre of an economic crisis that tested the 
limits and threatened the stability of the Eurozone (De Grauwe, 2010). The government at 
the time eventually requested a bailout package and pledged to implement a large-scale 
economic adjustment programme (EAP) in early 2010 with the technical assistance of the 
EU, the IMF, and the ECB. To address the chronic weaknesses of the Greek economy, this 
EAP imposed strict fiscal consolidation, external rebalancing, and large-scale structural 
reforms across sectors (Thomadakis, 2015). During 2008–2015, GDP shrank by more than 
25%, the unemployment rate increased from 7.8% to 24.9%, and residential property 
values decreased by more than a third (Meghir et al., 2017). At the same time, the 
fragmented social protection system failed to absorb the consequences of the deep crisis, 
and social indicators and living conditions dramatically deteriorated (Matsaganis, 2012; 
OECD, 2014). The share of the population severely materially deprived escalated from 
11.2% to 22.2% during 2008–2015, while the share of the population having unmet 
medical needs for financial reasons increased from 4.2% to 10.9% over the same period. 
The Greek crisis has several distinctive features. First, it is characterized by an 
unprecedented length and intensity, even compared with the Great Depression in the 
United States. Indeed, it was the deepest and most severe economic downturn across 
OECD countries in the postwar period (Andriopoulou et al., 2017) and among the worst in 
modern history. Second, the EAP required an extreme fiscal adjustment to move towards a 
primary budget surplus. This adjustment has been thus characterized “as everything but 
painless” (Meghir et al., 2017). Third, although several countries have managed to 
	9 In December 2009, a major agency lowered the credit rating from A- to BBB+. It is noteworthy that this 
was the first time that Greece did not have an A rating since 1999. Following this development, several other 
agencies also downgraded Greece’s credit rating (overall, agencies downgraded Greek bonds 19 times during 
October 2009-July 2011) (Ardagna & Caselli, 2012). Such events increased the cost of borrowing, and 
therefore access to private financing was practically impossible. 	
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gradually overcome the post-2009 economic crisis, the Greek economy is still struggling to 
successfully disengage from the EAP. 
Being a crucial field for public policy, health care was among the top priorities in 
the agenda of the EAP, not only from a fiscal savings perspective, but also in terms of 
promoting structural reforms within the health system (OECD, 2014). In this context, the 
EAP included two major measures directly related to health financing. First, it imposed 
significant cuts in health expenditure as a fiscal consolidation measure. In particular, 
public health spending was capped at 6% of GDP.10 In other words, the public sector was 
forced to address increasing health needs with reduced financial resources, possibly 
leading supply to be inadequate to respond to households’ health care needs (Mladovsky et 
al., 2012). Second, user charges increased during the post-EAP period, especially for 
pharmaceuticals (Economou et al., 2014; Gouvalas et al., 2016; Thomson et al., 2014). 
Hence, households experienced a “double hit” of the decreased availability and capacity of 
the public health system and higher user charges. In addition, a third hardship for Greek 
households was associated with the reduced disposable income (due to salary cuts and tax 
increases) and increase in unemployment, which in turn resulted in lower household 
purchasing power and ability to pay for health care. In broader terms, an economic crisis is 
generally associated with insecurity about the future, as households worry about the 
growing debt and loss of wealth, and thus change their perceptions of their employment 
and income prospects (Petev & Pistaferri, 2012). 
Taking the aforementioned into account, an important, but rather understudied, 
question relates to how households’ health care consumption changes in the face of an 
economic shock and the aforementioned “triple hit” (i.e. cuts in public health expenditure, 
increase in user charges, decrease in disposable income). Although several studies have 
examined household behaviour towards the consumption of health care and the 
responsiveness of household health expenditure (HHE) to income changes (Chaze, 2005; 
Getzen, 2000; Zare et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2011), there is scant evidence on how HHE 
responds to income changes before and after large-scale economic adjustment and shocks. 
To our knowledge, the only two relevant studies of this topic focus on countries hit by the 
1997 East Asian crisis. By using household data from Thailand, Okunade et al. (2010) 
found that household consumption of health care became more responsive to income 	10 The fiscal pressure associated with the EAP has four implications regarding public providers: (a) decrease 
of human and material resources, (b) increased barriers to access to public health services, due to restricted 
availability, (c) lower quality of care and of hospital stay, and (d) lower levels of patient satisfaction 
(Rodrigues et al., 2013; Sissouras, 2014). 
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changes (i.e. higher income elasticity11) after the beginning of the 1997 crisis. Yang et al. 
(2001) reported similar findings for Korea, although their methodology was based on 
aggregate data and a two-point estimate of income elasticity.  
 
2.2. Hypothesis development 
In periods of economic downturn, households often reduce HHE and shift towards 
public services because of their lower ability to pay out-of-pocket expenditure (OOPE) (H. 
Waters et al., 2003a; Yang et al., 2001). In Greece, this is depicted by the significant 
increase in hospital admissions, outpatient visits, and laboratory tests in public health 
services after the introduction of the EAP (Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine, 
2016; Kentikelenis & Papanicolas, 2012). Moreover, households may decide to reduce 
non-essential health care expenses in response to economic distress (Yang et al., 2001) and 
private health care payments might become less “necessary” given the alternative of using 
public services in a period of severe financial hardship. On that basis, we formulate the 
first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: HHE became more sensitive to income changes (income elastic) in the post-
EAP period. 
The composition of HHE may differ across households of different socioeconomic 
status (SES). For instance, the HHE of less-privileged households primarily comprises 
OOPE for pharmaceuticals, while they tend to incur lower expenses at hospitals, as 
outpatients, and for dental care. In this context, a different mix of health care goods and 
services might result in heterogeneous consumption changes in response to altering income 
since expenses for some types of health care (e.g. cost-sharing for medicines) are more 
essential and cannot be easily avoided or postponed. Hence, the second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Health care consumption responses to income changes (different income 
elasticities) differ across household types. 
	11  Income elasticity of household health expenditure essentially measures how the household health 
expenditure changes as household income changes (i.e. how responsive consumers are to income changes). It 
is given by the ratio between the percentage change in household health expenditure and the percentage 
change in income. If income elasticity is positive (negative), the goods are considered as normal (inferior). In 
general, income elasticity is relatively low for necessities, because individuals will normally purchase them, 
even if they have low income (Mankiw, 2018). In general, income elasticity is regarded as an important 
measure in equity analysis of health expenditures (O’Donnell et al., 2008). 
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As mentioned above, households have the option to shift to public services and 
avoid OOPE for some types of health care. Moreover, they may reduce OOPE for non-
essential goods and services because of financial constraints. However, there is no 
substitute for user charges, which constitute a prerequisite for gaining access to some types 
of health care. For instance, cost-sharing schemes in pharmaceutical care imply that 
individuals should pay user charges to receive and adhere to their therapy. In this context, 
one could expect that those households whose HHE primarily consists of payments for 
user charges would not become more sensitive to income changes after the introduction of 
the EAP because their HHE is relatively rigid, consists of payments for essential goods and 
services, and cannot be substituted by shifting towards public services. We thus develop 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Contrary to privileged households, vulnerable households did not become 
more sensitive to income changes in the post-EAP period. 
Our last hypothesis largely relies on the notion of permanent income. In particular, 
several formal and informal mechanisms for borrowing, saving, and selling assets allow 
households to smooth their consumption over time (Damme et al., 2004). In this context, 
consumption responses to current income changes may be more modest, since one could 
expect that consumers will alter their behaviour and respond strongly to more permanent 
income changes (Hall & Mishkin, 1982). We thus test such a hypothesis for the case of 
HHE: 
Hypothesis 4: HHE responses to permanent income changes are greater than those arising 
from current income changes (i.e. permanent income elasticity is higher than current 
income elasticity). 
 
2.3. The Greek case 
Examining OOPE12 in the Greek health care system is particularly interesting for 
two reasons. First, traditionally, health financing in Greece has been largely funded by 
HHE 13  (Economou et al., 2017; Thomson et al., 2009). This historical pattern is 	12 The main types of out-of-pocket payments in Greece are the following: (a) direct payments for medical 
care that is not covered by health insurance, (b) cost-sharing schemes and user charges (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals), (c) payments for medical care, which is covered by health insurance and is purchased with 
out-of-pocket payments (in order to facilitate access or receive services of higher quality) (Economou et al., 
2017). 13 Recent OECD data reveal that Greece has the fourth highest OOP expenditure in OECD (as a percentage 
of total health spending), after Cyprus, Bulgaria and Latvia. When looking at OECD data on OOP spending 
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particularly evident when examining OOPE from a comparative perspective, as shown in 
Figure A1 (in Appendix A). In particular, Greece’s OOPE (as a share of health spending) 
is substantially higher than that of the other EU and OECD countries. However, although 
the Greek health system is highly dependent on OOPE, the role of private health insurance 
is quite limited (Mossialos et al., 2005; Souliotis et al., 2016). In this context, Greece has 
the lowest percentage of the population covered by health insurance (public and/or private) 
among OECD countries, a fact that also exacerbates the problem and increases reliance on 
OOPE (OECD, 2017). 
In general, the high OOPE in Greece can be interpreted by the deficiencies of the 
public system, including waiting lists, low responsiveness and satisfaction with health 
services, and low quality of care (C. Economou, 2010). In addition, the public sector is 
also characterized by undersupply of diagnostics and technology, informal payments, lack 
of a referral system and weak primary care, all of which further exacerbate the level of 
OOPE (Mossialos et al., 2005). The main health policy concern arises from the fact that 
this historical pattern clearly attenuates the extent to which equity in financing can be 
achieved in the Greek health system, while low-income groups disproportionately 
contribute to health care financing (Economou, 2010). Increased out-of-pocket payments 
may also impede access to health services and decrease the use of necessary medical care, 
especially for the vulnerable household types (Hwang et al., 2001).  
In addition to health financing in Greece being highly dependent on OOPE, a 
second aspect makes the Greek case particularly interesting. As noted above, Greece 
signed a bailout agreement and implemented a large-scale EAP amid a severe sovereign 
debt crisis, leading to a “triple hit” with profound implications on health financing. 
Following the introduction of the EAP, health financing was largely shaped and influenced 
by fiscal constraints, mainly due to the cap of 6% of GDP for public health expenditure. In 
this context, the public expenditure on health currently amounts to 5% of GDP,14 which is 
low compared to the EU average of 7.2% of GDP (OECD/European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies, 2017). Second, several cost-sharing schemes were 
introduced, the most important of which were co-insurance charges for medicines 
(Economou et al., 2017). In Greece, there are three potential cost-sharing rates (25%, 10% 	
as a share of household consumption, Greece has also the fourth highest share among the EU countries (after 
Bulgaria, Malta and Cyprus). 14 Total health expenditure was approximately 8.4% of GDP in 2015, and amounted to 9.5% of GDP before 
the onset of the crisis and the introduction of the EAP. What should be noted, however, is that GDP 
decreased by more than a quarter during the economic crisis.  
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and 0%) for medicines. After the introduction of the new cost-sharing scheme, a larger 
number of diseases is included in the highest co-insurance rate of 25%, while only some 
life-threatening medicine are fully covered (Gouvalas et al., 2016). The third hit was not 
directly related to health financing sources. In particular, the sharp decline of several types 
of labour and capital income (e.g. from wage and salaries, self-employment, business 
activities, dividends, rents etc.) (Giannitsis & Zografakis, 2018) along with the increased 
unemployment rate have significant implications for households’ purchasing power and 
ability to pay for health care. These changes (the “triple hit”) appear to have significant 
implications for health financing. Hence, both the level and the composition of average 
HHE from 2008 to 2015 differ substantially, which motivates further empirical research on 
HHE in the Greek context (see Figure A2 in Appendix A). 
Therefore, analysing the relationship between income and HHE for the Greek case 
is particularly interesting because of: (a) the high HHE; and (b) the change in the level and 
composition of HHE associated with the impact of the EAP both on demand for and on the 
supply of health care. 
 
2.4. Literature review 
2.4.1. Health financing and out-of-pocket payments during periods of economic adjustment 
 A strand of the literature has examined the changes, trends and patterns in health 
financing during economic recessions associated with the changes in macroeconomic and 
fiscal environment and the subsequent health policy responses (Mladovsky et al., 2012; 
Thomson et al., 2014). The vast majority of the evidence relies on aggregate data, 
examines the trends from a descriptive perspective, and elaborates on the impact of health 
policy responses to the crisis on health care financing across countries. With this in mind, 
this review will briefly summarize some main points and elements about health financing 
during periods of economic adjustment and will particularly focus on the literature on 
OOPE.  
 
Implications for public expenditure on health 
Economic crises are generally associated with GDP reduction, growing fiscal 
deficits, high public debt, and increasing borrowing costs, which in turn constrict or lead to 
changes in the allocation of public budgets. In this context, several studies have 
demonstrated that the countercyclicality of public spending for health is particularly 
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important in order to mitigate the negative impact of recessions, protect population health 
status and ensure access to health care during periods of economic downturn (Cashin, 
2016; Velenyi & Smitz, 2014).  
Although some developing countries have adopted countercyclical policies for 
health financing, public expenditure on health has been generally considered as procyclical 
in low- and middle-income countries, with evidence suggesting that it follows the same 
direction as the overall economic performance (G. Chen, Inder, Lorgelly, & 
Hollingsworth, 2013; Hou et al., 2013; Liang & Tussing, 2019).  
On the other hand, evidence from developed countries is rather mixed and 
contradictory. For example, some papers indicate that public expenditure on health tends to 
be acyclical (Afonso & Jalles, 2013; Del Granado, Gupta, & Hajdenberg, 2013), while 
another strand of the literature corroborates countercyclical patterns among advanced 
economies (Darby & Melitz, 2008; Velenyi & Smitz, 2014). Furthermore, it appears that 
prolonged and severe recessions may bring about procyclical responses even among 
developed countries, mainly due to fiscal and credit constraints that limit the fiscal space 
(Velenyi & Smitz, 2014).  
Generally speaking, a recent analysis suggests that European countries responded 
differently to the challenges posed by the economic decline, with some of them –including 
Greece- adopting large budgetary cuts in health under the pressure of the rising fiscal 
constraints (Cylus & Pearson, 2014; Morgan & Astolfi, 2014; Thomson et al., 2014). 
Additionally, evidence shows that the potential public budget cuts are not merely linked 
with recession severity, but are rather associated with the implementation of adjustment 
programmes that usually entail heavy conditionality and specific health policy measures 
(Aaron Reeves et al., 2014). In that spirit, the extent to which government pursues and 
adopts countercyclical responses relates to a country’s fiscal space, borrowing constraints, 
political polarization and institutional capacity (Abbott & Jones, 2012; Calderón, Duncan, 
& Schmidt-Hebbel, 2016) 
 
Implications for out-of-pocket expenditure 
 There are many channels through which an economic crisis and the relevant 
adjustment programmes could influence out-of-pocket payments, thus making the link 
unclear and more complex (Cylus & Pearson, 2014; Morgan & Astolfi, 2014). In this 
sense, whether and how economic contraction and adjustment policies affect OOPE cannot 
be easily predicted a priori, due to multiple factors that move in contradictory directions 
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(Du & Yagihashi, 2015).  
Generally speaking, economic recessions have widespread effects on household 
financial situation and living conditions, with many households experiencing significant 
income reduction, greater debt level, unemployment and increased financial insecurity. 
Households may thus reduce, avoid or postpone some of their payments, purchase fewer 
health care goods and services, or shift to public services (Dranove, Garthwaite, & Ody, 
2014; H. Waters, Saadah, & Pradhan, 2003b). This channel can be essentially regarded as a 
direct demand-driven effect, predominantly associated with households’ lower 
affordability and ability to pay during economic crises.  
 On the other hand, there are some indirect channels through which economic 
decline could influence households’ health care consumption decisions (Docteur, 2009). 
First, the public budget cuts essentially imply that the public sector should address the 
increasing needs for health care with reduced financial and human resources. On the 
supply side, the public sector may be thus inadequate to meet population needs and the 
demand for health care due to reduced availability and capacity, especially in a period of 
increasing demand (Kentikelenis et al., 2014; Mladovsky et al., 2012). In an overwhelmed 
public health system,15 some households may thus consider a substitute for public services 
to facilitate access to health care and receive timely and high quality care, shifting to 
private services (de Belvis et al., 2012; Hoel & Sæther, 2003; Rodrigues, Zólyomi, 
Schmidt, Kalavrezou, & Matsaganis, 2013). Put another way, the declining performance of 
the public sector implies that some households may prefer to visit private providers and/or 
bear the burden of higher out-of-pocket payments, aiming at less waiting time and better 
responsiveness and quality of care. Second, some of the health policy responses during an 
economic crisis are normally expected to influence out-of-pocket payments. For example, 
evidence indicates that various countries tend to adopt several cost-sharing schemes in 
response to an economic crisis, which in turn shift costs onto households and increase out-
of-pocket payments (Karanikolos et al., 2013; Thomson et al., 2014). Third, supply 
reduction, doctors’ salary cuts and the increased barriers to accessing health services may 
exacerbate doctors’ pressure for informal payments in public services (Docteur, 2009; 
Economou et al., 2014). This is particularly relevant for Greece, where informal payments 
often constitute a means – or even a prerequisite - to facilitate access to health care in 	15 In particular, public budget cuts appear to have, among others, the following implications: decrease of 
human and material resources, increased barriers to access to public services due to reduced availability, 
lower quality of care, and lower levels of patient satisfaction (Grigorakis, Floros, Tsangari, & Tsoukatos, 
2016; Rodrigues et al., 2013; Sissouras, 2014). 
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Greece (Davaki & Mossialos, 2005; WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2018a). 
Considering that fact, recent evidence suggests an increasing demand for informal 
payments during the post-crisis period (Souliotis et al., 2016).  
Descriptive evidence for the impact of economic recessions and adjustment 
programmes on out-of-pocket spending is rather mixed, reflecting the various and 
conflicting channels described above. Findings from the 1997 East Asian crisis reveal that 
out-of-pocket payments decreased due to significant reduction in household income and 
purchasing power (H. Waters et al., 2003a; Yang et al., 2001). However, evidence from the 
OECD countries is somewhat conflicting, showing that out-of-pocket expenditure was 
procyclical in 20 out of 32 countries; a fact that is possibly explained by the household 
income loss, switch to less expensive medical care and shift to public services (Cleeren, 
Lamey, Meyer, & De Ruyter, 2016). In the same spirit, several studies for the recent 
European crisis also indicate that the trends in out-of-pocket spending during the crisis are 
rather mixed, with Greece being among the countries with the largest decline in Europe 
(Cylus & Pearson, 2014; Thomson et al., 2014).  
2.4.2. Income elasticity of household health expenditure  
During the past decades, a strand of the literature has examined and estimated the 
income elasticity of health expenditure using both aggregate and micro-level data. The 
existing evidence, however, consists of conflicting empirical findings and a vigorous 
discussion regarding the size of income elasticity (Costa-Font, Gemmill, & Rubert, 2011; 
Getzen, 2000). In this section, we will briefly review the key findings from the macro-level 
studies, and further elaborate on the estimates that rely on micro-level data.  
 
Macro-level studies  
Since the late 1970s, several papers have employed macro-level data to examine 
the association between GDP and health expenditure since the 1970s. In one of the first 
and most influential papers dealing with this topic, Newhouse (1977) used annual 
aggregate data for 13 countries, and showed that income elasticity of health expenditure 
ranged from 1.15 to 1.31, suggesting that health care is a luxury good (Newhouse, 1977). 
Most of the subsequent empirical work has indeed corroborated the “health care luxury 
hypothesis” and the high explanatory power of the association between GDP and health 
spending per capita (U.-G. Gerdtham & Jönsson, 2000).  
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Following Newhouse’s study, an increasing body of literature employed 
multivariate regression models aiming to address omitted variable bias and its potential 
implications on the magnitude of the coefficient of interest.16 Similar to previous evidence, 
most of these studies also supported the “health care luxury hypothesis” (Gerdtham, 
Snrgaard, Andersson, & Jonsson, 1992; Gerdtham, Sogaard, Jonsson, & Andersson, 1992; 
Leu, 1986). In addition, Parkin et al. (1987) replicated Newhouse’s exercise using data for 
18 OECD countries, and raised two methodological issues with significant implications for 
empirical work (Parkin, McGuire, & Yule, 1987). First, they found significant differences 
in the magnitude of the income elasticity, depending on the model’s functional form. 
Second, they showed that international comparisons of health expenditure should rely on 
purchasing power parity (PPP) rather than exchange rates, since such an approach 
considers both price and quantity.17 In particular, they found an income elasticity of 1.12 
when using a linear regression model and an exchange rate conversion, while the elasticity 
dropped to 0.90 after a conversion based on PPP.  
The literature gradually shifted from cross-sectional to panel data analysis, given 
that the latter takes into account the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across 
countries. For instance, Sen (2005) argues that the cross-sectional findings based on 
aggregate-level data may be misleading, since most studies do not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and the models may suffer from omitted variable bias (Sen, 2005). Using 
data for the OECD countries and panel data techniques, various studies have estimated that 
income elasticity ranges between 0.7 and 0.8 after controlling for country- and time-
specific dummies and a comprehensive set of regressors (U.-G. Gerdtham, 1992; U.-G. 
Gerdtham, Jönsson, MacFarlan, & Oxley, 1998). In contrast, some other panel data studies 
have reported evidence of income elasticity that exceeds unity among the OECD countries 
(Hitiris, 1997; Hitiris & Posnett, 1992; Liu, Li, & Wang, 2011).  
Panel data approaches in turn raised further methodological concerns due to the 
spurious association between GDP and health spending, arising from non-stationarity and 
cointegration properties (Hansen & King, 1996). In this regard, a series of studies adopted 	16 These studies controlled for some additional regressors, such as the share of population aged under 15 and 
over 65 years old, urbanization, demand- and supply-side variables, and institutional and health system 
characteristics. 17 After the study by Parkin et al. (1987), there was a vigorous debate regarding the issue of conversion 
factor instability. A few years later, Gerdtham and Jonsson (1991) used OECD data and, contrary to Parkin et 
al. (1987), did not report evidence of conversion factor instability, concluding that health care is indeed a 
luxury even when using PPP as conversion factor (U. G. Gerdtham & Jonsson, 1991) In a brief note 
published in Journal of Health Economics, Murthy (1992) has also discussed conversion factor instability, 
and elaborated on the findings of Gertham and Jonsson (1991) (Murthy, 1992). 
	 51 
approaches that address these issues and found evidence in favour of the “health care 
luxury hypothesis”, especially in the long run (Okunade & Karakus, 2001; Okunade & 
Murthy, 2002; Woodward & Wang, 2012). In contrast, some relatively recent studies 
employed panel data from the OECD (Baltagi & Moscone, 2010; Sen, 2005) and some 
broader sets of countries (Baltagi, Lagravinese, Moscone, & Tosetti, 2017; Fan & 
Savedoff, 2014; Farag et al., 2012; Xu, Saksena, & Holly, 2011) and showed that income 
elasticity is consistently below unity. For instance, two recent studies employed panel 
datasets and found that health care is a necessity, with the income elasticity of health 
expenditure differing depending on country’s income level (Baltagi et al., 2017; Farag et 
al., 2012).  
In contrast to the literature using datasets from multiple countries, the vast majority 
of regional-level studies reveal that income elasticity is well below unity (Getzen, 2000). 
For instance, Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998) employed data from the Canadian 
provinces, and estimated that income elasticity is 0.77 (Di Matteo & Di Matteo, 1998). 
Using regional data, some other papers have further confirmed that income elasticity is 
below unity in the USA (D. G. Freeman, 2003; Moscone & Tosetti, 2010), Canada (Di 
Matteo, 2005), Italy (Giannoni & Hitiris, 2002) and among regions in the OECD (López-
Casasnovas & Saez, 2007). For instance, Freeman relied on regional-level data from 
different states in the USA, and showed that the income elasticity of health spending 
ranges between 0.82 to 0.84 (D. G. Freeman, 2003).  
 
Micro-level studies 
Although aggregate data have been widely employed for estimating income 
elasticity of health spending, their use has been subject to criticism, mainly because such 
approaches essentially imply “the application of microeconomic analysis to 
macroeconomic data” (Parkin et al., 1987). In this section, we thus focus on a strand of the 
literature that employs micro-level analysis, using either individual or household data. In 
this context, apart from the papers focusing on health expenditure, we also review some 
key studies on the estimates for income elasticity of health care utilization.  
A widely quoted paper on the microeconometric analysis of demand for health care 
relied on data from the RAND experiment (Newhouse & Phelps, 1976). In particular, this 
study estimated the income elasticity with respect to hospital and physician services and 
found that both types of services are income inelastic. Several studies have also employed 
micro-data from the USA, and have made similar findings (Willard G. Manning & 
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Marquis, 1996; Silver, 1970). For example, Feenberg and Skinner (1994) employed a 
Tobit model and cross-sectional data, and found that the income elasticity of HHE is 
approximately 0.35 (Feenberg & Skinner, 1994).  
Apart from the USA, the income elasticity of health expenditure has been examined 
in several countries, with most evidence from survey data indicating that health care is 
indeed a necessity. Using a cross-sectional dataset, Chernichovsky and Meesok (1986) 
employed a linear regression model with log-transformed dependent variable, and showed 
that the income elasticity of HHE is approximately 0.70 (Chernichovsky & Meesook, 
1986). Based on survey data, Trivedi (2002) employed a two-part model, with the 
magnitude of the income elasticity of HHE ranging from 0.6 to 0.7 (Trivedi, 2002). In the 
same spirit, Mocan et al. (2004) relied on micro-data from urban regions in China and 
demonstrated that the income elasticity of HHE lies between 0.30 and 0.52 (Mocan, Tekin, 
& Zax, 2004), while another study found slightly higher estimates and further confirmed 
that health care is income inelastic (Jowett, Contoyannis, & Vinh, 2003). Using cross-
sectional data from the Swiss Household Income and Consumption Survey, Chaze (2005) 
employed Box-Cox censoring models to derive the income elasticity of HHE, which 
amounted to approximately 0.51 (Chaze, 2005). Furthermore, a number of studies have 
employed micro-level data, and also support that health care is indeed a necessity across 
countries of different development level and with different health system structure 
(Abegunde & Stanciole, 2008; Bago d’Uva & Jones, 2009; Kumara, Samaratunge, AJ, JP., 
& K., 2016; Lépine, 2015; Zhou et al., 2011). In contrast to the majority of micro-level 
studies, a smaller strand of the literature has found that health care is a luxury, at least 
according to some econometric specifications and estimation techniques (Rous & 
Hotchkiss, 2003; Sepehri, Sarma, & Simpson, 2006). For example, Sepehri et al. (2006) 
employed a Tobit and a truncated model, and found that the magnitude of the income 
elasticity differs depending on the model specification (Sepehri et al., 2006). In particular, 
the point estimate of income elasticity was found to range between 0.77 and 1.17 when 
using a truncated and a Tobit model respectively.  
Although various studies have estimated the income elasticity of HHE, little is 
known about the heterogeneity across different household types and income levels. One of 
the few relevant papers employed linear and quantile regression models, and revealed that 
income elasticity of HHE lies between 0.4 and 0.5, and was generally lower for poorer 
households (Zare et al., 2013). The latter finding is opposite to the one found by Parker and 
Wong, who reported that income elasticity is higher for the low-income groups (S. W. 
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Parker & Wong, 1997). In addition, another strand of the literature does not find a specific 
pattern to how income elasticity changes across income  groups (Okunade, Suraratdecha, 
& Benson, 2010; Trivedi, 2002). 
 
Explaining the discrepancy between micro- and macro-level studies 
As shown in this brief review, there is a discrepancy regarding the magnitude of the 
income elasticity of health expenditure in the literature using aggregate-level data (Mocan 
et al., 2004). For instance, although many studies support the ‘health care luxury’ 
hypothesis, a meta-regression approach showed that income elasticity lies between 0.4 and 
0.8 (Costa-Font et al., 2011). In contrast, the vast majority of microeconometric studies 
clearly demonstrate that health care is a necessity. The two types of study have substantial 
differences, the most fundamental of which relates to the source of variation. In particular, 
aggregate-level studies rely on variation “between groups”, whereas the source of variation 
in micro-level studies arises  “within groups” (Getzen, 2000).  
Newhouse (1977) explained this discrepancy, and argued that although price is a 
significant “rationing factor” across countries and over time, this is not the case for the 
studies that rely on “within country” variation due to the presence of health insurance 
(Newhouse, 1977). In particular, health insurance and social protection mechanisms allow 
consumers to purchase health care without bearing the full price. This is evident even in 
the US health system, whose financing largely relies on private health expenditure18. In 
this spirit, the existence of such schemes (i.e. health insurance or redistributive 
mechanisms) can largely explain the differences in the estimates of micro- and macro-level 
studies19 (Blomqvist & Carter, 1997). For example, Phelps and Newhouse (1974) showed 
that income elasticity decreases as the monetary price that consumers should pay falls 
(Phelps & Newhouse, 1974). A second aspect that might explain this discrepancy relates to 
potential model misspecification (e.g. spurious regression). For example, Gertham and 
Jonsson (1992) argued that some aggregate analyses may suffer from omitted variable bias, 
and this methodological shortcoming could partly explain the size of income elasticity (U.-
G. Gerdtham & Jönsson, 1992). 	18 For example, Medicare and Medicaid or other redistributive schemes essentially subsidize health care for 
specific population groups and weaken the link between household income and health expenditure. 19 Contrary to micro-level studies, aggregate studies exploit variation in country or regional level (i.e. from 
cross sections of several countries). In this case, the country bears the full costs of health care, and income 
should thus have a greater role in explaining health expenditure compared to studies using micro-level data 
(Newhouse, 1977). 
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Generally speaking, Engel curves and income elasticity are clearly microeconomic 
terms, and their estimates normally require the analysis of individual (or household) data 
(Parkin et al., 1987). They are thus sceptical about the use of macroeconomic tools when 
analysing and explaining microeconomic concepts. In this context, Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980) have also argued that20:     
 
“If, however, as is frequently the case, the data are available only for 
aggregates of households, there are no obvious grounds why the theory, 
formulated for individual household, should be directly applicable (Deaton 
& Muellbauser, 1980)” 
 
It is thus evident that treating aggregate behaviour as the natural outcome of an 
individual decision/behaviour (i.e. exact aggregation) requires a number of conditions, 
which are not always met. Therefore, using and analysing aggregate data to infer aspects 
related to individual behaviour may incur aggregation bias. This issue has been widely 
discussed in the existing literature, and is widely known as the “problem of aggregation” or 
the so-called “social multiplier”21 (Getzen, 2000; Glaeser, Scheinkman, Sacerdote, & Jose 
Scheinkman, 2003). 
 
2.4.3. Modelling household health expenditure: some methodological considerations 
 In this section, we briefly review some technical details that need to be considered 
when modelling health expenditure at micro-level, and briefly elaborate on the main 
distributional characteristics of HHE (Deb & Trivedi, 2002). First, the distribution of 
health expenditure is characterized by restricted range, since it does not take negative 
values by definition. Second, there are households and/or individuals that might not seek or 
purchase health care within the period of observation, and some observations thus have 
zero value. Third, the distribution of health expenditure is positively skewed with a heavy 
right-hand tail (Dormont, Grignon, & Ne Huber, 2006; W G Manning & Mullahy, 2001). 
These properties also arise from the fact that a relatively small fraction of individuals with 
severe health problems tends to consume high cost medical care, due to comorbidities and 
health complications. HHE can be thus characterized as a limited dependent variable, with 	20 They also noted that: “In general, it is neither necessary, nor necessarily desirable, that macroeconomic 
relations should replicate their microeconomic foundations so that exact aggregation is possible.” 21 For instance, estimated elasticity of health expenditure from regional-level data tend to be lower than 
those from cross-country datasets. This means that the level of analysis influences the estimates, and 
potentially implies the presence of aggregation bias (Costa-Font et al., 2011). 
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its distribution having substantial differences compared to a Gaussian or symmetric 
distribution. Given these characteristics, an OLS estimate of a conventional linear 
regression model is inefficient, and also leads to biased estimates (Buntin & Zaslavsky, 
2004; Manning, 2012). Taking these remarks into account, there are three main 
econometric approaches for modelling micro-level data for health expenditure: (a) single-
equation modelling, (b) two-part models (TPM), and (c) selectivity models (SSM) (Jones, 
2000).  
 
Single-equation modelling  
The first type of single-equation approaches consists of linear models, the use of 
which generally requires the transformation of the dependent variable due to the 
distributional characteristics of health expenditure data. Besides, employing an OLS 
estimation method on the original scale of the dependent variable may have significant 
implications in terms of consistency and efficiency of the estimate (Manning, 1998). This 
transformation leads to a more symmetric distribution, and the normality assumption is 
thus more plausible. The most commonly applied technique to reduce skewness and make 
the distribution more symmetric is a log-transformation (Jones, 2010a). In general, such a 
model is given by the following expression: ln($!) = '!"( + *! , ,(*) = 0	/01	,('"*) = 0 
where $!  is the dependent variable, '!  is a set of regressors, (  is the vector of the 
corresponding coefficients and *! is the error term.  
A drawback of this approach relates to the scale of the predicted expenditures, 
which are presented in logarithmic terms, although the variable of interest is the actual 
expenditure. It is noteworthy that the exponentiated predictions of the log-scale values 
would not coincide with the actual predictions, given that ,(ln($)) ≠ ln	(,($)). In this 
context, the most popular approach for estimating the predicted value on the actual scale is 
based on a non-parametric smearing factor proposed by Duan (Duan, 1983). 
GLM is the second type of single-equation models used for the econometric 
analysis of HHE, and relies on two main components: (a) a link function g that reflects the 
relationship between the mean to the linear predictor and (b) a variance function that links 
the variance with the mean (Wooldridge, 2010). The link function can take several 
functional forms such as identity, logit, probit and log. Generally speaking, the form for 
the link function is given by the following expression: 
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3! = 4(5!) = (# + ($'$!+	. . . +(%'%! 
where 3! is the linear  predictor. 
In addition, the variance function identifies the relationship between the mean and 
the variance, and is generally given by the following expression (W G Manning & 
Mullahy, 2001): 7/8(9|') = ;(5('())& 
where 9 is the dependent variable, and < is a finite and non-negative parameter that defines 
the distributional family.  
Contrary to the linear models with log-transformed dependent variable, GLM does 
not require retransformation, since the predicted values are estimated on the original scale 
(W G Manning & Mullahy, 2001). Most of the empirical work on HHE has used log-link 
and a Gamma distribution (Manning, 2012), whereas Poisson and binomial distribution are 
generally more relevant when modelling count data, such as health care utilization 
(Mihaylova, Briggs, O’Hagan, & Thompson, 2011). In general, the identification of the 
appropriate functional form is important, given that a misspecification of the distribution 
form implies efficiency loss. Hence, there are some established diagnostic and statistical 
tests in order to identify the appropriate link and distributional family (Jones, 2010a; 
Willard G. Manning, Basu, & Mullahy, 2005; Pregibon, 1980).  
 
Two-part and selection models 
Going beyond single-equation techniques, TPM and SSM have attracted much 
interest since the early 1980s, in the context of an interesting debate on the econometrics of 
health care demand (a comprehensive overview of this debate can be found in Jones 
(2000)). TPM is an empirical approach that has been closely associated with the models 
proposed and adopted in the context of the RAND approach (Duan, Manning, Morris, & 
Newhouse, 1983; W.G. Manning, Duan, & Rogers, 1987), whereas SSM is a technique 
that has been used to address selection issues especially in labour economics (Heckman, 
1979; Puhani, 2000).  
The TPM distinguishes spenders from non-spenders, and models the HHE 
conditional on its positive value. The first part of a TPM is a binary response model, which 
models the probability of having positive expenditure =($ > 0|') = ?('"(), where ? is 
the cumulative distribution function (i.e. normal and logistic for probit and logit 
respectively). The second part of the TPM predicts the HHE conditional on its positive 
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value (i.e. subsample of non-zero HHE) and is essentially a linear model, with the 
logarithmic transformation of HHE as a dependent variable. Thus, the unconditional 
predicted health expenditure is given by the probability of spending for health care (first 
part) times the expected level of HHE (second part), and can be derived from the following 
expression: ,($!|'!) = =($! > 0|'!) × 	,($!|'! , $! > 0) 
 A detailed description of the statistical details, identification and estimation of the 
TPM is presented by Mullahy (1998), who also elaborates on alternative specifications 
such as the modified TPM (MTPM). In particular, the MTPM uses a binary response 
model for the first part, while the second part consists of a GLM instead of a conventional 
linear model (Mullahy, 1998). 
 A common problem in the empirical analysis of limited dependent variables relates 
to potential selection issues. In order to address such problems, Heckman proposed a 
regression technique, based on a two-step estimation (Heckman, 1976, 1979). The first 
step is the selection mechanism (binary response model) and aims to distinguish those 
whose outcome is observed. Using latent variables notation, the SSM is expressed by the 
following: $'!∗ = ''!(' + *'! ,				A = 1,2 $! = D$)!∗ 	EF	$$!∗ > 0	0		GHℎJ8KELJ  
Based on this model formulation, the first step of the Heckman’s SSM is based on a 
probit model. For the selected (second) part of the sample, the parameters of interest are 
estimated using a linear regression of the outcome variable on the independent variables 
and the inverse Mills ratio (O’Donnell et al., 2008; Puhani, 2000). The second step is thus 
given by the following expression:  $! = ')!( + MN) O('$!($P)Q('$!($P) + J)! 
where N)  is the standard deviation of *)! , M  is the correlation coefficient between the 
residuals, and *(,!"-!.)0(,!"-!.) corresponds to the inverse Mills ratio.  
The main contribution of Heckman’s SSM is the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio 
in the second part of the model, which particularly aims to correct for selection bias. 
However, the application of SSM in the empirical work often suffers from some practical 
problems, mainly due to potential collinearity between the inverse Mills ratio and the 
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independent variables included in vector X (Leung & Yu, 1996; Puhani, 2000). This is 
often the case, especially when there are no available “exclusion restrictions”22. 
In this context, there are some important theoretical and practical criteria that should be 
considered when evaluating the relative advantages of these approaches (Dow & Norton, 
2003; Madden, 2008). From a theoretical and conceptual standpoint, the choice of the 
model largely relies on the nature of the research hypothesis. With this in mind, the main 
methodological question relates to whether we aim to model actual or potential outcomes 
(Duan, Manning, Morris, & Newhouse, 1984; Madden, 2008). More specifically, the 
actual outcomes are observed variables, in which zeros demonstrate a genuine decision of 
zero spending for health care (i.e. zero values for actual HHE correspond to the fact that 
households incur no monetary costs for health care).  Therefore, if zeros are actual decision 
of zero expenditure, there are no selection issues. On the other hand, a potential outcome 
essentially corresponds to a latent and partially observed outcome (Dow & Norton, 2003). 
The positive cases are true observations of the potential outcomes, whereas zeros illustrate 
the cases in which there is a missing (latent) outcome. Therefore, zeros do not represent 
zero value for the potential outcome. In the case of health expenditure, zero is considered 
as an actual decision of no spending, and a model of HHE thus concentrates on the actual 
expenditure. In this context, albeit selection constitutes a major concern in several 
econometric applications, a model of health expenditure focuses on actual outcomes, in 
which zeros are genuine (Dow & Norton, 2003; Duan et al., 1984; Mihaylova et al., 2011). 
The second criterion relates to the practical issues arising from the exclusion restrictions in 
a SSM. In fact, it is practically difficult to identify variables that influence the decision to 
spend for health care, but not the level of expenditure (Vella, 1998). Indeed, in the case of 
health spending, the selection and the expenditure equation essentially depend on similar 
variables (Salas & Raftery, 2001). The absence of plausible exclusion restrictions may lead 
to collinearity problems and large standard errors in the parameter estimates23 (Puhani, 
2000; Wooldridge, 2010).  
 	22  Generally, a SSM requires the separate identification of the selection and the level equation (i.e. a 
different set of independent variables in each equation). Thus, some variables (the so-called “exclusion 
restrictions”) influence the decision for participation, but they are not included in the second step of the 
Heckman model. 23 In case there are no exclusion restrictions, the only potential way of separate identification is the non-
linearity of the inverse Mills ratio that is added as an additional term in the level equation. Leung and Yu 
(1996) have emphasized the importance of the collinearity between the inverse Mills ratio and the 
independent variables of the level equation, and concluded that this issue constitutes a critical factor for 
choosing between TPM and SSM (Leung & Yu, 1996).  
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2.5. Data and methods 
2.5.1. Data 
We analyse a pooled dataset drawn from the repeated cross-sectional Household 
Budget Surveys (HBS), which are nationally representative surveys carried out annually by 
the Hellenic Statistical Authority from 2008 to 2015. These surveys include variables 
about demographics, household size and composition, employment, education, income, 
insurance characteristics, nationality and region and provide detailed information on 
household expenditure for goods and services. The dataset we used consists of 33,089 
observations.24 
The dependent variable of this study is HHE. By using the corresponding CPI, 
expenditure is deflated and converted into 2015 prices to reflect real values. The main 
variable of interest is net household income, deflated and adjusted to 2015 prices. We also 
use a dummy for the EAP, which takes the value of 1 for the years after the introduction of 
the EAP (2010–2015). Moreover, our model includes an interaction term between the EAP 
dummy and net income, which aims to capture whether the introduction of the EAP 
modifies the association between income and HHE. 
We also control for three main sets of variables widely employed in the literature 
for household consumption behaviour. The first set of regressors includes several 
characteristics of the household head, including age, employment, educational attainment, 
sex, marital status, and insurance status. Second, in terms of household characteristics, we 
control for (a) household size, (b) squared household size, (c) household members aged 
less than 4, and (d) the number of elderly (aged more than 65 years old). We focus on these 
age groups because they are generally considered to have a greater need for and utilization 
of health care. In addition, our model includes region fixed effects to control for regional 
variation. Table A1 in Appendix A further presents and describes the variables we 
employed. 
Apart from income, we extend the analysis by using an alternative proxy for the 
household’s financial situation (i.e. consumption). Household spending decisions are often 
based on long-run resources rather than current income. For instance, households may 	24 The annual sample size for the surveys of the period 2008-2013 was approximately 3500 households. 
Specifically, the sample size was 3460, 3524, 3512, 3515, 3572, and 3468 households in 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. In addition, the sampling fraction was 0.08% and the response rate ranged 
from 63% to 72%, depending on the year of survey. It is noteworthy that the sample size for the last two 
surveys was larger, as it approximated 6000 households. Specifically, it was 5888 (response rate: 63.2%) and 
6150 households in 2014 and 2015 respectively. 
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decide to relax their budget constraints either by liquidating assets or by bearing additional 
debt to afford the burden of OOPE for health care. Indeed, several studies have used total 
expenditure as a proxy for household income (Chernichovsky & Meesook, 1986; Zare et 
al., 2013). Additionally, based on previous studies of income inequality and poverty (Abul 
Naga & Burgess, 1997; Abul Naga, 1994), we use the available welfare indicators in the 
HBS (i.e. disposable income and consumption expenditure) to construct a composite 
welfare indicator (CWI) that captures the concept of permanent income. Previous work 
based on data from the Greek HBS has created a similar CWI (Mitrakos & Tsakloglou, 
1998, 2010). Appendix A presents additional methodological details for the construction of 
the CWI. 
 
Identifying vulnerability 
As pointed out above, we estimate income elasticity of HHE for different 
population groups, depending on household vulnerability25. Household vulnerability can 
be explained as “the propensity to suffer from a welfare shock, bringing the household 
below a socially defined minimum level” (Haughton & Khandker, 2009). Therefore, this 
definition implies that vulnerability is not strictly associated with exposure to poverty, but 
it essentially identifies the probability of being exposed to adverse welfare shocks 
(Chaudhuri, Jalan, & Suryahadi, 2002). According to the existing literature, some of the 
main household characteristics associated with increased vulnerability to economic shocks 
are the following: (a) low-educated household head, (b) female household head, (c) older 
household head, (d) unemployed household head, (e) large number of elderly, (f) low 
household income, (g) large number of children (Corbacho, Garcia-Escribano, & 
Inchauste, 2003; Glewwe & Hall, 1998; Ligon & Schechter, 2003; Nikoloski & Ajwad, 
2013). Therefore, we provide some estimates with a particular focus on these groups, 
aiming to identify potential differences in the income elasticity across different household 
types.  
 
 
	25  Household income and/or consumption are widely considered as measures that summarize and 
approximate household well-being. The latter, however, does not defined in terms of income. Rather, it 
incorporates the risk of being exposed to shocks and adverse consumption changes (Ligon & Schechter, 
2003).  
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2.5.2. Empirical models   
Two-part model 
Our main empirical model is a modified two-part model (MTPM) (Mullahy, 1998), 
which has slight differences compared to the conventional TPM. In particular, the first part 
identifies whether health expenditure is positive; this is a binary response model in which 
the dependent variable equals 1 if health expenditure is positive. Conditional on a positive 
value, the second part focuses on the level of ΗΗΕ. Based on these remarks, our main 
model consists of (a) a logit for the whole sample and (b) a generalized linear model 
(GLM) with a gamma error distribution for the set of positive outcomes (i.e. the variance is 
proportional to the squared mean) and a log-link function (i.e. exponential conditional 
mean model) 
In particular, the first part of the model is a logit given by the following expression:  Pr($! > 0	| '!) = exp	('!/)1 + exp	('!/)			(1) 
where ' is the vector of the regressors and / is the vector of the regression coefficients. 
The second part of the MTPM is a GLM, as described above. In this context, the 
second part can be presented by the following equation: ,($!|$! > 0, '!) = exp('!()		(2) 
where ( is the vector of the regression coefficients for the second part of the model. Based 
on (1) and (2), the MTPM can be written as ,($!|	'!) = Pr($! > 0	| '!) 	× 	,($! 	|$! > 0, '!) = = exp('!W) 	× 	exp	('!()1 + exp	('!W) = exp	('!(/ + ()1 + exp	('!W) 					(3) 
The choice of this model is based on several specification tests. In particular, we 
employ a modified Park test to choose the distribution family (i.e. the relationship between 
the mean and the variance), and several tests (Pregibon link test, Pearson correlation test, 
modified Hosmer and Lemshow test) to identify the GLM link function (i.e. the 
relationship between the linear predictor and the mean) (Deb & Norton, 2018; Willard G. 
Manning et al., 2005). Last, we present some measures for goodness of fit and model 
performance (i.e. mean squared error, root mean squared error, mean absolute prediction 
error) (Jones, 2010b). More details are presented in Appendix A (Tables A3 and A4).  
In addition to the baseline model, we also estimate alternative models for 
robustness checks. First, we employ a TPM with a logistic regression as a first part, and a 
linear regression model with a log-transformed dependent variable in the second part. For 
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this model, we also use the Duan smearing method of retransformation (Duan, 1983). 
Second, we carry out a similar analysis using a MTPM, in which the second part has a log 
link function and a Poisson family distribution.  
 
Single-equation modeling  
Apart from the TPM, we employ single-equation models for the total sample that have 
been also used in the existing literature for modelling health expenditure (Buntin & 
Zaslavsky, 2004; Mihaylova et al., 2011).  In particular, we focus on (a) linear regression 
model with log-transformed outcome variable, estimated by OLS, (b) GLM with log link 
and Gamma family distribution, and (c) GLM with log link and Poisson family 
distribution. 
  
Quantile regression models 
Empirical techniques such as OLS and GLM model the dependent variable by 
using a conditional mean function. However, the income elasticity of HHE may vary 
depending on the level of HHE. We thus undertake an additional analysis to describe the 
relationship between HHE and the independent variables at different points of the 
conditional HHE distribution. To do so, we employ quantile regressions models (Koenker 
& Bassett, 1978; Koenker & Hallock, 2001). In particular, such a technique allows us to 
identify the potential variation in the income elasticity of HHE at different points of the 
conditional distribution of the response variable. 
 
Instrumental variable approach 
Most estimates of income elasticity of HHE generally tend to ignore potential 
endogeneity concerns (Trivedi, 2002; Zare et al., 2013). As an additional robustness check, 
we relax this assumption, and employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach aiming to 
address potential endogeneity issues, such as measurement error in income. In particular, 
the presence of measurement error might induce bias in our estimates, and we thus check 
their robustness after obtaining exogenous variation in income. In this context, an IV 
should be correlated with income, and should not be correlated with the error term 
(Hausman, 2001).  
We instrument income with a household-specific asset/wealth index to address 
potential endogeneity issues. In order to construct the wealth index, we employed a 
principal component analysis to aggregate the available household indicators into an index 
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(Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006). Given that Greece is a high-
income country, the indicators and assets included in the wealth index are not similar to the 
ones used for the construction of similar indices for low- and middle-income countries 
(Foubert, Levecque, Van Rossem, & Romagnoli, 2014; E. E. Freeman et al., 2013; 
Nikoloski & Mossialos, 2013). Tsakloglou and Panopoulou (1998) and Ferguson et al. 
(2003) have used assets as proxies for household welfare and have provided relevant 
details for the variables that could be used for the construction of an index in Greece26 
(Ferguson, Tandon, Gakidou, & Murray, 2003; Tsakloglou & Panopoulou, 1998). As a 
robustness test, we employed an IV model using the sum of the household assets as an IV 
for income.  
Several studies that examine household demand have used ownership of assets or 
an asset/wealth index as an instrument for household income (Ali, Villa, & Joshi, 2018; 
Lépine, 2015; Lindelow, 2005; Rous & Hotchkiss, 2003; Skoufias, Di Maro, González-
Cossío, & Ramírez, 2009; Skoufias, Tiwari, & Zaman, 2012). Indeed, a large body of the 
literature suggests that such an index and its components (e.g. ownership of assets, housing 
characteristics) are generally correlated with household income (Jofre-Bonet, Serra-Sastre, 
& Vandoros, 2018; Skoufias et al., 2012; Strauss et al., 2004), and our instrument satisfies 
the relevance condition. In addition, households are generally expected to make negligible 
errors when reporting this type of information especially compared to reporting their 
income (Filmer & Scott, 2012; Glewwe & Nguyen, 2002; Wittenberg & Leibbrandt, 
2017).  
Given that the first-stage F statistic exceeds the minimum threshold of 10, 
empirical evidence supports the strength of our instruments. Therefore there is no weak 
identification problem (Staiger & Stock, 1997). Additionally, we obtain the Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM statistic and the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic to test for under-identification 
and weak identification respectively. These tests provide evidence in favour of the choice 
of our instrument, since they suggest that our models do not suffer from under-
identification or weak identification. 
 
	26 The variables we used for the construction of the index were the following: house ownership without 
financial obligations (e.g. mortgage), hot water, central heating, car ownership, washing machine, more than 
two television sets, personal computer, second house ownership, and area per equivalent member (binary 
variables that equals 1 if the area per member is more than 30 square meters). 
	 64 
2.6. Results 
2.6.1. Summary statistics 
Figure HHE decreased after the introduction of the EAP, and Figure 2.1 illustrates 
that there is a shift of the Kernel density function to smaller values. Approximately 13.2% 
of the observations report zero HHE, while the percentage of the sample with zero 
expenditure is much higher for the other types of expenditure27 (more details are presented 
in Appendix A Table A2). The high frequency of zeros is essentially the main reason we 
opt for a TPM as our main empirical specification. There are substantial differences in the 
means of net household income, age, household head education, and employment as well 
as in household size and the composition between households with zero and non-zero 
HHE. 
 
Figure 2. 1: Kernel density estimate of household health expenditure and income 
 
 
 
 	27 In particular, 39.6% of the households report zero pharmaceutical expenditure, while the corresponding 
percentages for hospital, dental and outpatient expenditure are 81.5%, 64.5% and 39.1% respectively. 
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2.6.2. Regression analysis  
Probability of health care spending 
According to Table 2.1, income is positively associated with the probability of 
ΗΗΕ, while the coefficient of the variable for the EAP is negative, suggesting that the 
period after the introduction of the EAP is associated with a lower probability of spending 
for health care. Our analysis also demonstrates that the relationship between income and 
the probability of having non-zero HHE changes with the introduction of the EAP. These 
findings remain robust across different model specifications and after using IV techniques 
to address potential endogeneity issues.  
We find a strong association between the household head’s demographics and 
probability of HHE. The odds of health spending by households with older household 
heads are higher (and increasing with age) relative to the odds of spending for the age 
group of 15–34. For instance, the odds of health care spending by a household whose head 
is more than 75 years old are more than twice the odds for a household with a young head. 
Similarly, the odds of having non-zero HHE for a household with a male head are 
approximately 0.71 times the odds for one with a female head28. In constrast to educational 
level, urbanity, household size and composition, and household heads’ marital, 
employment, and insurance status  are all statistically significant determinants of the 
probability of incurring OOPE. For instance, household size, the number of members aged 
under 4, and the number of members aged over 65 years old are all positively linked with 
the probability of having non-zero health spending. 
Based on the first part of the MTPM, Figure 2.2 presents the predicted probability 
of non-zero HHE for different income levels, which is increasing with income for both 
periods. Moreover, in the post-EAP period, the predicted probability of non-zero HHE is 
lower than that in the pre-EAP period, especially for low-income households. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	28 The odds ratio for each variable is given by the exponentiated coefficient. 
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Figure 2. 2: Predicted probability of non-zero household health expenditure 
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Table 2. 1: Two-part model, total sample (2008-2015 household data) 
 MTPM (logit, Gamma) TPM (logit, log-
transformed OLS) 
MTPM (logit, Poisson) IV probit 2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Participation 
equation 
Expenditure 
equation 
Participatio
n equation 
Expenditure 
equation 
Participatio
n equation 
Expenditure 
equation 
Participatio
n equation 
Expenditure 
equation 
EAP -2.113*** -0.901*** -2.113*** -0.901*** -2.113*** -1.836*** -1.974*** -0.961** 
 (0.774) (0.324) (0.774) (0.289) (0.774) (0.418) (0.615) (0.384) 
Log 
income 
0.402*** 0.421*** 0.402*** 0.405*** 0.402*** 0.447*** 0.487*** 0.707*** 
 (0.073) (0.030) (0.073) (0.026) (0.073) (0.035) (0.067) (0.044) 
EAP x Log 
income 
0.151** 0.079** 0.151** 0.075*** 0.151** 0.172*** 0.177*** 0.089** 
 (0.077) (0.032) (0.077) (0.029) (0.077) (0.041) (0.061) (0.038) 
Male -0.342*** -0.018 -0.342*** -0.060** -0.342*** -0.022 -0.215*** -0.086*** 
 (0.064) (0.031) (0.064) (0.027) (0.064) (0.033) (0.028) (0.022) 
35-44 0.165** -0.020 0.165** -0.017 0.165** -0.045 0.082** -0.057* 
 (0.076) (0.047) (0.076) (0.040) (0.076) (0.051) (0.039) (0.035) 
45-54 0.116 -0.036 0.116 0.014 0.116 -0.088* 0.024 -0.036 
 (0.079) (0.047) (0.079) (0.042) (0.079) (0.052) (0.041) (0.037) 
55-64 0.339*** 0.081 0.339*** 0.124*** 0.339*** 0.052 0.108** 0.059 
 (0.088) (0.050) (0.088) (0.044) (0.088) (0.055) (0.046) (0.040) 
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65-74 0.538*** 0.004 0.538*** 0.081 0.538*** 0.028 0.235*** 0.017 
 (0.134) (0.062) (0.134) (0.052) (0.134) (0.072) (0.061) (0.047) 
75+ 0.996*** 0.034 0.996*** 0.194*** 0.996*** 0.061 0.471*** 0.171*** 
 (0.150) (0.066) (0.150) (0.055) (0.150) (0.073) (0.066) (0.048) 
Primary/lo
wer 
secondary 
education 
-0.129 -0.044 -0.129 -0.079*** -0.129 -0.059* -0.120*** -0.079*** 
 (0.082) (0.027) (0.082) (0.024) (0.082) (0.030) (0.035) (0.021) 
Upper and 
post-
secondary 
education 
-0.111 0.078** -0.111 0.017 -0.111 0.066* -0.202*** -0.077*** 
 (0.090) (0.034) (0.090) (0.029) (0.090) (0.038) (0.041) (0.027) 
Higher 
education 
0.072 0.145*** 0.072 0.107*** 0.072 0.095** -0.224*** -0.080** 
 (0.101) (0.039) (0.101) (0.034) (0.101) (0.044) (0.052) (0.036) 
Intermedia
te 
population 
density 
0.031 -0.020 0.031 -0.006 0.031 -0.028 0.052** 0.008 
 (0.058) (0.027) (0.058) (0.023) (0.058) (0.030) (0.026) (0.019) 
Sparsely 
populated 
-0.125** 0.034 -0.125** 0.030 -0.125** 0.024 -0.023 0.068*** 
 (0.062) (0.025) (0.062) (0.022) (0.062) (0.028) (0.027) (0.019) 
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Household 
size 
0.201*** 0.051 0.201*** 0.048 0.201*** 0.042 0.002 -0.056* 
 (0.069) (0.034) (0.069) (0.032) (0.069) (0.037) (0.040) (0.029) 
Household 
size 
squared 
-0.030*** -0.006 -0.030*** -0.004 -0.030*** -0.006 -0.006 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Divorced -0.194* -0.027 -0.194* -0.073 -0.194* 0.008 -0.068 -0.069* 
 (0.102) (0.052) (0.102) (0.046) (0.102) (0.057) (0.045) (0.038) 
Never 
married 
-0.341*** -0.148*** -0.341*** -0.233*** -0.341*** -0.119** -0.158*** -0.203*** 
 (0.083) (0.047) (0.083) (0.039) (0.083) (0.057) (0.040) (0.033) 
Widowed -0.231** -0.095** -0.231** -0.128*** -0.231** -0.098** -0.109*** -0.120*** 
 (0.098) (0.039) (0.098) (0.036) (0.098) (0.040) (0.042) (0.030) 
Members 
aged below 
4 
0.607*** 0.142*** 0.607*** 0.154*** 0.607*** 0.145*** 0.285*** 0.164*** 
 (0.072) (0.030) (0.072) (0.027) (0.072) (0.029) (0.031) (0.021) 
Members 
aged more 
than 65 
0.285*** 0.116*** 0.285*** 0.122*** 0.285*** 0.101*** 0.133*** 0.115*** 
 (0.065) (0.024) (0.065) (0.020) (0.065) (0.025) (0.024) (0.016) 
Self-
employed 
0.338*** 0.188*** 0.338*** 0.142*** 0.338*** 0.171*** 0.108*** 0.121*** 
 (0.070) (0.034) (0.070) (0.028) (0.070) (0.036) (0.033) (0.025) 
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Farmer 0.225** 0.084* 0.225** 0.037 0.225** 0.088* 0.098** 0.103*** 
 (0.112) (0.049) (0.112) (0.047) (0.112) (0.050) (0.050) (0.039) 
Unemploye
d 
0.070 0.098 0.070 0.019 0.070 0.085 0.170*** 0.147*** 
 (0.092) (0.063) (0.092) (0.050) (0.092) (0.069) (0.047) (0.044) 
Retired 0.351*** 0.215*** 0.351*** 0.211*** 0.351*** 0.177*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 
 (0.075) (0.037) (0.075) (0.030) (0.075) (0.042) (0.033) (0.025) 
Other 
inactive 
0.652*** 0.250*** 0.652*** 0.235*** 0.652*** 0.200*** 0.343*** 0.237*** 
 (0.100) (0.046) (0.100) (0.037) (0.100) (0.049) (0.044) (0.032) 
Uninsured 0.488*** -0.010 0.488*** 0.026 0.488*** -0.014 0.054 -0.145*** 
 (0.088) (0.065) (0.088) (0.055) (0.088) (0.071) (0.052) (0.051) 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.860*** 2.898*** -2.860*** 2.472*** -2.860*** 2.721*** -3.693*** -0.129 
 (0.743) (0.300) (0.743) (0.266) (0.743) (0.350) (0.631) (0.407) 
Observatio
ns 
31,940 27,878 31,940 27,878 31,940 27,878 31,920 27,860 
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Level of HHE 
Column 2 in Table 2.1 shows the baseline estimates of the second part of the 
MTPM, which models health expenditure conditional on its positive value. The dummy 
indicating the EAP has a negative coefficient, suggesting that the post-EAP period is also 
negatively associated with HHE. Income is positively associated not only with the 
probability of spending for health care (as suggested in the first part), but also with the 
level of expenditure. The significance and sign of the interaction term indicate that the 
introduction of the EAP modifies the association between income and HHE. These 
findings also remain robust to alternative specifications in the second part of the TPM, as 
shown in columns 4 and 6 in Table 2.1. Estimates from single-equation models, reported in 
the Appendix Table A5, further validate our results. Last –using an asset index as 
instrument for income- Table 2.1 (column 8) shows the estimates of a 2SLS model, and 
indeed confirms that our findings are strong and robust after using an IV approach.  
Apart from income, other socioeconomic characteristics such as educational level, 
employment, and marital status also appear to be statistically significant determinants of 
HHE. In contrast, although a household head’s core demographics (sex, age) are 
statistically significant predictors of the probability of incurring non-zero HHE, they are 
not significantly associated with the level of HHE conditional on its positive value. As 
expected, the numbers of household members aged under 4 and more than 65 years old are 
both positively associated with HHE. Finally, the predicted level of HHE is increasing with 
income and generally lower after the introduction of the EAP (Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2. 3: Predicted level of household health expenditure 
 
 
2.6.3. Income elasticity of HHE 
Following Mullahy (1998), we measure the responsiveness of HHE to income 
changes, using two measures. First, we estimate the probability semi-elasticity, which 
measures the absolute change in the probability of health spending following a percentage 
change in income. As shown in Table 2.2, the probability semi-elasticity (evaluated at 
means) is 0.055. 
 
Table 2. 2: Income elasticity of household health expenditure 
 Total period Pre-EAP Post-EAP Significant 
difference29 
Probability semi-elasticity 
Probability 
semi-elasticity 
0.055 0.026 0.059 Yes 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)  
Unconditional income elasticity 
Main model 0.54 0.45 0.56 Yes 	29 Pairwise comparisons of elasticities were performed, using t-test statistics. This analysis was conducted 
using the relevant version of margins command in STATA. 
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TPM (logit, 
GLM Gamma) 
  
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
TPM (logit, 
OLS) 
0.52 0.43 0.54 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
TPM (logit, 
GLM Poisson) 
0.64 0.47 0.68 Yes 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)  
GLM Gamma 0.54 0.45 0.57 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  
OLS 0.46 0.41 0.48 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
GLM Poisson 0.64 0.49 0.70 Yes 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)  
2SLS 0.77 0.71 0.79 Yes 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  
 
We also estimate the probability semi-elasticity for the periods before and after the 
introduction of the EAP in Greece. We find a significant rise in the probability semi-
elasticity of HHE with respect to income after the introduction of the EAP, suggesting that 
an equal percentage change in income is associated with a greater change in the probability 
of spending after the EAP. As shown in Figure 2.4, the probability semi-elasticity is 0.026 
in the pre-EAP period and 0.059 in the post-EAP period. 
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Figure 2. 4: Probability semi-elasticity of household health expenditure in pre- and post-
EAP period (with 95% CI) 
 
Further, we provide evidence regarding the size of the unconditional income 
elasticity of HHE, which captures both probability and conditional elasticity (given by the 
first and second parts of the MTPM, respectively) (Mullahy, 1998). In particular, the 
income elasticity of HHE is estimated as 0.54, demonstrating that a 10% increase in 
household income is associated with a 5.4% rise in HHE. Thus, the size of the elasticity 
indicates that health care is—in technical terms—a necessity. In addition, our analysis 
shows that income elasticity rose from 0.45 to 0.56 following the introduction of the EAP 
(Figure 2.5). In the same vein, Table 2.2 shows that –after using an IV approach- income 
elasticity increases in the post-EAP period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0
2
.0
3
.0
4
.0
5
.0
6
.0
7
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y s
em
i-e
las
tic
ity
Pre-EAP Post-EAP
Period
Probability semi-elasticity in pre- and post-EAP period (with 95% CI)
	 75	
Figure 2. 5: Income elasticity of HHE in pre- and post-EAP period (with 95% CI) 
 
 
Overall, HHE is more responsive to income changes in the post-EAP period. 
Although these estimates rely on our baseline model, our results are robust to alternative 
models and estimation techniques, such as (a) TPM with log-transformed linear model as 
second part, (b) MTPM with GLM with Poisson family as second part, (c) several single-
equation models. Using different models, the magnitude of the income elasticity of HHE is 
similar to the one derived from the main model (see Table 2.2), while –according to all 
models we estimated-there is also a statistically significant increase in income elasticity in 
the post-EAP period. For example, the estimates of the conventional TPM (logit, OLS) 
show that the income elasticity amounts to 0.52, which is slightly lower than the baseline 
estimate. It also appears to increase after the introduction of the EAP (from 0.43 to 0.54).  
Apart from being robust to different modelling approaches, our results are also 
insensitive and robust to the inclusion/exclusion of explanatory variables. For instance, if 
we estimate the baseline model without including education as a control variable, income 
elasticity amounts to 0.51 and 0.59 for the pre- and post-EAP period respectively, while 
the relevant figure for the total period is 0.57. We also test the robustness of our findings, 
after controlling for a quadratic term of income, and income elasticity is 0.56. In the pre-
EAP period, it approximates 0.45, and increases to 0.60 in the post-EAP period. We 
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estimate the elasticities using other empirical models and further confirm the baseline 
findings. More details can be found in the Appendix Tables A6 and A7.  
 
2.6.4. Income elasticity of HHE, by household type 
Grouping households is interesting for our analysis since households of different 
SES may have different behaviour towards HHE and may react differently to income 
changes. Examining the income elasticity of HHE across household types therefore allows 
us to provide a more detailed and analytical overview of the way in which HHE responds 
to income changes. 
To check the potential heterogeneity in income elasticity, we stratified the sample 
by the following household types: (a) the bottom 40% of the income distribution, (b) 
female household heads, (c) low-educated household heads, (d) unemployed household 
heads, (e) uninsured household heads, (f) no working household members, (g) households 
with unmarried mothers as the household head, and (h) elderly couples. 
Table 2.3 presents the estimates of the income elasticity of HHE for different 
household types. The results are consistent with the findings presented in Section 2.6.3, 
confirming that health care is a necessity regardless of household type and SES. Moreover, 
our findings suggest heterogeneity across household types: HHE is more elastic for 
households with a higher SES. For instance, households in the bottom income quintiles 
exhibit a lower income elasticity of HHE relative to households in the top 60%. Similar 
results are reported for households whose heads are women, with a low level of education, 
unemployed, or uninsured as well as for households with no working members. For 
example, households headed by an unemployed member tend to have a lower income 
elasticity compared to those with an employed household head. In addition, in contrast to 
the households headed by employed individuals, the income elasticity of HHE did not 
increase among households with an unemployed household head. 
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Table 2. 3: Income elasticity of household health expenditure, by household type 
 Total 
period 
Pre-EAP Post-EAP Significant 
difference 
(pre-post) 
Income level     
Bottom 40% 0.29 0.40 0.26 No 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)  
Top 60% 0.75 0.59 0.79 Yes 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)  
Gender of household head     
Female 0.52 0.50 0.52 No 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)  
Male 0.54 0.43 0.58 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)  
Education of household head     
No formal education 0.49 0.34 0.52 No 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.06)  
Formal education 0.54 0.46 0.57 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
Employment status of household 
head 
    
Unemployed 0.46 0.52 0.47 No 
 (0.06) (0.15) (0.06)  
Employed 0.55 0.45 0.58 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  
Insurance status     
Uninsured 0.38 0.62 0.36 No 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.08)  
Insured 0.56 0.45 0.59 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
Working members     
No working members 0.40 0.30 0.42 No 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)  
Other type 0.64 0.46 0.68 Yes 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)  
Unmarried mother     
Unmarried mother 0.63 0.59 0.74 No 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.11)  
Other type 0.53 0.42 0.56 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
Elderly couple     
Elderly couple 0.42 0.44 0.41 No 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.05)  
Other 0.55 0.45 0.59 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  
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Our results also suggest a significant increase (at the 5% level) in income elasticity 
between the pre- and post-EAP periods for the majority of the subgroups. However, there 
is no significant increase in income elasticity for socially less-privileged population 
groups. Compared with the pre-EAP period, the higher socioeconomic strata become more 
responsive to income changes, whereas this is not the case for the lower socioeconomic 
groups. Therefore, a 10% change in income in the post-EAP period is associated with a 
higher percentage change for higher socioeconomic groups (compared with the pre-EAP 
period). We do not report similar findings for households of lower SES, which appear to 
retain the same sensitivity to income changes. This finding has various policy implications, 
as it indicates the differential responses in HHE across household types. 
 
2.6.5. Income elasticity of HHE, by the level of HHE 
The previous analysis focused on modelling HHE by using a conditional mean 
function. We also examined the potential heterogeneity in the income elasticity of HHE at 
different points of the conditional distribution of the response variable. By focusing on the 
non-zero observations of the HHE distribution, we ran quantile regressions at different 
points, finding that the income elasticity of HHE is positive and below unity; in other 
words, health care is a necessity across all quantiles of the HHE distribution. However, the 
size of the elasticity differs across these quantiles, as it is more income inelastic for 
households having relatively low HHE. Income elasticity is lower in the 0.10 quantile and 
gradually increases until the 0.60 quantile. In addition, it is relatively constant across the 
0.70–0.90 quintiles. 
 
Table 2. 4: Income elasticity of household health expenditure, by level of household health 
expenditure 
Quantile of 
HHE 
distribution 
Total period Pre-EAP Post-EAP Significant 
difference 
0.10 0.36 0.40 0.35 No 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)  
0.20 0.39 0.35 0.40 No 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)  
0.30 0.43 0.41 0.43 No 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
0.40 0.44 0.44 0.44 No 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
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0.50 0.48 0.46 0.49 No 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
0.60 0.51 0.45 0.53 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
0.70 0.50 0.42 0.53 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
0.80 0.50 0.40 0.54 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
0.90 0.50 0.43 0.53 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
 
In addition, we find a statistically significant increase in income elasticity for the 
higher quintiles (0.60–0.90 quintiles), whereas this is not the case for the lower quintiles. 
This finding is consistent with those reported in Section 2.6.4 since those in the lowest 
quintiles of the HHE distribution are less-privileged socioeconomic groups, for which we 
do not report an increase in the income elasticity of HHE. 
 
2.6.6. Using alternative measures of household welfare 
Household spending decisions are often based on long-run resources rather than 
current income. For instance, households may decide to liquidate assets, use savings, or 
bear additional debt to incur OOPE for health care. In this context, the elasticity with 
respect to permanent income might be different compared with the one with respect to 
current income. By using two alternative measures of a household’s financial situation (i.e. 
consumption expenditure and the CWI) and based on additional models (Tables A9 and 
A10 in Appendix A), we thus test the fourth hypothesis of this study. Our findings show 
that the elasticity of HHE with respect to permanent income is consistently higher than that 
with respect to current income, suggesting that HHE responses to permanent income 
changes are greater than those arising from current income changes (Table 2.5). This 
finding is robust when using either consumption or the CWI, both of which can better 
capture the notion of “permanent income” (Meyer & Sullivan, 2003; Mitrakos & 
Tsakloglou, 2010). 
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Table 2. 5: Income elasticity of household health expenditure (proxies for permanent 
income) 
Model Welfare 
measure 
Total 
period 
Pre-EAP Post-
EAP 
Significant 
difference 
TPM (logit, 
GLM Gamma) 
Log 
expenditure 
0.92 0.75 0.97 Yes 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
TPM (logit, 
GLM Gamma) 
CWI 1.09 0.83 1.17 Yes 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)  
 
By using the alternative measures of a household’s financial situation, our analysis shows 
that the income elasticity of HHE is consistently higher after the introduction of the EAP 
across all empirical models and estimation methods. These findings further confirm our 
first hypothesis regarding the increased income elasticity of HHE in the post-EAP period 
since they suggest that this finding is robust even when using alternative measures of 
household welfare.  
 
2.7. Discussion  
Using household data from repeated cross-sections over 2008–2015, our analysis 
identifies the determinants of HHE and examines potential changes in the income 
sensitivity of HHE and consumer behaviour following a severe economic crisis and the 
introduction of a large-scale EAP. The regression estimates suggest that the introduction of 
the EAP is associated with a lower probability of health care spending and lower HHE. 
Further, we find that the introduction of the EAP modifies the association between income 
and HHE. 
Our analysis reveals that the income elasticity of HHE is less than unity, implying 
that health care is a technical necessity. In other words, HHE increases (decreases) less 
than proportionally in response to an income increase (decrease). This finding is generally 
consistent with the vast majority of the literature using micro-data (Getzen, 2000). The size 
of our estimate can be attributed to the lack of adequate prepayment mechanisms and the 
high OOPE in Greece, not only as a share of health spending but also as a fraction of the 
household budget (OECD/EU, 2016). In a review of the literature, Getzen (2000) indeed 
notes that evidence suggests that income elasticity tends to be somewhat greater –ranging 
from 0.2 to 0.7- in cases where “insurance is less prevalent and most payment is made out 
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of pocket” (Getzen, 2000). The results are generally robust across econometric 
specifications, and indicate that HHE is not a voluntary and deliberate choice (Lépine, 
2015). Rather, it is related to either health shocks or households’ responses to gaining 
access to health services in the context of a fragmented health system that does not ensure 
the accessible and timely provision of high-quality care (Davaki & Mossialos, 2005; 
Economou, 2010). 
Examining whether health care is a necessity or luxury has significant implications 
from a public policy perspective, especially regarding health financing. For instance, if 
health care is indeed a necessity, then there are further grounds and arguments for more 
active public involvement in health financing and in the health care system more generally 
(Baltagi et al., 2017; Costa-Font et al., 2011; Gertler & Hammer, 1997). However, 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that health care is a luxury suggests weaker public 
intervention in health financing and coverage and a greater role for market forces (Di 
Matteo, 2005).  
In terms of Hypothesis 1, our analysis indicates a statistically significant increase in 
the income elasticity of HHE between the pre- and post-EAP periods (from 0.45 to 0.56). 
Households are more responsive to income changes after the introduction of the EAP, and 
this finding is robust across econometric specifications. Furthermore, it is in line with other 
studies that have found that the income elasticity of HHE increased after the 1997 
economic crisis in Thailand and Korea (Okunade et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2001). In 
contrast to the crises in Thailand and Korea, the Greek crisis was much stronger in terms of 
length and intensity. We also show a significant increase in the probability semi-elasticity 
of HHE with respect to income, suggesting that a proportionally similar change in income 
is associated with a higher change in the probability of incurring HHE in the post-EAP 
period (relative to the pre-EAP period). Therefore, it appears that households’ decisions to 
spend on health care as well as the level of HHE became more sensitive to income changes 
after the introduction of the EAP. These findings imply a change in household behaviour 
towards health care, since households appear to exhibit greater consumption responses to 
changes in their income during the post-EAP period. 
This finding can be further explained from a theoretical perspective. One 
explanation for the greater income sensitivity is associated with the unnecessary use of and 
non-essential payments for health care. In particular, households may decide to reduce 
OOPE for non-essential health care goods and services after an economic crisis (in the 
same way that they may reduce expenses for restaurants or clothing), as a response to 
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increasing financial difficulties (Yang et al., 2001). Second, households may become more 
sensitive to income changes since they normally reduce their HHE and shift towards public 
services during periods of economic distress because of their reduced purchasing power 
and ability to pay OOPE (H. Waters et al., 2003a; Yang et al., 2001). This is indeed 
depicted in the increase in hospital admissions, outpatient visits, and laboratory tests in 
public health services after the introduction of the EAP (Institute of Social and Preventive 
Medicine, 2016; Kentikelenis & Papanicolas, 2012). Our findings confirm that households 
continue to consider health care to be a necessity. They also suggest that different priorities 
and preferences exist regarding the consumption of health care and HHE in the post-EAP 
period. OOPE for health care is more elastic and generally considered to be less 
“necessary” in the post-EAP period given the alternative of using public services. 
To examine Hypothesis 2, we estimated the income elasticity of HHE by household 
type. While HHE is generally income inelastic across all household types, we did find 
heterogeneous responses of HHE to income changes based on households’ SES or degree 
of vulnerability. In particular, HHE is more inelastic for lower SES households. Overall, 
lower socioeconomic groups exhibit lower flexibility in HHE as income changes than 
higher socioeconomic strata. Based on a descriptive analysis of the Greek HBS data for 
2005 and 2009, another study also reported that HHE is more inelastic among low-income 
households because of the relatively inflexible need for care (Kondilis, Giannakopoulos, et 
al., 2013). Our finding can be explained on the basis of the different mixes of medical 
goods and services consumed by each socioeconomic group and their relative costs. For 
instance, the HHE of less-privileged households primarily consists of payments for 
pharmaceuticals (i.e. user charges and payments for non-reimbursed medicines), while 
they tend to incur lower expenses for hospital/outpatient visits and dental care. These 
combinations of health care goods and services might result in heterogeneous consumption 
responses to income changes since the expenses for some health care goods and services 
(e.g. cost-sharing for medicines) are more essential and cannot be easily avoided or 
substituted by shifting to the public sector. 
In addition, the heterogeneity in income elasticity can be attributed to several 
structural barriers to accessing health care for the poorer segments of society. This result 
highlights the need for progressive policies that aim for equity in health care access and 
financing (Zare et al., 2013). Several barriers impede access to health care in Greece, 
especially for the most vulnerable groups (Kyriopoulos et al., 2014; Zavras, Zavras, 
Kyriopoulos, & Kyriopoulos, 2016). In this context, appropriate public policy responses 
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are needed, especially for less-privileged households. Further, the lower income sensitivity 
of HHE among lower socioeconomic groups can be interpreted on the basis of the 
socioeconomic gradient in health and the fact that poorer individuals tend to have lower 
health status and greater health care needs. 
In terms of Hypothesis 3, in contrast to higher socioeconomic groups, less-
privileged households did not become more sensitive to income changes in the post-EAP 
period. As pointed out above, households often shift to public services and avoid OOPE 
for some types of health care because of reduced disposable income (Yang et al., 2001). 
However, such mechanisms cannot work for certain types of OOPE. In particular, there is 
no substitute (in the public sector) for user charges, which constitute a prerequisite for 
gaining access to certain health care. For instance, cost-sharing schemes in pharmaceutical 
care imply that individuals should pay user charges to receive and adhere to their therapy. 
Households whose HHE primarily consists of payments for pharmaceuticals (or user 
charges more generally) did not become more sensitive to income changes because their 
HHE is relatively rigid. Poor households appear to be more “protective” about their health 
care consumption compared with richer ones, and this intensified in the post-EAP, during 
which HHE became more elastic for higher socioeconomic groups, but not for less-
privileged households. This relative “rigidity” of poorer households as income changes 
combined with the high share of income devoted to health care raises concerns about the 
implications of the EAP on household welfare because of the increased incidence of 
catastrophic expenditure at the household level. Given the budget constraints faced by 
poorer households, such a finding illustrates that they may cut spending on other goods and 
services rather than that for health following an income decrease. 
Further, HHE is income inelastic over its conditional distribution. However, the 
quantile regression estimates show that HHE is more income inelastic in the lower 
quantiles of the HHE distribution. A statistically significant increase in the income 
elasticity of HHE is only observed in the top quantiles of the HHE distribution (0.6–0.9 
quintiles), suggesting that contrary to those at the bottom, “big spenders” are those who 
actually became more sensitive to income changes during the post-EAP period. This 
finding serves as an additional robustness check to the aforementioned findings, as 
households in the lower quantiles are expected to be lower socioeconomic groups (neither 
of which exhibited a statistically significant increase in income elasticity between the pre- 
and post-EAP periods). 
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Finally, Hypothesis 4 concerned income sensitivity with respect to permanent 
income. To our knowledge, this is the first study examining how HHE responds to current 
and permanent income and identifying potential differences depending on the welfare 
measure used. Measures of permanent income are particularly important to better 
understand households’ health care consumption since households tend to smooth 
consumption over their lifetime and their consumption decisions are rather based on 
permanent income or the notion of lifetime wealth rather than current income. Transitory 
income changes tend to have only small effects on consumption, whereas permanent 
shocks are associated with greater consumption responses (Jappelli & Pistaferri, 2010). We 
show that the size of income elasticity is greater when using more permanent measures of 
welfare. In other words, HHE responses to permanent income are greater than those arising 
from variations in current income. In addition, by using consumption expenditure and the 
CWI, we present strong evidence of greater income sensitivity in the post-EAP period, a 
finding that further validates our baseline results. 
Finally, our study has some limitations. First, the aggregate nature of the EAP as 
well as the cross-sectional design of the surveys do not allow us to employ quasi-
experimental approaches or estimate the causal effects. Therefore, the interpretation of 
associations as causal relationships should be made with caution. Second, our model does 
not include a health variable. This is a common limitation in studies using household data 
(Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2011; Okunade et al., 2010; Zare et al., 2013), since it is 
practically difficult to approximate health status at the household level and most budget 
surveys do not ask questions about health status. However, we control for proxies for the 
need for health care at the household level, especially those groups considered to be heavy 
health care users. Last, the impact of each of the “triple hits” cannot be isolated and tested 
separately, due to lack of relevant data.  
 
2.8. Conclusion  
The unprecedented length and intensity of the Greek crisis as well as the magnitude 
of the fiscal adjustment make this case particularly interesting in several respects. In 
particular, Greek households experienced the “triple hit” of public budget cuts, increased 
user charges, and a large decrease in disposable income and household purchasing power. 
The presented analysis of how households behaved in the face of this economic shock (and 
the associated “triple hit”) suggests that the introduction of the EAP is associated with a 
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lower probability of health care spending and lower HHE. Apart from the regression 
estimates, we show that households became more sensitive to income changes after the 
introduction of the EAP. We also find heterogeneity in the income elasticity of HHE across 
household types and over the HHE distribution as well as show that lower SES households 
did not become more sensitive to income changes after the onset of the economic crisis. 
Lastly, by using a novel proxy for permanent income, our findings suggest that HHE 
responses to permanent income changes are greater than those arising from current income 
changes. From a public policy perspective, this study provides evidence and informs 
policymaking about households’ behaviour towards health care, health financing, and the 
design of social safety nets. 
Our findings have several policy implications. Estimating the income sensitivity of 
HHE is useful for evidence-based health policy because it thoroughly informs 
policymaking about resource allocation decisions and financing (Lépine, 2015; Zare et al., 
2013) and allows governments to improve the design of social safety net programmes 
aiming to protect the vulnerable from structural adjustments (Rous & Hotchkiss, 2003). 
Low income elasticity provides grounds for public policy responses and interventions that 
aim to reduce the OOP price through subsidies or abolish cost-sharing mechanisms for 
lower socioeconomic groups, which are less responsive to income changes (Zare et al., 
2013). Based on our findings, and considering that health financing in Greece largely relies 
on OOPE, a potential policy response could incorporate exemptions from user charges for 
vulnerable households or income-related user charges. The introduction of such a scheme 
would improve equity in financing by reducing the financial burden of OOPE for less-
privileged households, leading to higher progressivity in health financing. Although the 
introduction of income-related user charges constitutes the “first-best solution”, it 
incorporates several practical problems and difficulties (Barros, 2012). First, the 
implementation of this system is associated with high administrative costs and might be 
complicated. Second, there is a dearth of data on actual income in Greece because of high 
levels of informal activity, deficiencies in the tax system, and tax evasion, which lead to 
significant distributional effects (Matsaganis & Flevotomou, 2010). Therefore, relying on 
tax data for introducing differential user charges may be misleading. Such a problem 
clearly threatens the objective of this system (i.e. to establish equity and higher 
progressivity in health financing). Instead of such a complicated scheme, another policy 
response could simply promote reductions in the OOP price (e.g. subsidies or abolish cost-
sharing mechanisms) for specific types of households with a low ability to pay. In addition, 
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our findings highlight the need to protect basic health care, especially during prolonged 
economic recessions. This appears to be necessary in order to preserve adequate human 
health capital for investment and consumption, which in turn can be catalysts for triggering 
economic recovery and also improve labour productivity.  
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Chapter 3 
Financial protection in health among middle-aged and elderly: evidence 
from the Greek economic recession 
Abstract 
Since the late 2000s, the Greek economy has entered a long period of recession and 
adopted various fiscal consolidation measures, with reforms and retrenchment in health 
care being among the main public policy priorities. Based on data from the Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), this study investigates the extent to 
which financial risk protection in health has changed among older households during the 
economic crisis in Greece. We focus on the middle-aged and elderly; the heavy users of 
health services with high need and costs for health care, who have also faced a substantial 
health and financial burden during the crisis. Our analysis shows that the headcount and 
overshoot of catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) substantially increased during the 
crisis, suggesting that financial protection has eroded to a great extent among the middle-
aged and elderly. Prior to the economic crisis, CHE was mainly due to inpatient and 
nursing care, followed by outpatient care and medicines. However, our findings reveal that 
the contribution of household pharmaceutical spending to CHE substantially increased 
during the study period. The headcount of CHE rose across all population groups we 
examined, with low-income and households with chronic and multimorbid patients being 
disproportionately affected. Our results are generally robust to different scenarios and 
definitions of CHE. Although we do not report signs of socioeconomic inequalities in the 
risk of CHE in 2007, our findings show that the probability of CHE is decreasing with 
households’ financial situation in 2015, revealing substantial inequalities. Hence, 
especially after the onset of the crisis, low-income households are less protected against 
the financial catastrophe due to OOPE; a finding that raises significant distributional and 
equity concerns. Strengthening financial protection among the middle-aged and elderly is 
an imperative challenge for the Greek health system, and several policy responses need to 
be adopted towards this direction. 
 
Keywords: financial protection, catastrophic health payments, health coverage, older 
households, elderly, fiscal adjustment, Greece 
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3.1. Introduction  
 Since the late 2000s, the Greek economy has entered a long period of economic 
recession, which is possibly the most severe economic decline among high-income 
countries in the past decades (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014). Greece was effectively excluded 
from the credit markets in early 2010, and eventually received the largest bailout package 
in history (Gourinchas et al., 2016). The Greek government agreed to implement a set of 
fiscal consolidation measures and reforms aiming to reduce fiscal deficit and restore 
external competitiveness in exchange for official assistance from the EU, the ECB and the 
IMF (Ardagna & Caselli, 2012; Zettelmeyer et al., 2013). However, in contrast to the 
countries that successfully graduated from their adjustment programmes, Greece signed 
three successive programmes, all of which adopted a tight fiscal stance, included large-
scale reforms and imposed substantial conditionality (Pagoulatos, 2018).  
The fiscal consolidation came at an unprecedented cost. Having peaked at 27.5%, 
the unemployment rate has exceeded 20% during recent years, whereas GDP has shrunk 
by more than a quarter (Eurostat, 2018c). In terms of the long-term effects, Greece also 
faced the largest loss in potential output among OECD countries (Ball, 2014). In addition, 
the deep decade-long recession had significant implications on inequality and poverty rates 
(Andriopoulou et al., 2017; Kaplanoglou & Rapanos, 2016; Leventi & Matsaganis, 2016). 
In a similar spirit, Eurostat data demonstrate that some important social indicators, such as 
the percentage of the population with severe material deprivation and the share of those 
who are unable to make ends meet, deteriorated after the inception of the crisis30 (Eurostat, 
2019a).  
Given that the fiscal imbalances in Greece can be largely linked to the dysfunctions 
and inefficiencies of the health and welfare system (Matsaganis, 2011; Petmesidou et al., 
2014), reforms and retrenchment in health care were inevitably among the main priorities 
of the public policy agenda during the crisis (OECD, 2014; Pagoulatos, 2018). Focusing on 
health care, Greece implemented various cost-containment measures to cut down the 
	30 According to Eurostat, for example, the percentage of the population with severe material deprivation was 
approximately 11% before the inception of the crisis, and escalated to more than 20% in the period after 
2013. Likewise, the percentage of the population who are unable to make ends meet increased from 20% to 
almost 40% in the period after 2013.  
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public budget, with public expenditure on health being capped at 6% of GDP 31 
(Karanikolos et al., 2013; Kentikelenis & Papanicolas, 2012). Second, user charges 
substantially increased especially for outpatient prescription drugs and diagnostic tests 
(Thomson et al., 2014). The cost-sharing schemes, along with the internal reference pricing 
for medicines, shifted the health costs to patients (Kentikelenis et al., 2014; World Health 
Organization, 2018). For example, recent estimates suggest that the effective co-payment 
rate for prescription medicines is, on average, higher than 20% (Gouvalas et al., 2016; 
Kanavos & Souliotis, 2017). Third, the benefits package became less comprehensive, 
having potential implications in the scope of coverage (Economou et al., 2014).  Lastly, 
given that entitlement to health insurance largely depends on employment status, the 
uninsured population rapidly increased due to the rising unemployment trends during the 
recession (Economou et al., 2017). Data from the Greek Ministry of Health and the 
European Commission, for example, indicate that the uninsured population approached 
2.0-2.5 million in Greece (European Commission, 2015a; Greek Ministry of Health, 2016)  
The looming erosion of health coverage, along with the adverse effects of the 
economic turmoil on households’ financial situation, pose significant challenges to Greek 
households, which historically incur high out-of-pocket health payments compared to their 
counterparts in other OECD countries (I. Kyriopoulos, Nikoloski, & Mossialos, 2019; 
Mossialos et al., 2005). Whether the incidence of financial catastrophe due to these 
payments increases during periods of economic hardship cannot be easily answered a 
priori. Some studies, for example, show that households tend to curtail OOPE and shift 
towards public services, or do not even seek health care during economic recessions (H. 
Waters et al., 2003a; Yang et al., 2001). If this is the case, households’ reliance on out-of-
pocket payments is expected to scale down. On the other hand, policy responses to the 
crisis have been expected to decrease disposable income and have presumably eroded 
health coverage, resulting in weakened financial protection mechanisms (Stuckler et al., 
2017). 
This study particularly focuses on financial protection and catastrophic health 
payments among older households. The concerns about the risk of CHE and financial 
protection are more pronounced for this age group (Bloom et al., 2015; Hwang et al., 2001; 
Quintal & Lopes, 2016), for four key reasons. First, the elderly tend to suffer from multiple 	31At the time of writing this paper, public spending on health was approximately 5.1% of GDP. In 2010, 
before the implementation of the fiscal adjustment programme, it peaked at 6.6% of GDP.  
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chronic conditions and have greater needs and costs for health care but fewer financial 
resources to cover them (Goldman & Zissimopoulos, 2003; Jayawardana, Cylus, & 
Mossialos, 2019; Kawabata, Xu, & Carrin, 2002; Lehnert et al., 2011). Second, in contrast 
to countries in which pensions and salaries were largely protected, the income of older 
people fell substantially due to the large pension and salary cuts in Greece (Giannitsis & 
Zografakis, 2018; McKee & Stuckler, 2016), while the probability of reemployment 
success is low among the middle-aged who lost their jobs during the recession (Wanberg, 
Kanfer, Hamann, & Zhang, 2016). Both these factors resulted in a further reduction in 
households’ ability to pay for medical care. Third, evidence indicates that older people 
may be more vulnerable to the negative health consequences of an economic crisis (Cutler, 
Knaul, Lozano, Méndez, & Zurita, 2002; Laliotis et al., 2016). Last, Greece has one of the 
highest percentages of population aged more than 60, with the projected share being more 
than 40% by 2050 (United Nations, 2017).  
Against this background, this study investigates financial protection among older 
households in Greece, and examines the extent to which the incidence and intensity of 
CHE have changed over the period of the recent economic crisis. The study contributes to 
the literature in the following ways. First, it extensively explores the changes in financial 
protection for high-need, high-cost patients during a period of economic recession. 
Although a recent comparative paper analysed the trends in OOPE during 2007-2013 
across some European countries (Palladino et al., 2016), it did not particularly focus on the 
changes in financial protection across different population groups. This is important, given 
that health policy responses during an economic crisis may have different implications 
across different population groups (Kondilis, Giannakopoulos, et al., 2013; Stuckler et al., 
2017). Additionally, this study did not include Greece, which has been arguably hardest hit 
by the recession in Europe.  Second, we identify which types of expenditure are the main 
contributors to the overall CHE among older households, and how they have changed over 
the period of the recession. Third, we employ regression models that address potential 
selection issues, arising from the fact that some households may not use medical care due 
to financial barriers to accessing medical services (S. Brown, Hole, & Kilic, 2014; 
Kawabata et al., 2002). This is particularly relevant in our case, given that the share of 
people reporting unmet needs and barriers to accessing health services has significantly 
risen during the economic crisis (Eurostat, 2018d; Kentikelenis et al., 2014; Kyriopoulos et 
al., 2014). 
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3.2. Literature review 
3.2.1. Financial protection in health: theoretical background and stylized facts   
Financial protection is a key factor for universal health coverage and a crucial 
element of health system performance assessment (Saksena, Hsu, & Evans, 2014; 
Wagstaff, 2008). There are at least three reasons that explain the need for and the 
importance of financial protection for patients. First, OOPE and demand for health care are 
irregular, unpredictable, and not “steady in origin”, unlike that for other goods and services 
(Arrow, 1963). In particular, there is increased uncertainty about the incidence of OOPE, 
and the timing and severity of disease. Second, health care is often costly and households 
may be unable to bear the financial burden of health payments. In some cases, even low-
cost medical care can lead to severe financial difficulties, especially for the poor and 
vulnerable population groups (WHO, 2005). Third, poor health and illness are linked with 
productivity loss and a fall in income and also increase the risk of poverty, which is in turn 
associated with worse health status (Cole & Neumayer, 2006; OECD and WHO, 2003). 
Financial protection can be achieved by sharing the risk of financial hardship 
across individuals (pooling) and by spreading the risk over time (prepayment) (Mossialos 
& Dixon, 2002). Pooling protects households from high and unpredictable health payments 
and equates contributions regardless of the risk of illness and the need for medical care. 
Prepayment reduces uncertainty as contributors pay an average expected cost in advance 
(Carrin, Buse, Heggenhougen, & Quah, 2009). In this context, pooling and prepayment are 
particularly important for cross-subsidization between richer and poorer (equity subsidy), 
and between high- and low-risk individuals (risk subsidy) (Gottret & Schieber, 2006) 
Strong financial protection serves two important policy objectives: equity and 
efficiency (Moreno-Serra, Thomson, & Xu, 2013). From an equity perspective, financial 
protection can substantially improve equity in financing and facilitate access to health 
services (Kutzin, 2013). For example, strong financial protection arises from the presence 
of adequate prepayment schemes, which are expected to lower OOPE and reduce the 
regressivity of health financing (Murray, Knaul, Musgrove, Xu, & Kawabata, 2000). 
Comprehensive coverage is also expected to facilitate access to health services for the most 
vulnerable population groups, which might have previously forgone care due to financial 
barriers to access (Moreno-Serra & Smith, 2012). In addition to equity considerations, 
financial protection also generates substantial efficiency gains. From a health system 
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perspective, pooled resources can be better used to cover population needs for health care 
compared to OOPE, leading to more health benefits. In the absence of financial protection 
mechanisms, patients may postpone the use of medical care or face unmet needs, which 
may in turn exacerbate the severity of their health problems in the future, resulting in 
greater need for more expensive medical care due to late diagnosis and treatment (J. Chen, 
Rizzo, & Rodriguez, 2011). This is expected to generate additional future costs and 
substantial inefficiencies. From a macroeconomic standpoint, if households do not need to 
save resources to pay OOPE, consumption and investment will possibly increase and 
further promote economic growth32  (Frenk & De Ferranti, 2012; Moreno-Serra et al., 
2013; Soucat, 2017).  
Generally speaking, health systems with strong financial protection mechanisms 
share some common characteristics. First, countries with a low incidence of financial 
catastrophe tend to have a low level of OOPE, which is normally less than 15% of their 
total health expenditure (WHO, 2005; WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2018b). Second, 
financial protection mechanisms are better and stronger in countries with high public 
expenditure on health. Cross-country evidence shows that financial protection is linked not 
only with the fiscal space and a government’s capacity to devote resources to public 
expenditure (i.e. public spending as a share of GDP), but also with the public policy 
priorities when allocating the public budget (i.e. public spending on health as a share of 
total public spending) (Heller, 2006; Tandon & Cashin, 2010). Third, the accurate design 
of all health coverage dimensions (breadth, scope, depth) is widely considered as a 
significant aspect affecting the strength and extent of financial protection across 
countries33 (Thomson et al., 2009). In this context, evidence suggests that countries with 
comprehensive financial protection mechanisms tend to adopt specific strategies for health 
coverage and cost sharing, such as low fixed co-payments instead of percentage co-
insurance rate, caps for co-payments for each individual or household, and several 
exemptions for the most vulnerable population groups, such as the low-income households 
and the heavy users of health care (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2018b). 	32Further information on the potential macroeconomic effects of weak financial protection mechanisms are 
summarized in several reports, which also elaborate on the ‘poverty trap’ due to health payments and the 
potential implications of restricted access to health care and poor health on labour productivity (WHO, 2000, 
2010). 33 Breadth of coverage is defined on the basis of entitlement to healthcare, and identifies who is covered by 
prepayment and statutory schemes. The scope of coverage is determined by the range and quality of services 
and benefits covered, and relates to the health services included in the benefits package. Last, the depth of 
coverage is determined by the level of user charges and the proportion of costs covered by prepayment 
mechanisms (WHO, 2010). 
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3.2.2. Empirical evidence on financial catastrophe due to health payments 
Measuring financial protection across countries has attracted scholarly interest, 
from both a methodological and policy perspective. In a seminal cross-country study, Xu et 
al. (2003) employed cross-country survey data and provided comparative evidence on the 
incidence of CHE from the mid to late 1990s. Xu et al. defined health payments as 
catastrophic if they were higher than 40% of a household’s capacity to pay, and showed 
that there was considerable variation in the frequency of CHE, which was relatively greater 
among transition and Latin American countries (Xu et al., 2003). In a follow-up study, 
they used 116 datasets from 89 countries, covering almost 89% of the world population 
(Xu et al., 2007). Similar to their previous findings, they showed that there were 
substantial differences in financial protection across countries. For example, more than one 
out of ten households incurred CHE in Brazil and Vietnam, whereas the corresponding 
figure approximated 0% in the United Kingdom, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.  
In a recent study covering 133 countries, Wagstaff et al (2018) estimated the global 
incidence of CHE, setting the CHE threshold at 10% of total household expenditure 
(Wagstaff et al., 2018). According to their estimates, the global rate of CHE was 9.7% in 
2000, rose to 11.4% in 2005, and slightly increased to 11.7% in 2010. The latter 
corresponds to approximately 808 million people, with most of them living in Asian 
countries (World Health Organization and World Bank, 2017). The highest headcount of 
CHE was observed in Latin American and Caribbean countries (14.8%) followed by Asian 
and African countries, the CHE incidence of which approximated 12.8% and 11.4% 
respectively. The share of households having CHE was 7.2% in Europe, and somewhat 
lower in Northern America (4.6%) and Oceania (3.9%). 
 
Evidence from the USA and the European region 
Apart from the cross-country findings, a strand of the literature focuses on 
particular countries, aiming to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the incidence, 
intensity and potential determinants of the risk of CHE. For instance, Waters et al. (2004) 
employed household-level data and estimated the extent of financial protection in the US 
population (H. R. Waters, Anderson, & Mays, 2004). Using a threshold of 10% of income, 
they showed that 7.5% of households faced CHE, with the poorer and those with chronic 
patients being more susceptible to CHE. Evidence from the USA also suggests that almost 
seven out of ten uninsured patients who had emergency surgery incurred CHE due to 
hospital costs (Scott et al., 2017), while a similar incidence has also been reported among 
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uninsured trauma patients (Scott et al., 2018). By employing a threshold of CHE at 10% of 
income, another study found that 18.2% of the population aged between 65 and 74 faced 
CHE in the USA, whereas the corresponding percentage for those above 75 years was 
23.2% (Baird, 2016). With the exception of France and Slovenia, the incidence of CHE 
among American households in these age groups was generally comparable with that of 
European countries. 
A recent analysis showed substantial differences across European countries, with 
Moldova, Georgia and Latvia having the highest headcount of CHE followed by Albania 
and various East European countries (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2018b). 
According to these estimates, the share of households at risk of financial catastrophe due to 
health payments was also quite high in Greece and Portugal. However, some countries 
appear to perform quite well in terms of financial protection. Recent evidence, for 
example, shows that the headcount of CHE is less than 2% in France, Sweden, Ireland, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom (O’Dowd, Kumpunen, & Holder, 
2018).  
Besides the cross-country variation in the rate of CHE, there are also differences in 
the trends of the headcount of CHE over recent years, possibly reflecting the different 
health financing policies and the heterogeneous responses to the economic crisis. For 
instance, the incidence of CHE increased from 2.1% to 3.2% during 2010-2015 in Austria 
(Czypionka, Röhrling, & Six, 2018), remained relatively stable at 1.5% in the UK, and 
decreased in Croatia and Germany (Siegel & Busse, 2018; Voncina & Rubil, 2018). 
Setting the threshold of CHE at 30% of a household’s capacity to pay, a recent study from 
Greece also showed that the incidence of CHE increased from 2.18% to 3.46% during 
2010-2015 (Chantzaras & Yfantopoulos, 2018). Setting the threshold of CHE at 30% of 
the total income, another comparative study found substantial cross-country differences in 
the headcount of CHE among the οlder population. In 2013, Italy and Spain had the higher 
share of households at risk of CHE, followed by Czech Republic and Austria (Palladino et 
al., 2016). Focusing on the period 2007-2013, Palladino et al. showed that the incidence of 
CHE increased only in Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic, but not in the other European 
countries included.  
Using a cut-off point of 40% of capacity to pay, Kronenberg and Barros (2014) 
found that the incidence of CHE decreased from 7.9% to 5.0% in Portugal during 2000-
2005 (Kronenberg & Barros, 2014). Another study employed data from the 2010 
Portuguese HBS, and found that the frequency of CHE was 2.1% (Quintal & Lopes, 2016), 
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with the risk of CHE being substantially higher for households with an elderly household 
member. Both studies suggest that higher income is associated with a lower probability of 
having CHE in Portugal. A similar pattern is observed in Belgium, where the headcount of 
CHE is somewhat lower among the richer households (De Graeve & Van Ourti, 2003). For 
example, almost 2% of households incurred CHE in Belgium, with the incidence of CHE 
being more than 5% in the first income quintile and less than 1% among the high-income 
households. Dukhan et al. (2010) employed a cut-off point of 40% of household capacity 
to pay and found that CHE incidence decreased from 2% to less than 1% over the period 
1995-2006 in France (Dukhan, Korachais, Xu, Saksena, & Mathonnat, 2010). Contrary to 
the results from Portugal and Belgium, CHE was more common among the high-income 
households. 
Apart from the core EU countries, a strand of the literature has also examined the 
extent of financial protection in Eastern Europe and the Balkan region. Bredenkamp et al. 
(2011) provided comparative evidence for financial protection in the Western Balkans 
(Bredenkamp, Mendola, & Gragnolati, 2011). Using a cut-off point of 10% of total 
expenditure, they found that the incidence of CHE exceeded 20% in Albania and Kosovo 
in the early 2000s, but was noticeably lower in the other countries of the region. Updated 
findings from Albania revealed that the rate of CHE substantially decreased from more 
than 20% to approximately 13% during 2002-2008. However, there were still significant 
socioeconomic disparities, with low-income households being more prone to financial 
catastrophe due to health payments than their richer counterparts (Tomini, Packard, & 
Tomini, 2013). Using data from Serbia, another study also documented that poor 
households are more susceptible to CHE (Arsenijevic, Pavlova, & Groot, 2013). 
Additionally, it showed that rural residence, a large number of household members and the 
presence of chronic patients in the household are expected to further increase the risk of 
CHE. 
Setting a cut-off point of 10% of total expenditure, evidence from Turkey shows 
that the share of households with CHE ranged from 3.2% to 4.8% over the period 2004-
2010 (Özgen Narcı, Şahin, & Yıldırım, 2015). Various studies corroborate that household 
income is a significant determinant of CHE, with poorer households being less likely to 
encounter CHE in Turkey (S. Brown et al., 2014; Yardim, Cilingiroglu, & Yardim, 2010). 
Contrary to these results, evidence from various countries, such as Georgia (Gotsadze, 
Zoidze, & Rukhadze, 2009; Zoidze, Rukhazde, Chkhatarashvili, & Gotsadze, 2013) and 
Estonia (Habicht, Xu, Couffinhal, & Kutzin, 2006), show that the worse-off tend to be 
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more susceptible to financial catastrophe due to health payments.  
 
Evidence from other countries 
A large body of evidence has focused on financial protection in Asia. For example, 
a study estimated the headcount and overshoot of financial catastrophe due to health 
payments in 14 Asian countries (van Doorslaer et al., 2007). Their findings reveal that 
there is substantial variation in CHE measures in Asia, with Bangladesh, Vietnam, China 
and India being the countries with the highest incidence of CHE. Assuming that the 
threshold of CHE is 10% of total household expenditure, 10-15% of households faced 
CHE among these countries. Focusing on patients who suffered from acute coronary 
events, a comparative study examined the extent of financial protection across some Asian 
countries (Jan et al., 2016). Overall, two out of three uninsured patients encountered CHE, 
whereas the corresponding figure for the insured patients was approximately 50%. Similar 
to van Doorslaer et al. (2007), this study also reported significant cross-country differences 
in the headcount of CHE. For instance, almost 80% of uninsured and 56% of insured 
patients suffering an acute coronary event incurred CHE in China, while the incidence of 
CHE was almost zero in Malaysia. In China, more than one in ten households experienced 
financial catastrophe due to health payments, with the incidence being significantly greater 
among poor households and those with chronic patients (Li et al., 2012; Meng et al., 2012). 
Using alternative definitions, another study showed that more than a quarter of elderly 
households incurred CHE in China (Z. Wang, Li, & Chen, 2015), and also found that 
health insurance is not a protective factor against the risk of CHE. Lastly, a significant 
strand of the literature has examined the trends in financial protection in Thailand, 
especially after the implementation of various policies to achieve universal health 
coverage. Using several thresholds to define CHE, a study showed that both headcount and 
overshoot of CHE gradually declined after the introduction of universal health coverage 
(Somkotra & Lagrada, 2008). Assuming a cut-off point of 10% of total expenditure, for 
example, the CHE headcount declined from 6.4% to 4.9% during 2000-2004. In a follow-
up analysis, another study found a further reduction in the incidence of CHE, which 
approached 4% of Thai households in 2006 (Somkotra & Lagrada, 2009). Evidence also 
reveals that high-income households and households with chronic patients or hospitalized 
members are more likely to incur CHE in Thailand (Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathien, 
& Prakongsai, 2007; Somkotra & Lagrada, 2009).   
Using a cut-off point of 30% of non-food expenditure, a cross-country analysis 
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examined the headcount of CHE in twelve Latin American and Caribbean countries during 
the 2000s, with the highest incidence of CHE being observed in Chile (approximately 
15.4%) followed by Guatemala, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic and Argentina (Knaul, 
Wong, Arreola-Ornelas, & Méndez, 2011). Low-income, uninsured households and those 
with children and elderly members were more likely to experience financial catastrophe 
due to health payments. In another study, Wagstaff et al. (2015) showed that almost all 
Latin American countries have achieved substantial improvements in terms of financial 
protection and universal health coverage over the period 1990-2013 (Wagstaff et al., 
2015). Using data from 1992 to 2004, Knaul et al. (2006) found that financial protection 
deteriorated during the Mexican economic crisis in the mid 1990s, but gradually improved 
in the late 1990s (Knaul et al., 2006). It is noteworthy that this pattern was generally robust 
to different thresholds and definitions of CHE. Some other studies have also examined the 
trends in CHE and the impact of health insurance reforms on financial protection in 
Mexico, and have showed that the incidence of CHE generally varies between 2% and 5% 
depending on income group and insurance status (Doubova, Pérez-Cuevas, Canning, & 
Reich, 2015; Knaul et al., 2012; Nikoloski & Mossialos, 2018). 
  
3.3. Data and methods 
3.3.1. Data 
Our analysis relies on survey data from the SHARE, a cross-national survey that 
includes micro-level data about physical and mental health, health care use and costs, 
household consumption and assets, housing, behavioural risks, cognitive function, social 
network, family relationships, demographics and socioeconomic characteristics (Börsch-
Supan et al., 2013). This survey particularly focuses on the older segments of the 
population, and covers those aged more than 50 years old.  
In order to conduct this analysis, we employ cross-sectional data from Waves 2 and 
6 for Greece, which took place in 2007 and 2015 respectively.34 Wave 2 was conducted 
just before the onset of the economic crisis, whereas Wave 6 took place in a period when 
the effects and implications of the crisis were pronounced and fully evident. Therefore, we 
employ micro-level data for a period spanning the economic crisis (Lyberaki & Tinios, 	34  SHARE Wave 3 (SHARELIFE) is not relevant for this study, since it focuses on variables about 
respondents’ life history. Wave 2 is thus the latest available wave for the pre-crisis period. In addition, 
Greece did not participate in SHARE waves 4 and 5, which took place in 2011 and 2013 (Lyberaki & Tinios, 
2018; SHARE Release Guide, 2018).  
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2018). The sample size in Wave 2 is 3,412 individuals, with 1,524 of them aged more than 
65. Likewise, Wave 6 includes 4,937 observations, and approximately half of them are 
more than 65 years old. The sample size for the pooled dataset amounts to 8,349 
individuals, who live in 5,558 households.  
 
3.3.2. Measuring incidence and intensity of catastrophic health payments   
Baseline measures 
Our analysis relies on some established measures of headcount and overshoot of 
CHE. In particular, OOPE is regarded as catastrophic if the health payments budget share 
(i.e. ratio between health payments and household total expenditure) exceeds a specific 
threshold (van Doorslaer et al., 2007). With this in mind, if the OOPE of a household ! is ""#!, and the total household expenditure is $%#!, then a household ! has incurred CHE if 
the health payments budget share, ""#!/$%#!, is greater than the predefined cut-off point '.  
Given that there is no consensus on the cut-off point above which health 
expenditure is considered as CHE, we present several scenarios using thresholds ranging 
from 5% to 20% of the total expenditure (O’Donnell et al., 2008; WHO, 2018b). We 
employ total expenditure as an indicator for household financial resources, since the ratio 
between OOPE and household income is not sensitive to how households finance their 
health care consumption35 (O’Donnell et al., 2008).  
Our analysis examines both the headcount and overshoot of financial catastrophe, 
and relies on three measures for financial catastrophe due to health payments. First, we 
estimate the headcount (incidence) of CHE, which corresponds to the share of the sample 
that incurs CHE. Let ( the number of households, and ) a binary indicator that takes the 
value of 1 if ""#!/$%#! is greater than the respective threshold ', and 0 otherwise. The 
headcount can be thus expressed as follows:  
*$+,-"./0 = 1(3)!"!#$  	35 In other words, using income does not allow us to identify potential variations in consumption over time, 
due to changes in household borrowing and saving patterns (World Health Organization and World Bank, 
2017).O’Donnell et al. (2008) gave an illustrative example for this case. In particular, if two households have 
similar OOPE and income, the OOPE-income ratio will be the same. Assume that the first household relies 
on its own savings to cover the health payments. The second households, however, does not have savings, 
and should thus reduce its current expenditure to pay for medical care. Therefore, although the OOPE-
income ratio is identical for both households, this is not the case for the health payments budget share (i.e. 
health payments divided by total household expenditure), which is greater for the second household (World 
Health Organization, 2001) 
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Second, we estimate the intensity (overshoot) of CHE, which measures the average 
extent by which the OOPE exceeds the corresponding cut-off point of CHE (O’Donnell et 
al., 2008; Tomini et al., 2013). The overshoot is given by the following expression: 
45$67ℎ""0 = 1(345$67ℎ""0!"!#$  
where 45$67ℎ""0! = )! × (;%%&!'(&!< − ') . Simply put, 45$67ℎ""0!  is the difference 
between the health payments budget share and the predefined threshold for each household !. 
Mean positive overshoot (MPO), the last measure we employ, is simply given by 
the ratio between overshoot and headcount. This measure essentially demonstrates the 
average OOPE among the households that exceeded the predefined threshold of CHE 
(Tomini et al., 2013). In contrast to headcount and overshoot36 , a higher predefined 
threshold does not necessarily imply a lower MPO (O’Donnell et al., 2008).  
Besides the estimates for the total sample, we also stratify our sample and calculate 
the incidence and intensity of CHE for different total expenditure quintiles and depending 
on the presence of chronic or multimorbid patients in the household. By using the CPI 
(Eurostat, 2018b), expenditure is adjusted into 2015 prices.  
 
Additional measures of CHE 
We also employ some additional measures and techniques, aiming to test and 
strengthen the robustness of our main results. First, we derive the rank-weighted incidence 
and intensity of CHE. In particular, the measures presented in the previous section do not 
take into consideration whether the households that tend to incur CHE are poor or rich, 
although this aspect is important from a policy perspective (Somkotra & Lagrada, 2008). 
In order to account for these distributional aspects, we first estimate ?@)*  and ?@+ , the 
concentration indices for headcount and overshoot respectively.37 Using these indices, we 
then adjust38 the headcount and overshoot (Wagstaff, 2008; Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 2003), 
and provide the corresponding rank-weighted measures. In this context, the rank-weighted 	36 In general, headcount and overshoot decrease as the respective CHE threshold increases.  37 A positive (negative) !""# implies that the CHE is more common among richer (poorer) households. In 
the same vein, a positive (negative) !"$ means that the richer (poorer) tend to have a higher overshoot.  38 Using concentration indices to construct the rank weighted measures, we assign a weight of two in the 
poorest household. The weights fall with income, and the weight for the household with the highest income 
is zero.  
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measures do not only show the headcount and overshoot of financial catastrophe, but also 
reflect aspects about their distribution with respect to household living conditions 
(Somkotra & Lagrada, 2008). They thus incorporate normative considerations and value 
judgments associated with the distribution of CHE across households of different income 
level (Gottret, Schieber, & Waters, 2008).  These measures are given by the following 
expressions:  *$+,-"./0, = (1 − ?@)*) × *$+,-"./0 45$67ℎ""0, = (1 − ?@+) × 45$67ℎ""0 
Based on the above expressions, if catastrophic health payments are more common 
among the worse-off (i.e. negative ?@)*), the ranked-weighted headcount will be higher 
than the headcount, and vice versa. Likewise, if poorer households tend to have a larger 
overshoot, ?@+ will be negative and the rank-weighted overshoot will be greater than the 
standard measure of overshoot.  
Second, apart from using health payments budget share to define CHE, our analysis 
also considers alternative definitions and uses a different denominator instead of total 
household expenditure. In particular, we perform a similar analysis, and examine CHE 
with reference to the ratio between OOPE and non-food expenditure (Khan, Ahmed, & 
Evans, 2017; Wagstaff & Doorslaer, 2003). In this case, the thresholds range from 20% to 
50%.  
 
3.3.3. Regression models   
Our analysis also focuses on the determinants of the probability of incurring CHE. 
In doing so, we employ two types of regression analysis. First, and similar to the common 
practice in regression models for the probability of having catastrophic health payments, 
we employ a logistic regression model. Let #! = Pr	(?*)! = 1) be the probability that a 
household !  incurs CHE. Then the logistic regression model is given by the following 
expression:  logit(#!) = log I #!1 − #!J = K!L 
and the probability of CHE is:  Pr(?*)! = 1) = #! = exp	(K!L)1 + exp	(K!L) 
where K! is the set of regressors, and L is the vector of the parameter estimates. 
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Second, we address potential selection issues, arising from the fact that some 
households may postpone health payments and may not use health care due to financial 
restrictions and barriers to access (S. Brown et al., 2014; Kawabata et al., 2002). In doing 
so, we employ a maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Sartori (2003), which relies 
on a two-step approach that distinguishes those who seek medical care39 (Sartori, 2003). 
Generally speaking, the selection equation models the health care use, while the outcome 
equation focuses on the probability of facing CHE adjusted for the selection issues (S. 
Brown et al., 2014). This approach can be employed in cases of binary outcomes of 
interest, does not require a different set of regressors for the two equations, and relies on a 
different assumption about the error terms in the two equations. 40  In particular, the 
selection and outcome equations are given by the following expressions:  
Selection equation: Q$! = K!R + S$! 
Outcome equation: Q-! = K!T + S-! 
where Q corresponds to the unobserved continuous dependent variables, and R and T are 
the vectors of the regression coefficients for the selection and the outcome equation 
respectively. Last, S$! and S-! are normally distributed residual terms. 
 Given that Q is unobserved, the observed outcomes are the following:  U$! = V0	!X	Q$! < 01	!X	Q$! ≥ 0 
 U-! = V0	!X	Q-! < 01	!X	Q-! ≥ 0 
where U$!  equals 1 if the household !  uses health care, and U-!  indicates whether the 
household ! incurred CHE (i.e. the observed outcome of the equation of interest).   
	39  Generally speaking, the Heckman model is the most commonly used approach to address potential 
selection (Heckman, 1979). Identification of the Heckman model requires a different set of regressors in each 
equation (i.e., the so-called ‘exclusion restrictions’). The exclusion restrictions imply that there are some 
independent variables, which influence the selection but not the outcome equation. In fact, this poses several 
problems since it is practically difficult to find those variables, while several studies often use exclusion 
restrictions without the appropriate theoretical justification, leading to model misspecification (Puhani, 2000; 
Sartori, 2003). 40 This model relies on an assumption about identical errors in the two equations. It is noteworthy that the 
Sartori estimator is more accurate than and preferable to a binary response model (e.g. probit, logit), if this 
assumption is fairly plausible (Marinescu, 2006). This assumption is satisfied if the explanatory variables and 
decision process for the selection and outcome are similar, and both processes are close in time and 
geographical proximity (Sartori, 2003). In our case, the conditions needed to satisfy the assumption of the 
Sartori estimator are arguably met; the process and determinants of seeking medical care are similar to those 
of spending for health care and having CHE, while the condition for time and geographical proximity is 
fairly reasonable (S. Brown et al., 2014; Salas & Raftery, 2001).  
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 Following the approach proposed by Sartori (2003), we further define the following 
random variables [!.: 	[!/ = \1	!X	U$! = 00	"0ℎ$6]!7$ 
 [!$ = \1	!X	U$! = 1	+/,	U-! = 00	"0ℎ$6]!7$  
 [!- = \1	!X	U$! = 1	+/,	U-! = 10	"0ℎ$6]!7$  
 
In particular, [!/  is unity if the household does not seek health care (i.e. not 
selected). Additionally, [!$  equals 1 if the household seeks medical care and the main 
dependent variable is 0 (i.e. the households does not face CHE), whereas [!- equals 1 if the 
household uses health care and the outcome variable equals 1 (i.e. the household incurs 
CHE). Following the definitions of the random variables [!., the probability that [!. takes 
the value of 1, Pr^[!. = 1_, is defined as follows: Pr([!/ = 1) = a(−b!R) 
 Pr([!$ = 1) = Va(−b!T) − a(−b!R)	!X	(R − T)b! > 00		!X	(R − T)b! ≤ 0  
 Pr([!- = 1) = Va(b!T)	!X	(R − T)b! > 0a(b!R)	!X	(R − T)b! ≤ 0 
where a is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.  
As explained above, the dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the 
value of 1 if a household faces CHE. Apart from a dummy that takes the value of 1 for the 
wave after the introduction of the EAP, we control for the following characteristics of the 
household head: marital status, gender, age, age-squared, education and employment 
status. The set of regressors also includes some key household characteristics, which can 
be considered as potential predictors of the risk of CHE: total expenditure quintile, 
household size, squared household size, presence of multimorbid patients, members with 
long-standing activity limitation (GALI), members admitted to a hospital. 
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3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Headcount and overshoot of catastrophic health expenditure   
Table 3.1 shows the headcount and overshoot of CHE for Waves 2 and 6, which 
took place in 2007 and 2015 respectively. In doing so, we rely on several scenarios for the 
threshold above which household health expenditure is considered as CHE. As expected, 
the use of a lower threshold implies a greater estimate for the headcount of CHE. Using 
2015 data, for example, we find that the incidence of CHE falls from 34.00% to 13.55%, 
when we set the cut-off point at 10% and 20% of total household expenditure respectively. 
What is interesting, however, is that the trends in the incidence of CHE are generally 
consistent regardless the cut-off point we adopted.  
Our findings suggest that there is a sharp increase in the headcount of CHE from 
2007 to 2015. Setting a threshold of 20% of total household health expenditure (baseline 
scenario), our findings suggest that the incidence of CHE increased from 5.83% to 13.55% 
over the period 2007-2015. As shown in Table 3.1, the trends of the headcount of CHE are 
not sensitive to the threshold we adopt; a fact that further validates the robustness of our 
findings. For example, using a cut-off point of 10% of total expenditure, we find that the 
percentage of those having CHE increased from 18.49% to 34.00% during 2007-2015. We 
also estimate the incidence of CHE, after defining the financial catastrophe in terms of 
non-food expenditure. As shown in Table 3.1, our findings also indicate a rise in the share 
of households facing financial catastrophe regardless the threshold of CHE.  
 
Table 3. 1: Headcount and overshoot of catastrophic health payments 
 % Total health expenditure % Non-food expenditure 
 5%  20% 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 36.25 55.85 22.47 33.31 
 (1.10) (1.00) (0.98) (0.91) 
Overshoot 3.02 5.85 - - 
 (0.15) (0.18) - - 
MPO 8.32 10.48 - - 
 (0.34) (0.27) - - 
 10%  30% 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 18.49 34.00 16.24 27.84 
 (0.88) (0.92) (0.85) (0.86) 
Overshoot 1.70 3.67 - - 
 (0.12) (0.15) - - 
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MPO 9.22 10.80 - - 
 (0.53) (0.35) - - 
 15% 40% 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 9.91 20.73 12.63 23.83 
 (0.67) (0.76) (0.78) (0.81) 
Overshoot 1.02 2.35 - - 
 (0.10) (0.12) - - 
MPO 10.33 11.33 - - 
 (0.78) (0.44) - - 
 20%  50% 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 5.83 13.55 9.34 21.23 
 (0.50) (0.63) (0.67) (0.77) 
Overshoot 0.65 1.50 - - 
 (0.08) (0.10) - - 
MPO 11.12 11.09 - - 
 (1.04) (0.55) - - 
 
Aiming to identify the extent to which households’ health payments exceed the 
CHE threshold, we also estimate the intensity of CHE. Table 3.1 corroborates that the 
overshoot of CHE rose during the study period in all cases we examined. Our baseline 
estimates reveal that the CHE overshoot was 0.65% in 2007, and increased to 1.50% in 
2015. Similar to the headcount of CHE, the overshoot is decreasing with the size of the 
threshold for CHE. In 2015, for example, the overshoot was 5.85% and 1.50% in the case 
of the lowest (5%) and the highest (20%) threshold respectively. 
Contrary to the headcount and overshoot, we do not expect that MPO necessarily 
falls as the threshold increases (O’Donnell et al., 2008). According to our baseline 
scenario, households that experienced CHE spent an average of 31.12% of household 
expenditure for medical care in 2007. Although the fraction of households facing CHE 
substantially increased during 2007-2015, they tended to pay a similar share of their total 
expenditure for health care in 2015. In particular, the average health payments budget 
share among those households approached 31.09% in 2015; a share that is almost similar 
to the corresponding figure in 2007. 
Last, we also estimate the rank weighted headcount and overshoot, both of which 
allow us to account for the distribution of CHE with respect to household living conditions. 
Using a cut-off point of 20% of total household expenditure, we show that the rank 
weighted headcount increased from 5.77% to 15.79% over the period 2007-2015, 
suggesting that the change in the incidence of CHE is even higher after taking into account 
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distributional aspects. As pointed above, these changes can be attributed to the negative 
sign of the concentration index, which implies that the poor population groups are more 
likely to encounter CHE. Likewise, the rank weighted overshoot also rose from 0.46% to 
1.51% in 2007 and 2015 respectively. Further details are presented in Table B1 in the 
Appendix B.  
 
3.4.2. Headcount and overshoot of catastrophic health expenditure, by total household 
expenditure quintile   
 Table 3.2 presents the incidence and intensity of CHE across different expenditure 
quintiles. Generally speaking, our analysis reveals that the proportion of households with 
CHE is greater in 2015 than in 2007 across all socioeconomic groups. After splitting the 
sample by educational level, we find that the fraction of households with CHE also 
increased across all groups during 2007-201541. What is interesting, however, is that the 
change in the headcount of CHE was substantially greater in the first quintile. Under the 
baseline scenario, the headcount of CHE among the households in the bottom quintile 
escalated from 6.44% to 22.24% during 2007-2015, whereas the corresponding change in 
the richest quintile was quite lower (i.e. from 6.00% to 8.21%). The incidence of CHE 
more than doubled among the households in the second quintile; it increased from 5% in 
2007 to almost 13% in 2015. Among those in the third quintile, the frequency of CHE in 
2015 approximated 14%, and was almost twice the incidence in 2008. Likewise, 5.16% 
and 10.75% of the households in the fourth expenditure quintile experienced CHE in 2007 
and 2015 respectively. Using different thresholds and definitions for CHE, we further 
confirm our baseline findings in all socioeconomic groups we examined.  
 As shown in Table 3.2, the overshoot of CHE also increased across all 
socioeconomic groups. Among the households in the lowest quintile, for example, the 
overshoot went from 0.28% to 1.84% during 2008-2015. The smallest absolute change in 
intensity of CHE was observed among the richest households. In this group, the overshoot 
increased from 1.08% to 1.53% during the study period. After calculating the ratio 
between overshoot and headcount, we find that the MPO among the households in the 
lowest quintile was 4.39% and 8.27% in 2008 and 2015 respectively. This finding implies 
that the health payments for those who faced CHE was, on average, 24.39% and 28.27% of 
their total expenditure in 2008 and 2015 respectively. On the other hand, the MPO among 	41 Results are presented in Table B2 (Appendix B). 
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the richest households was quite higher, possibly due to the relatively lower headcount of 
CHE. In the fifth quintile, for instance, the health payments budget share for those having 
CHE increased from 37.92% to 38.58% during 2008-2015.  
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Table 3. 2: Headcount and overshoot of catastrophic health payments, by total household expenditure quintile 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 5% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
HQ 46.08 68.15 38.43 57.06 39.08 59.59 32.55 47.21 25.04 47.24 
 (2.38) (2.00) (2.42) (2.22) (2.53) (2.21) (2.54) (2.28) (2.32) (2.30) 
Overshoot 3.36 7.92 2.98 5.72 3.36 6.41 2.56 4.52 2.81 4.68 
 (0.26) (0.41) (0.30) (0.38) (0.37) (0.41) (0.32) (0.38) (0.43) (0.41) 
MPO 7.73 11.63 7.76 10.03 8.60 10.75 7.86 9.57 11.24 9.91 
 (0.43) (0.51) (0.63) (0.54) (0.76) (0.58) (0.80) (0.68) (1.39) (0.75) 
           
10% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
HQ 24.38 47.29 20.66 34.44 19.50 37.73 14.39 25.68 13.46 24.84 
 (1.98) (2.11) (1.93) (2.07) (2.12) (2.07) (1.86) (1.92) (1.84) (1.90) 
Overshoot 1.66 5.10 1.56 3.52 1.96 3.99 1.44 2.76 1.91 2.99 
 (0.18) (0.35) (0.23) (0.31) (0.30) (0.35) (0.26) (0.32) (0.37) (0.35) 
MPO 6.80 10.78 7.54 10.22 10.05 10.59 9.98 10.74 14.16 12.02 
 (0.51) (0.59) (0.87) (0.67) (1.24) (0.73) (1.46) (1.00) (2.14) (1.15) 
           
15% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
HQ 13.33 31.05 10.32 22.25 10.98 21.85 7.19 14.91 7.72 13.57 
 (1.56) (1.93) (1.42) (1.78) (1.68) (1.70) (1.35) (1.49) (1.43) (1.45) 
Overshoot 0.77 3.16 0.80 2.14 1.22 2.56 0.93 1.82 1.40 2.06 
 (0.12) (0.29) (0.18) (0.24) (0.24) (0.28) (0.21) (0.27) (0.31) (0.30) 
MPO 5.56 10.17 7.78 9.62 11.07 11.73 12.96 12.23 18.19 15.16 
 (0.57) (0.71) (1.30) (0.76) (1.81) (0.95) (2.32) (1.29) (2.99) (1.69) 
           
20% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
HQ 6.44 22.24 4.99 12.97 6.52 13.56 5.16 10.75 6.00 8.21 
 (1.12) (1.74) (1.04) (1.44) (1.15) (1.37) (1.00) (1.27) (1.30) (1.10) 
Overshoot 0.28 1.84 0.44 1.27 0.80 1.70 0.64 1.18 1.08 1.53 
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 (0.07) (0.23) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) (0.23) (0.17) (0.22) (0.27) (0.25) 
MPO 4.39 8.27 8.86 9.81 12.29 12.51 12.36 11.01 17.92 18.58 
 (0.72) (0.88) (1.97) (0.88) (2.04) (1.12) (2.19) (1.50) (3.58) (2.04) 
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3.4.3. Headcount and overshoot of catastrophic health expenditure, by chronic condition 
status    
 As shown in Table 3.3, the incidence of CHE increased over 2007-2015, regardless 
the number of household members with chronic conditions or multimorbidity. Among 
households without chronic patients, for example, the headcount of financial catastrophe 
due to health payments went up from 0.44% to 2.92% during 2007-2015. The headcount of 
CHE was much greater in households with chronic or multimorbid patients. For the 
households with one chronic patient, the incidence of CHE increased from 5.04% to 
15.16% during the study period. The corresponding figures for households with two or 
more chronic patients were approximately 12% and 20% in 2007 and 2015 respectively. 
Lastly, under the baseline scenario, one out of ten households with multimorbid patients 
were at risk of financial catastrophe due to health payments in 2007, with this figure being 
almost doubled in 2015. 
 Similar to the headcount of CHE, the overshoot was also greater among the 
households with more than two chronic patients and multimorbid patients. During the 
study period, the overshoot increased from 1.18% to 2.44% in the households with 
multimorbid patients, and from 1.35% to 2.17% among those with more than two chronic 
patients. In the households with no or one chronic patient, the intensity of CHE also 
increased during 2007-2015, but its magnitude was smaller than that of the other 
household types. As shown in Table 3.3, results are robust to different scenarios and 
definitions of CHE. 
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Table 3. 3: Headcount and overshoot of catastrophic health payments, by chronic condition status 
 Households without 
chronic patients 
Households with one 
chronic patient 
Households with 2 or more 
chronic patients 
Households with 
multimorbid patients  
Threshold: 5%  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 12.14 23.73 36.44 60.48 57.57 75.52 52.35 72.65 
 (1.67) (2.05) (1.47) (1.32) (2.28) (1.55) (1.58) (1.13) 
Overshoot 0.60 1.61 2.84 6.37 5.58 8.64 4.89 8.61 
 (0.13) (0.23) (0.19) (0.26) (0.41) (0.38) (0.27) (0.28) 
MPO 4.93 6.80 7.80 10.53 9.69 11.44 9.33 11.85 
 (0.69) (0.78) (0.44) (0.36) (0.61) (0.45) (0.45) (0.34) 
         
Threshold: 
10%  
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 4.81 10.61 17.54 35.99 32.93 51.28 28.55 47.67 
 (1.25) (1.48) (1.12) (1.27) (2.16) (1.80) (1.42) (1.25) 
Overshoot 0.22 0.84 1.56 4.04 3.36 5.50 2.91 5.66 
 (0.07) (0.17) (0.16) (0.22) (0.35) (0.34) (0.23) (0.25) 
MPO 4.54 7.93 8.91 11.21 10.20 10.72 10.18 11.87 
 (0.70) (1.27) (0.69) (0.49) (0.89) (0.54) (0.66) (0.42) 
         
Threshold: 
15%  
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 1.81 5.11 9.03 22.40 19.19 31.53 16.45 31.09 
 (1.00) (1.02) (0.82) (1.07) (1.79) (1.68) (1.15) (1.15) 
Overshoot 0.04 0.48 0.93 2.64 2.11 3.45 1.82 3.73 
 (0.02) (0.13) (0.12) (0.18) (0.29) (0.28) (0.19) (0.21) 
MPO 2.44 9.29 10.34 11.78 10.99 10.94 11.06 12.01 
 (1.08) (1.86) (1.00) (0.61) (1.23) (0.68) (0.92) (0.50) 
         
Threshold: Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
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20%  
Head count 0.44 2.92 5.04 15.16 12.42 19.89 10.06 20.96 
 (0.32) (0.77) (0.62) (0.91) (1.47) (1.44) (0.90) (1.01) 
Overshoot 0.01 0.27 0.59 1.72 1.35 2.17 1.18 2.44 
 (0.01) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.24) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) 
MPO 1.68 9.49 11.74 11.35 10.87 10.89 11.73 11.65 
 (0.62) (2.38) (1.32) (0.75) (1.60) (0.84) (1.18) (0.60) 
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We further provide evidence for the headcount and overshoot of CHE among 
households with members who suffer from specific chronic conditions. For example, our 
baseline estimates show that the headcount of CHE among households with diabetic 
patients increased from 10.37% to 24.32% during 2007-2015. Likewise, the frequency of 
financial catastrophe due to OOPE in households with hypertensive members in 2015 was 
more than twice the incidence of 2007 (i.e. it increased from 8.11% to 18.50%). More 
details are presented in Table B3 in Appendix B.  
 
3.4.4. Contribution of different types of health expenditure to overall catastrophic health 
payments 
 This section analyses the contribution of each type of expenditure to the overall 
CHE under the baseline scenario. In other words, we disaggregate the OOPE of those who 
experienced CHE into its major components. Overall, household payments for outpatient 
care were a major driver of financial catastrophe due to health payments. As shown in 
Figure 3.1, outpatient services accounted for 31.53% of the CHE in 2007, and increased to 
44.3% in 2015. Additionally, CHE can be largely attributed to payments for 
pharmaceuticals, especially in the period after the onset of the economic crisis. In 
particular, pharmaceuticals were responsible for 18% and more than 40% of CHE in 2007 
and 2015 respectively. Contrary to these payment types, the contribution of inpatient and 
nursing care to CHE fell from 50% to less than 14% during 2007-2015. 
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Figure 3. 1: Contribution of health expenditure components to overall CHE (among 
households with CHE) 
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows that the drivers of CHE differ across socioeconomic groups.  
Generally speaking, our analysis shows that the contribution of inpatient care spending to 
CHE increases with socioeconomic status. On the contrary, the pharmaceutical share is 
greater in lower quintiles, and therefore CHE among poorer households can be largely 
attributed to payments for medicines.  
What is also interesting, however, relates to the changes over the study period. For 
example, we find some interesting differences in the types of expenditure that lead to 
financial hardship among the poorest households. In the first quintile, for example, the 
contribution of pharmaceuticals to the CHE increased from 28% to almost 40% during 
2007-2015. Expenditure for outpatient care was also a significant component leading to 
CHE, and accounted for almost 53% and 44% in 2007 and 2015 respectively.  
In both periods, payments for outpatient care accounted for the highest share of 
CHE among the households in the second and third quintile. In these socioeconomic 
groups, the contribution of pharmaceuticals to catastrophic health payments also increased 
between 2007 and 2015. In the second quintile, for example, the pharmaceutical share of 
CHE rose from 27.63% to almost 45%. Likewise, the contribution of pharmaceuticals to 
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CHE increased from 20% to 40% among households in the third quintile. On the other 
hand, the share of CHE arising from payments in inpatient and nursing care fell during the 
study period.  
Similar to the other socioeconomic groups, the contribution of pharmaceutical 
expenditure to CHE also rose from 18.50% to more than 30% in the fourth quintile. 
Outpatient care accounted for 23% and 48% of CHE in 2007 and 2015 respectively. Last, 
inpatient care was generally the largest driver of financial hardship in the richest 
households. However, its contribution to CHE fell from 85% to less than 43% over the 
period 2007-2015. In contrast, the share of medicines and outpatient care substantially 
increased among those in the fifth quintile. In particular, payments for medicines 
accounted for 5.5% and 27% of the CHE in 2007 and 2015 respectively. Among the 
households of the fifth quintile that faced CHE, outpatient spending was 9.4% and 30.5% 
of the total OOPE in 2007 and 2015 respectively. 
 
Figure 3. 2: Contribution of health expenditure components to overall CHE (among 
households with CHE), by total household health expenditure 
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3.4.5. Determinants of catastrophic health payments    
 This study also aims to identify which households are at risk of financial 
catastrophe due to health payments. As explained above, we employ two types of analysis: 
a logistic regression model, and a selection model with a Sartori estimator. Tables 3.4 and 
3.5 present the regression estimates based on the pooled dataset, and confirm that the 
determinants of CHE after estimating the logistic regression model are almost identical to 
those derived from the selection model.  
 As shown in Table 3.4, our baseline findings (i.e. threshold at 20% of total 
household expenditure) reveal that the odds of incurring CHE for a household in 2015 are 
2.43 times the odds of CHE for a household in 2007.42 In addition, the odds of having 
CHE for the households in the top expenditure quintile are almost 36% lower than the odds 
for their low-income counterparts. We also show that the households headed by employed 
or self-employed individuals are less likely to encounter CHE compared to those headed 
by pensioners, whereas we do not find any difference in the probability of CHE between 
the other employment categories. The variables associated with the health status of the 
household members appear to be strong predictors of the probability of CHE. In particular, 
the odds of facing CHE are 80% higher for a household with multimorbid members than 
for a household without those patients. Likewise, households with hospitalized patients and 
members with long-standing activity limitation are also more likely to experience CHE. 
However, we do not find a significant relationship between some core demographics of the 
household head (e.g. gender, age, marital status) and the probability of having CHE. As 
shown in Table 3.4, our baseline results are generally robust to a wide range of alternative 
definitions for financial catastrophe due to health payments. 
 
Table 3. 4: Probability of facing catastrophic health payments (logistic regression 
estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CHE 
(threshold: 
5%) 
CHE 
(threshold: 
10%) 
CHE 
(threshold: 
15%) 
CHE 
(threshold: 
20%) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit 
     
Year dummy 0.989*** 0.946*** 0.933*** 0.886*** 
 (0.072) (0.081) (0.096) (0.116) 	42 The odds ratio for each variable is given by the exponentiated regression coefficient. 
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Unmarried -0.404** -0.256 -0.145 -0.056 
 (0.168) (0.194) (0.220) (0.259) 
Divorced -0.388** -0.190 -0.193 -0.241 
 (0.174) (0.178) (0.219) (0.250) 
Widowed -0.246** -0.087 -0.053 -0.253 
 (0.125) (0.139) (0.169) (0.164) 
Male -0.075 -0.044 -0.126 -0.174 
 (0.088) (0.096) (0.109) (0.124) 
Age 0.002 -0.073* -0.050 -0.035 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.054) (0.063) 
Age squared 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Second 
quintile 
-0.269** -0.282** -0.229* -0.367** 
 (0.107) (0.115) (0.130) (0.158) 
Third quintile -0.184 -0.197 -0.222 -0.228 
 (0.115) (0.121) (0.142) (0.165) 
Fourth 
quintile 
-0.512*** -0.611*** -0.555*** -0.283 
 (0.121) (0.133) (0.159) (0.182) 
Fifth quintile -0.645*** -0.655*** -0.592*** -0.441** 
 (0.124) (0.140) (0.161) (0.190) 
Primary 
education 
0.021 -0.125 -0.159 -0.464*** 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.121) (0.137) 
Secondary 
education 
-0.065 -0.155 -0.097 0.005 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.117) (0.133) 
Tertiary 
education 
-0.078 -0.086 -0.007 -0.111 
 (0.121) (0.126) (0.146) (0.176) 
Employed or 
self-employed 
-0.152 -0.312** -0.492*** -0.442** 
 (0.104) (0.127) (0.176) (0.223) 
Unemployed -0.679*** -0.449* 0.020 0.285 
 (0.226) (0.254) (0.273) (0.318) 
Homemaker -0.083 -0.100 -0.087 -0.111 
 (0.098) (0.104) (0.119) (0.141) 
Other 0.298 0.662*** 0.591*** 0.591*** 
 (0.185) (0.178) (0.184) (0.190) 
Household 
size  
-0.158 -0.056 -0.009 -0.313 
 (0.165) (0.183) (0.233) (0.218) 
Household 
size squared 
-0.004 -0.028 -0.030 0.018 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.040) (0.039) 
Member with 
multimorbidi
ty 
0.768*** 0.630*** 0.615*** 0.590*** 
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 (0.062) (0.066) (0.074) (0.094) 
Member with 
long-standing 
activity 
limitation 
0.733*** 0.771*** 0.742*** 0.767*** 
 (0.080) (0.086) (0.101) (0.122) 
Hospitalized 
member 
1.204*** 1.320*** 1.324*** 1.426*** 
 (0.143) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) 
Constant -0.738 0.866 -1.123 -2.228 
 (1.461) (1.589) (1.982) (2.312) 
     
Observations 5,552 5,552 5,552 5,552 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For binary variables, the reference category is the complementary group. The reference categories for the 
other variables are married, first expenditure quintile, no education, retired for marital status, total household 
expenditure, education and employment status respectively.  
 
Table 3.5 presents some alternative regression estimates, after using a selection 
model with a Sartori estimator. The results presented in Column 1 suggest that age, gender 
and marital status of the household head are significant predictors of health care utilisation. 
They also reveal a socioeconomic gradient in the probability of health care use, with the 
richer households being more likely to use and spend on medical care. Additionally, 
having multimorbid and hospitalized patients or members with long-standing activity 
limitations in the household is positively associated with health care spending.  
In addition to the estimates derived from the selection equation, Table 3.5 also 
shows the regression estimates for the determinants of the probability of CHE. The 
findings are generally consistent with those of the logistic model. Our baseline analysis 
indicates that a household in 2015 is more likely to face CHE compared to 2007. 
Households in the fifth expenditure quintile are also less likely to encounter CHE than 
those in the bottom quintile. In addition, the probability of CHE is positively related to the 
presence of multimorbid or hospitalized members. Likewise, the households with members 
suffering from long-standing activity limitations have a higher probability of facing CHE. 
Similar to the results presented in Table 3.4, marital status, age, and gender of households 
head are not significant determinants of the risk of CHE.  
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Table 3. 5: Probability of incurring catastrophic health payments (Sartori selection model 
estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  CHE 
(threshold 
5%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
10%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
15%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
20%) 
 Selection Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome 
      
Year dummy 0.167*** 0.540*** 0.518*** 0.507*** 0.466*** 
 (0.049) (0.040) (0.043) (0.050) (0.058) 
Unmarried -0.372*** -0.160* -0.076 -0.059 -0.063 
 (0.106) (0.091) (0.098) (0.113) (0.128) 
Divorced -0.242** -0.205** -0.078 -0.084 -0.065 
 (0.098) (0.083) (0.092) (0.107) (0.122) 
Widowed -0.200** -0.161** -0.051 -0.059 -0.126 
 (0.080) (0.063) (0.067) (0.076) (0.087) 
Male -0.129** -0.075* -0.057 -0.079 -0.083 
 (0.057) (0.045) (0.049) (0.055) (0.063) 
Age 0.054** -0.027 -0.051** -0.034 -0.037 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) 
Age squared -0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Second quintile 0.093 -0.142** -0.137** -0.115* -0.199*** 
 (0.072) (0.058) (0.059) (0.065) (0.075) 
Third quintile 0.321*** -0.073 -0.063 -0.092 -0.092 
 (0.079) (0.061) (0.062) (0.068) (0.077) 
Fourth quintile 0.150* -0.252*** -0.315*** -0.276*** -0.099 
 (0.080) (0.063) (0.067) (0.075) (0.082) 
Fifth quintile 0.272*** -0.338*** -0.351*** -0.346*** -0.261*** 
 (0.083) (0.066) (0.069) (0.079) (0.089) 
Primary 
education 
0.103 -0.021 -0.127** -0.125** -0.256*** 
 (0.075) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) (0.070) 
Secondary 
education 
0.061 -0.076 -0.144** -0.118* -0.064 
 (0.072) (0.056) (0.057) (0.063) (0.069) 
Tertiary 
education 
0.069 -0.068 -0.091 0.003 -0.046 
 (0.081) (0.064) (0.067) (0.075) (0.086) 
Employed or 
self-employed 
-0.099 -0.190*** -0.175*** -0.211*** -0.203** 
 (0.069) (0.057) (0.065) (0.078) (0.094) 
Unemployed -0.307** -0.422*** -0.204 0.082 0.089 
 (0.132) (0.120) (0.129) (0.142) (0.163) 
Homemaker -0.016 -0.099* -0.083 -0.050 -0.050 
 (0.070) (0.053) (0.056) (0.063) (0.071) 
Other 0.133 0.217** 0.409*** 0.380*** 0.395*** 
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 (0.138) (0.101) (0.095) (0.095) (0.101) 
Household size  -0.122 -0.106 -0.089 -0.107 -0.258** 
 (0.102) (0.083) (0.093) (0.107) (0.118) 
Household size 
squared 
0.010 -0.000 -0.004 0.002 0.028 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) 
Member with 
multimorbidity 
0.446*** 0.437*** 0.377*** 0.344*** 0.321*** 
 (0.045) (0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.043) 
Member with 
long-standing 
activity 
limitation 
0.281*** 0.449*** 0.458*** 0.424*** 0.403*** 
 (0.060) (0.043) (0.044) (0.049) (0.057) 
Hospitalized 
member 
0.298*** 0.684*** 0.749*** 0.769*** 0.786*** 
 (0.100) (0.068) (0.060) (0.061) (0.064) 
Constant -0.949 0.634 0.860 -0.382 -0.548 
 (0.922) (0.767) (0.832) (0.965) (1.107) 
      
Observations 5,552 5,552 5,552 5,552 5,552 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For binary variables, the reference category is the complementary group. The reference categories for the 
other variables are married, first expenditure quintile, no education, retired for marital status, total household 
expenditure, education and employment status respectively. For brevity, we only present the estimates of the 
selection equation for the baseline scenario.  
  
Further to the analysis of the pooled dataset, we employ similar models for each 
wave separately. Table 3.6 presents the baseline estimates from the logistic regression and 
the selection model with Sartori estimator. Controlling for various confounders, the 
analysis of the 2007 wave reveals that the probability of CHE does not significantly differ 
across consumption quintiles. Instead, the probability of CHE is mainly driven by the 
health status of household members (e.g. presence of multimorbid and hospitalized 
members and of members with long-standing activity limitation). Likewise, our analysis 
shows that the variables capturing the health status of household members are also strong 
predictors of the probability of CHE in 2015. What is interesting, however, is that we find 
a clear socioeconomic differential in the probability of CHE in 2015. In other words, the 
analysis of the 2015 survey suggests that household financial situation is negatively 
associated with the probability of CHE, although this was not the case in 2007. This 
finding implies that low-income households are less protected against the financial risk of 
poor health, and can possibly be explained on the basis of several policy responses 
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implemented at that period. These findings are generally robust to different definitions of 
CHE. More details are presented in the Appendix Tables B3 and B4.  
 
Table 3. 6: Probability of incurring catastrophic health payments in each wave (baseline 
estimates) 
 Wave 2 Wave 6 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Logit Selection Outcome Logit  Selection Outcome 
       
Unmarried 0.006 -0.198 0.001 -0.024 -0.507*** -0.071 
 (0.530) (0.172) (0.273) (0.300) (0.136) (0.148) 
Divorced -0.594 -0.325** -0.211 -0.146 -0.207 -0.017 
 (0.740) (0.157) (0.319) (0.270) (0.129) (0.136) 
Widowed -0.492 -0.161 -0.201 -0.126 -0.246** -0.084 
 (0.360) (0.125) (0.183) (0.189) (0.106) (0.101) 
Male -0.101 -0.092 -0.047 -0.195 -0.161** -0.095 
 (0.262) (0.087) (0.132) (0.141) (0.076) (0.074) 
Age 0.065 0.077** 0.015 -0.114 0.027 -0.076** 
 (0.121) (0.037) (0.060) (0.076) (0.038) (0.036) 
Age squared -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 0.001* -0.000 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Second 
quintile 
-0.153 0.118 -0.092 -0.446** 0.059 -0.247*** 
 (0.322) (0.111) (0.161) (0.181) (0.095) (0.088) 
Third quintile 0.263 0.303** 0.172 -0.400** 0.351*** -0.187** 
 (0.348) (0.123) (0.167) (0.185) (0.107) (0.089) 
Fourth 
quintile 
0.071 0.277** 0.075 -0.417** 0.050 -0.172* 
 (0.375) (0.129) (0.181) (0.205) (0.102) (0.095) 
Fifth quintile 0.597 0.384*** 0.142 -0.813*** 0.186* -0.403*** 
 (0.388) (0.135) (0.197) (0.207) (0.107) (0.102) 
Primary 
education 
-0.610** 0.172 -0.334** -0.440*** 0.024 -0.271*** 
 (0.279) (0.128) (0.135) (0.160) (0.104) (0.086) 
Secondary 
education 
-0.367 0.143 -0.334** 0.074 0.014 -0.019 
 (0.329) (0.141) (0.168) (0.146) (0.085) (0.077) 
Tertiary 
education 
-0.481 0.010 -0.261 -0.029 0.132 -0.004 
 (0.407) (0.152) (0.205) (0.193) (0.099) (0.096) 
Employed or 
self-employed 
-0.332 -0.106 -0.162 -0.517* -0.083 -0.248** 
 (0.349) (0.102) (0.185) (0.272) (0.095) (0.112) 
Unemployed 0.732 -0.284 0.491 0.224 -0.333** 0.045 
 (1.114) (0.299) (0.518) (0.325) (0.151) (0.174) 
Homemaker -0.215 0.079 -0.087 -0.096 -0.091 -0.055 
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 (0.310) (0.105) (0.145) (0.163) (0.096) (0.084) 
Other 0.927** 0.015 0.490** 0.484** 0.179 0.367*** 
 (0.431) (0.245) (0.219) (0.211) (0.170) (0.114) 
Household 
size  
-0.354 0.005 -0.140 -0.292 -0.244* -0.310** 
 (0.379) (0.151) (0.223) (0.284) (0.143) (0.144) 
Household 
size squared 
0.022 -0.013 0.010 0.011 0.033 0.034 
 (0.055) (0.023) (0.033) (0.052) (0.024) (0.024) 
Member with 
multimorbidi
ty 
0.402** 0.486*** 0.233*** 0.621*** 0.427*** 0.340*** 
 (0.188) (0.072) (0.086) (0.112) (0.059) (0.051) 
Member with 
long-standing 
activity 
limitation 
0.968**
* 
0.294*** 0.389*** 0.758*** 0.273*** 0.442*** 
 (0.273) (0.091) (0.114) (0.136) (0.082) (0.067) 
Hospitalized 
member 
2.199**
* 
0.354** 1.209*** 0.957*** 0.224* 0.534*** 
 (0.232) (0.159) (0.113) (0.148) (0.130) (0.079) 
Constant -6.225 -2.047 -2.659 1.487 0.380 1.389 
 (4.447) (1.338) (2.239) (2.778) (1.318) (1.307) 
       
Observations 2,258 2,258 2,258 3,294 3,294 3,294 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For binary variables, the reference category is the complementary group. The reference categories for the 
other variables are married, first expenditure quintile, no education, retired for marital status, total household 
expenditure, education and employment status respectively.  
 
3.5. Discussion 
 Given the significant household income loss during the recession and the recent 
health policy responses, the extent to which the Greek population is financially protected 
against the risk of illness is a matter of interest and great importance for health system 
performance assessment 43  (Maresso et al., 2014; OECD, 2016). The concerns about 
financial protection are more pronounced for the older people, especially in a country 
where the population is rapidly ageing (United Nations, 2017). Apart from being high-
need, high-cost patients with complex multimorbidities, older people tend to encounter 
greater economic strain, struggle to cope with the negative changes in their financial 	43 The World Health Reports of the WHO have considered financial risk protection as one of the main 
dimensions of health system performance. More recently, the United Nations included it among the 
Sustainable Development Goals (Indicator 3.8.2). 
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situation during economic recession, and are also more prone to health shocks and the 
adverse effects of recession (Bierman, 2014; Fenge et al., 2012; Lyberaki & Tinios, 2018). 
Despite the importance and policy relevance of the topic, little is known about the impact 
of OOPE on financial protection among older households in Greece from an empirical 
perspective, and even less regarding the trends in incidence and intensity of CHE during 
the economic crisis.  
Our analysis draws on data from the SHARE survey and indicates that the 
headcount and overshoot of CHE more than doubled among older households during 2007-
2015. Setting the CHE threshold at 20% of total household expenditure, for example, our 
baseline results show that 5.83% of elderly households faced CHE in 2007, with the 
respective figure being almost 14% in 2015. This finding is further confirmed by our 
pooled regression estimates, which indicate that controlling for several confounders the 
odds of facing CHE for a household in 2015 are more than twice the odds of CHE for a 
household in 2007. Likewise, the overshoot of CHE also rose over the study period, 
suggesting that the average extent by which OOPE exceeds the corresponding threshold 
increased. The findings are robust to different thresholds of catastrophic health payments, 
and can be interpreted considering the broader socioeconomic environment and the 
relevant health policy responses during the economic recession. According to the WHO, 
there are three main elements that intensify the financial catastrophe due to health 
payments: weak prepayment mechanisms for financial risk pooling, households’ low 
ability to pay, and the presence of health care services that involve out-of-pocket 
contributions (WHO, 2005). In Greece, prepayment mechanisms are historically weak, and 
further eroded during the economic recession. This is indeed revealed not only by the 
heavy reliance on out-of-pocket payments, but also by the fact that Greece has currently 
the highest share of uncovered population in the OECD countries (OECD, 2017). Second, 
household ability to pay dramatically deteriorated due to salary and pension cuts, tax 
increases and rising unemployment. For example, the cumulative reduction of pensions in 
the public sector ranged from 20% to more than 45% during 2010-2013, while almost 
similar cuts were introduced in the private sector (Tinios, 2016). Third, the depth of 
coverage has been largely affected due to the introduction of user charges, especially for 
pharmaceuticals and diagnostic tests. Although the medicines for life-threatening diseases 
are fully reimbursed, a co-insurance rate of 10% was introduced for some medicines that 
were previously fully reimbursed (e.g. for type 2 diabetes, Alzheimer, dementia, epilepsy). 
The co-insurance rate also increased from 10% to 25% in various diseases, including 
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coronary heart disease, hyperlipidemia, osteoporosis, arthritis, cirrhosis and COPD 
(Economou et al., 2014). In addition, patients may also bear the additional financial burden 
of the difference between the retail and the reimbursed price of medicines, due to the 
introduction of an internal reference pricing system (Greek Foundation for Economic and 
Industrial Research, 2018). Evidence suggests that the average co-insurance rate increased 
from 11.3% to approximately 29% during 2011-2014 (Gouvalas et al., 2016). Another 
study analysed administrative data, and showed that the share of medicines with a 25% co-
insurance rate increased from 53% to 77%, whereas the average co-insurance rate rose 
from 13.3% to 18% during 2012-2013 (Siskou et al., 2014). 
After splitting the sample by expenditure quintile, we show that the headcount of 
CHE increased across all socioeconomic groups over 2008-2015. Among the households 
in the bottom expenditure quintile, the incidence of financial catastrophe escalated from 
6.44% to 22.24% during that period. The corresponding increase was, however, lower in 
the highest quintile. Given that the share of people with unmet medical needs also 
increased over the study period, especially among the poor segments of the population 
(Eurostat, 2018d), the incidence of CHE could have been even greater in the absence of 
financial barriers to access44 (Moreno-Serra, Millett, & Smith, 2011). It thus appears that a 
large share of the low-income older households is locked into a “bad trade-off”: they either 
pay OOPE and experience the risk of financial catastrophe, or face significant barriers to 
accessing health care and unmet medical needs.  
Next, we further disaggregate households by chronic condition status, and find that 
financial protection has eroded across several household types. Consistent with findings 
from European and Asian countries (Arsenijevic, Pavlova, Rechel, & Groot, 2016; Z. 
Wang et al., 2015), the rate of CHE is higher among households with chronic or 
multimorbid patients compared to those without. Our findings indicate that the Greek 
health system fails to protect those with poor health status, especially after the onset of the 
economic crisis. For example, more than one out of ten elderly households with 
multimorbid patients faced financial catastrophe in 2007, whereas the respective figure 
increased to more than 20% in 2015.  Evidence from the recession period suggests that 	44 The incidence of CHE may be relatively low because some households do not use health care due to 
several barriers to access associated with waiting lists, financial constraints, or limited availability of 
services. Therefore, they do not incur CHE, because their OOPE is zero. Removal of these barriers would 
potentially facilitate use of medical care and could increase the reliance on OOPE (WHO Regional Office for 
Europe, 2018b). Although financial protection measures adequately examine financial hardship for 
households that use health care, they cannot identify whether health payments lead to barriers to access and 
subsequent unmet medical needs. 
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despite the significant barriers (Kyriopoulos et al., 2014), ensuring access to health 
services was particularly important for chronically ill patients in Greece, even if they had 
to cut down expenses for other goods and services to finance health care. (Greek National 
School of Public Health, 2014; Skroumpelos et al., 2014). Generally speaking, the high 
incidence of CHE among elderly households with chronic patients, as well as the 
significant increase during 2007-2015 can possibly be interpreted by several characteristics 
of the Greek health system, and the lack of a thorough strategy to protect chronic patients 
from the financial burden of OOPE. In particular, although primary care is important for 
the provision of integrated and patient-centred care for chronic and  older patients (WHO, 
2016, 2018c), there is no comprehensive, coordinated, and continuous primary care system 
in Greece (Lionis et al., 2009; Oikonomou & Mariolis, 2010), with its funding being 
largely dependent on out-of-pocket payments (Groenewegen & Jurgutis, 2013; 
Kentikelenis & Papanicolas, 2012). Furthermore, chronic disease management is rather 
fragmented in Greece, with the economic recession posing additional challenges associated 
with quality, funding and access to care (Oikonomou & Tountas, 2011; Tsiantou, Mylona, 
et al., 2014). Additionally, although self-management of chronic conditions or the 
introduction of an integrated chronic care management model could, in some 
circumstances, reduce costs and improve outcomes (Bodenheimer, Wagner, & Grumbach, 
2002), such approaches have not been adopted or extensively discussed in Greece.  
Our analysis also focuses on the breadown of CHE by type of health care. Prior to 
the economic crisis, CHE was mainly due to inpatient and nursing care, followed by 
outpatient care and medicines. During 2007-2015, the contribution of household 
pharmaceutical spending to CHE substantially increased; a result that is potentially linked 
with the significant changes in cost-sharing for medicines and the introduction of the 
internal reference pricing system, along with the low generic penetration rate (Economou 
et al., 2017; Gouvalas et al., 2016). This finding is in line with recent evidence, which 
show that CHE is driven by payments for pharmaceutical in countries with weak financial 
protection mechanisms (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2018b). On the contrary, the 
contribution of inpatient care to CHE decreased over 2007-2015, possibly because 
households shifted to public services and became less willing to incur informal payments 
in hospitals (Economou, 2015; Souliotis et al., 2016). 
Last, we examine which household types tend to experience financial catastrophe 
due to health payments. As already discussed, whether poorer households are more 
susceptible to CHE is difficult to answer a priori. Evidence from several countries, for 
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example, suggests that the better-off have a lower probability of CHE (Amaya Lara & Ruiz 
Gómez, 2011; Gotsadze et al., 2009; Kronenberg & Barros, 2014; Meng et al., 2012), 
whereas another strand of the literature finds that richer households are more prone to 
financial catastrophe due to health payments (S. Brown et al., 2014; Somkotra & Lagrada, 
2009; Yardim et al., 2010).  
Our pooled regression estimates show that the households in the top quintile are 
generally less likely to incur financial catastrophe compared to the poorer population 
groups. This finding implies that low-income households are less protected against the 
financial risk associated with ill health. What is interesting, however, is that although the 
probability of CHE is decreasing with households’ financial well-being in 2015, this was 
not the case in 2007. In a similar spirit, Table 3.3 also indicates that the incidence of CHE 
differs to a great extent across expenditure quintiles in 2015, but not in 2007. These 
findings raise substantial distributional and equity concerns, and can be possibly explained 
on the basis of the policy responses implemented at that period. However, they contrast 
with recent evidence for older people in some European countries, which shows that 
financial protection is stronger among the lower socioeconomic groups (Palladino et al., 
2016). This discrepancy possibly reflects some idiosyncratic features of the Greek case. 
First, the breadth of coverage dramatically eroded during the crisis in Greece, affecting a 
large proportion of low-income people who ended up without entitlement to health 
insurance. Second, health financing in Greece is highly regressive due to the heavy 
reliance on OOPE, especially compared to other European countries (Economou et al., 
2017; Mossialos et al., 2005). Third, user charges were introduced in Greece, without 
adequately considering households’ vulnerability and income level (Thomson, 2015), and 
low-income households thus faced higher OOPE as a share of their income compared to 
their richer counterparts (Gemmill, Thomson, & Mossialos, 2008; Schokkaert & Van de 
Voorde, 2011).  
This study has some policy implications. In Greece, several attempts to facilitate 
access to health care and improve coverage did not fully serve their purpose for various 
reasons, including incomplete information about the legal arrangements, stigmatization, 
administrative deficiencies and bureaucratic rigidity (Chantzaras & Yfantopoulos, 2018; A. 
Kentikelenis, 2015; Polyzou et al., 2015). Building on the relevant experience from other 
high-income countries, there are some policy responses, which could strengthen financial 
protection mechanisms. First, targeted and means-tested exemptions from user charges, 
focusing on certain income and demographic groups, could reduce the incidence of CHE 
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especially among vulnerable households (Hossein & Gerard, 2013). Second, the 
introduction of an annual cap on all user charges per person or household could mitigate 
the extent to which households are exposed to the adverse effects of high OOPE (Cylus et 
al., 2018; Thomson & Mossialos, 2004). Third, in some cases low fixed co-payments could 
replace the percentage co-insurance rates, given that the latter normally shift the financial 
risk from insurers to patients (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2018b). Besides 
reforming cost-sharing mechanisms, and considering Greece’s rapidly ageing population, 
another policy response could relate to the establishment of a functioning primary and 
long-term care system. Striving for an integrated health and social care system and more 
holistic chronic disease management could be the basis for stronger financial protection 
among older people (Sadana, Soucat, & Beard, 2018; WHO, 2018a).  
This study has some limitations. First, the data for out-of-pocket spending are self-
reported; however, OOPE reporting is not expected to change by year (Goldman & 
Zissimopoulos, 2003; Kawabata et al., 2002; Lehnert et al., 2011). Second, we only 
analyse two waves (before and after the onset of the crisis) due to data limitations, and 
cannot adjust for underlying trends or other time-related factors, which could influence 
OOPE and the probability of CHE. Third, we could not examine how CHE evolved in the 
years between 2007 and 2015, since only Waves 2 and 6 are available for Greece (SHARE 
Release Guide, 2018). Fourth, we cannot investigate the coping strategies that households 
adopt due to excessive OOPE. Examining the role of coping strategies is important, since 
the ways through which health care is financed (e.g. savings, borrowing, selling assets, 
cutting down other types of consumption) have important implications on household 
consumption and welfare in the long run. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 This study examines financial protection among older households in Greece, a 
country that experienced a severe economic crisis and implemented several health policy 
responses that directly affected health coverage. Our findings reveal that the headcount and 
overshoot of CHE substantially increased over 2007-2015, suggesting that financial 
protection eroded to a great extent during the period of economic crisis. Incidence of CHE 
increased across all population groups, with low-income and households with chronic 
patients being disproportionately affected. Although we do not report signs of 
socioeconomic inequalities in the risk of CHE in 2007, our findings show a clear 
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socioeconomic differential in the probability of CHE and reveal substantial inequalities in 
2015. This can possibly be attributed to the policy responses implemented at that period, 
and raises significant distributional and equity concerns. Prior to the onset of the economic 
crisis, household payments for  inpatient and nursing care were the major drivers of CHE, 
followed by OOPE for outpatient care and medicines. However, our findings reveal that 
the contribution of household pharmaceutical spending to CHE substantially increased 
during the study period. Strengthening financial protection among older households is an 
imperative challenge for the Greek health system and other countries affected by the crisis, 
and several policy responses towards this direction should be adopted. In addition, targeted 
measures towards reducing the burden of OOPE for the poorer households are also needed, 
since those households have been disproportionately affected.  
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Chapter 4 
Does economic recession impact newborn health? Evidence from Greece 
Abstract 
In the context of an interesting debate regarding the effects of economic recession on 
health outcomes in Europe, this study examines the potential impact of the Greek crisis on 
newborn health. Using a large administrative dataset of 838,700 births over the period 
2008-2015, our analysis shows that birth weight (BW) and pregnancy length are generally 
procyclical with respect to economic conditions during gestation, while the probability of 
low birth weight (LBW) and preterm birth are both countercyclical. Further, we report 
heterogeneity in the association between business cycle fluctuations and newborn health 
across socioeconomic groups. Birth outcomes of infants born to families of lower 
socioeconomic status (SES) are responsive to economic conditions during the first and 
third trimester of the gestation. This is not the case for the high SES newborns, whose birth 
outcomes respond only to economic volatility in the first trimester. Further, economic 
adversity during preconception period raises the probability that women who conceive are 
highly educated and married, having implications for the cohort composition of women 
who get pregnant. After accounting for selection, the exposure to economic crisis is linked 
with a BW loss, which is driven by the children of lower SES parents. Our findings have 
some social policy implications. In particular, the impact of the crisis on birth indicators is 
more detrimental for the children of lower SES, resulting in a widening of the BW gap 
between infants of lower and higher SES families. This could in turn exacerbate long-term 
future socioeconomic and health inequalities and hinder social mobility.  
 
Keywords: birth outcomes, birth weight, business cycle fluctuations, economic crisis, 
recession, Greece 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the late 2000s, Europe faced a severe sovereign debt crisis, uncovering the 
Eurozone’s structural and design problems, and threatening its stability. Despite the 
previous global financial crisis, there was little concern about sovereign debt sustainability 
in Europe, and the markets were relatively calm in 2008, all the way until late 2009 (Lane, 
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2012). The crisis began in the autumn of 2009, when the Greek government announced a 
revision of the budget deficit that was actually more than twice the size of the previous 
estimate, exceeding 15% of GDP (Gibson, Palivos, et al., 2014; Honkapohja, 2014). After 
the dramatic increase of sovereign bond spreads, Greece was the first European economy 
to be excluded from the credit market, and subsequently, the country reached a bailout 
agreement with its creditors and implemented an EAP. 
During that period, the Eurozone crisis gradually broadened and deepened, with 
several other countries facing similar problems. However, the Greek economy was hit 
much harder than its counterparts. First, it faced a massive and prolonged recession 
(Romer & Romer, 2017), which was possibly the most severe economic crisis among 
developed countries in the post-war period (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014). Second, the strict 
economic adjustment programme that followed entailed heavy conditionality, extreme 
fiscal consolidation measures (Featherstone, 2011) and a grinding process of internal 
devaluation, having significant implications in terms of household disposable income and 
living conditions, mainly through salary adjustments in both the public and private sector 
(I. Kyriopoulos et al., 2019; OECD, 2014). Last, evidence suggests that poverty and 
inequality have risen in the wake of the economic recession, suggesting that the social 
aftermath and the distributional effects of the crisis are rather strong (Kaplanoglou & 
Rapanos, 2016; Matsaganis & Leventi, 2014). 
Even before the recent crisis, the impact of recessions on health attracted much 
scholarly interest. However, research findings have been rather inconclusive, due to the 
presence of several countervailing pathways (Ralph Catalano, 2009). For example, there is 
evidence that population health indicators, such as all-cause mortality, tend to deteriorate 
during periods of economic prosperity (Laporte, 2004; C. J. Ruhm, 2000; Christopher J 
Ruhm, 2003; Toffolutti & Suhrcke, 2014; van den Berg et al., 2017). The higher mortality 
rates appear to be driven by deaths from cardiovascular conditions, motor vehicle 
accidents, influenza/pneumonia, liver disease and other accidents, whereas some other 
cause-specific deaths are generally countercyclical (U.-G. Gerdtham & Ruhm, 2006; 
Neumayer, 2004). Another strand of the literature, however, challenges the previous 
findings, with several studies reporting that mortality exhibits an acyclical variation and 
others suggesting that economic downturns are detrimental for health (Cutler et al., 2002; 
U.-G. Gerdtham & Johannesson, 2005; McInerney & Mellor, 2012; Christopher J. Ruhm, 
2015; Svensson, 2007). Generally speaking, it appears that the effects of recessions vary 
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with the level of analysis, country context, extent and severity of the recession, studied 
health outcomes, and potential role of the welfare state (Suhrcke & Stuckler, 2012). 
Evidence from Greece shows that all-cause mortality fell after the inception of the 
crisis but the rate of decline was significantly lower (Laliotis et al., 2016). Using self-rated 
health status, several other papers showed that health trends deteriorated during economic 
recession (Kentikelenis et al., 2011; Vandoros et al., 2013; Zavras, Tsiantou, Pavi, Mylona, 
& Kyriopoulos, 2013). Mental health indicators also worsened during the Greek crisis 
(Drydakis, 2015; Mylona, Tsiantou, Zavras, Pavi, & Kyriopoulos, 2014), with the 
prevalence of major depression substantially increasing from 3.3% to 12.3% (M. 
Economou et al., 2016).  
Despite the growing academic and policy interest for the health consequences of 
the recent recession in Greece - and more generally, in Europe - a systematic review points 
out that evidence is “still unclear and fragmented”.  The effects of the crisis on health 
indicators appear to be heterogeneous, and studies have tended to focus on adult health 
(Parmar, Stavropoulou, & Ioannidis, 2016). Additionally, there is scant evidence on the 
impact of the recent economic recession on newborn health, and little is known about the 
potential socioeconomic differential in the impact of economic recession on health. 
Previous evidence is contradictory and rather inconclusive (Eiríksdóttir et al., 2013; 
Margerison Zilko, 2010), with some studies showing newborn health improvements (R. 
Dehejia & Lleras-Muney, 2004), and others suggesting worse newborn birth outcomes 
during economic downturns (Bozzoli & Quintana-Domeque, 2014; R Catalano, Hansen, & 
Hartig, 1999; Olafsson, 2016). 
Our analysis concentrates on birth outcomes. Focusing on newborn health 
indicators is crucial both from both public health and socioeconomic perspectives. Adverse 
birth outcomes are associated with greater mortality and morbidity, not only during 
infancy, but also later in life, during childhood and adulthood (Blumenshine, Egerter, 
Barclay, Cubbin, & Braveman, 2010). For example, LBW children appear to have greater 
rates of coronary heart disease, diabetes, metabolic syndrome, high blood pressure, 
osteoporosis and stroke during their adulthood (Almond et al., 2005; Gluckman et al., 
2008). Thus, newborn health can be considered as input in a health production function 
that essentially approximates the initial endowment of “human health capital”. Besides its 
association with various health indicators, poor newborn health can also affect cognitive 
function and development (Jefferis, Power, & Hertzman, 2002), anthropometry measures 
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(height, BMI), educational attainment, labour market outcomes and earnings45 (S. E. Black 
et al., 2007).  
Based on the above, this chapter intends to investigate the association between 
economic conditions during gestation and health at birth. It contributes to the literature in 
several ways. First, we use a large administrative dataset from Greece, a country that faced 
an unprecedented economic crisis in terms of duration, intensity and severity 
(Andriopoulou et al., 2017). The Greek case is important, since previous research focused 
on shorter recessions that had a lower impact on economic and social indicators. Previous 
studies have examined the 2001-2002 crisis in Argentina and the 2008 financial collapse in 
Iceland (Bozzoli & Quintana-Domeque, 2014; Olafsson, 2016), both of which lasted 
almost three years, and were less severe than the Greek crisis (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014). 
Second, compared to most other studies -which tend to focus on the link between 
unemployment and newborn health (Alessie, Angelini, Mierau, & Viluma, 2017; Schempf 
& Decker, 2010)- we examine the relationship between economic climate and uncertainty 
during pregnancy and birth indicators using two alternative measures: the Economic 
Sentiment Indicator (ESI) and the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU). Different 
from previous studies, our analysis captures the overall economic climate, expectations and 
uncertainty, which are not directly reflected in standard measures of economic activity 
such as GDP and unemployment rate (Gelper & Croux, 2010). Third, we use various 
detrending techniques to capture the cyclical component of the economic indicators, and 
test the robustness of our findings. Fourth, to our knowledge, this is the first paper 
documenting a socioeconomic differential in an economic crisis’ impact on newborn 
health. Fifth, using individual-level data, we provide additional evidence on potential 
selection into pregnancy during periods of economic uncertainty, and examine how the 
economic climate during preconception period might influence the type and characteristics 
of mothers who conceive. Last, using propensity score matching (PSM), we address 
potential selection arising from compositional changes on the type of mothers who 
conceive, and further employ various robustness checks.  
 
 
 	45 A substantial body of evidence suggests that in utero conditions strongly influence future health and 
socioeconomic outcomes, and have particularly examined the so-called ‘fetal origins’ hypothesis. David 
Barker, a British epidemiologist, was among the first proponents who linked in utero conditions with adult 
disease (Almond & Currie, 2011). 
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Hypothesis development 
In this study we are testing three hypotheses, formulated as follows.  
During economic recessions, the prevalence of depression and psychosocial stress 
tends to increase (Economou et al., 2013; Frasquilho et al., 2016; Hamilton et al., 1990), 
with both of them being risk factors for adverse perinatal outcomes (Grote et al., 2010). 
Additionally, household financial distress is expected to change the quantity and quality of 
maternal nutrition and to impede access to nutritious food, resulting in food insecurity 
during pregnancy (Brinkman et al., 2010; Studdert et al., 2001). Increased level of 
maternal stress and poor maternal nutrition during pregnancy may adversely affect 
gestational length, and intrauterine growth respectively (Bernabé et al., 2004; Hedegaard et 
al., 1996), both of which are, in turn, expected to influence birth outcomes (M.S. Kramer, 
1987). On this basis, we formulate our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Birth outcomes are sensitive to economic conditions during pregnancy, and 
the relationship varies depending on the stage of gestation.  
During economic recessions, low-SES households are more likely to compromise 
food quality and quantity, as they are more likely to experience severe financial hardship 
(Bonaccio et al., 2017; Brinkman et al., 2010). This might not apply to the families of 
higher SES, who possess more assets, have access to various coping mechanisms and 
credit and can smooth consumption without resorting to unhealthy dietary changes. 
Additionally, low-SES individuals are more susceptible to stress and mental health 
problems while also facing more limited access to mental health services during economic 
contraction (R. A. Catalano & Bruckner, 2005; Hauksdottir et al., 2013; Wahlbeck & 
McDaid, 2012; World Health Organization, 2011). Considering this range of impacts, we 
develop the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is heterogeneity in the relationship between prenatal business cycle 
fluctuations and birth outcomes across socioeconomic groups. 
 Evidence suggests that fertility declines during periods of economic crisis, while 
economic contraction and uncertainty is generally associated with fertility postponement46 
(Chevalier & Marie, 2017; Sobotka et al., 2011). However, economic adversity might 
influence differently the decision to conceive across household types and groups. In 
particular, less-privileged families may have faced credit constraints and reduction in their 	46 Economic distress leads to two effects that have opposite direction. In particular, it is associated with a 
negative income effect that reduces the demand for children, and a positive substitution effect which shifts 
demand towards the opposite direction. Given that empirical studies show a fertility decline during 
recessions, income effect is generally larger than the substitution effect (Gronau, 1977). 
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already low income, and may thus be unable to afford the costs of childbearing (Schneider 
& Hastings, 2015). They also have fewer savings and financial reserves to confront 
negative income shocks (Lusardi et al., 2011).  In this context, low-SES mothers may be 
less likely to conceive during recessions due to the reasons explained above. The 
characteristics of women who conceive during economic recession might be thus different 
compared to those of women who conceive during periods of normality. However, 
evidence on this topic is rather contradictory (Aparicio & González, 2014; R. Dehejia & 
Lleras-Muney, 2004). Given that these relationships are complex, and largely depend on 
the country setting, we examine the following hypothesis in the context of the Greek crisis:  
Hypothesis 3: Economic fluctuations influence the fertility decision differently across 
population groups.  
Economic distress might be associated with fertility postponement and changes in 
the types or characteristics of women who conceive during periods of economic adversity 
(Chevalier & Marie, 2017; R. Dehejia & Lleras-Muney, 2004). This implies compositional 
characteristics in the type of women who give birth (or selection into pregnancy during an 
economic downturn). Hence, we form our fourth hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: After accounting for compositional changes in the type of women who give 
birth during recessions, an economic crisis affects BW, with the impact being greater for 
children born to low-SES mothers 
 
4.2. Health effects of the Greek crisis 
Since 2011, there has been an interesting discussion regarding the health effects of 
the Greek crisis, which are still being debated (McKee & Stuckler, 2016). A widely quoted 
paper characterized the health consequences of the Greek crisis as “omens of a tragedy” 
(Kentikelenis et al., 2011) and, along with other empirical work, triggered a vigorous 
debate regarding the Greek case, with some studies expressing scepticism about the extent 
to which economic distress was harmful for health (Liaropoulos, 2012; Tapia Granados & 
Rodriguez, 2015). In general, most evidence examined the impact of the recession on 
financing, delivery and access to health services, while research on population health 
primarily focused on comparisons of various indicators between the pre- and post-crisis 
period (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014).  
According to a recent study, all-cause mortality has decreased following the 
economic crisis but the rate of decline was significantly lower, especially for women 
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(Laliotis et al., 2016). This study reported heterogeneous impact of the recession on cause-
specific deaths. In particular, it found that mortality due to diseases of the circulatory 
system decreased at a slower pace after the crisis, whereas the decline in deaths due to road 
accidents was actually greater during the period of economic downturn. It also showed that 
suicide mortality and deaths from mental illness, neurological diseases, and adverse events 
during treatment increased during the post-crisis period. Additionally, most ecological 
studies primarily focus on suicides, showing that the economic recession and austerity are 
associated with increased suicidality in Greece (Branas et al., 2015; Rachiotis, Stuckler, 
Mckee, & Hadjichristodoulou, 2015). For example, using time-series data over the period 
1968-2011, Antonakakis and Collins (2014) showed that overall and male suicide rates 
increased during the period of fiscal austerity and economic downturn in Greece47, while 
this was not the case for women (Antonakakis & Collins, 2014).  
Apart from the papers focusing on aggregate mortality trends, a strand of the 
literature also investigates the impact of economic decline on some other health indicators. 
The majority of these studies employ individual-level data from various surveys, thus 
avoiding potential bias arising from ecological inference fallacy. For example, evidence 
suggests that self-rated health trends have deteriorated after the onset of the Greek crisis 
(Vandoros et al., 2013; Zavras et al., 2013). Another study also employed survey data and 
a difference in differences approach, and found that economic crisis led to worse health 
trends in Greece but not in Ireland, although the latter also faced a severe financial crisis 
(Hessel, Vandoros, & Avendano, 2014). In another study, Drydakis (2015) employed 
longitudinal data and showed that unemployment led to negative effects on health status 
and mental health in Greece, whereas its adverse impact was stronger during periods of 
recession (Drydakis, 2015).  
In addition, various studies have employed repeated cross-sectional datasets to 
examine potential association between economic distress and mental health (M. Economou 
et al., 2014). For instance, descriptive evidence shows an increasing prevalence of major 
depression during the recession (from 3.3% to 12.3% during 2008-2013), while low-
educated, unemployed and those suffering from financial hardship had a higher likelihood 
of being depressed (M. Economou et al., 2016; Economou et al., 2013). Furthermore, the 	47 Prior to these empirical studies, there was an interesting debate regarding the trends in suicide mortality 
during the Greek crisis, which mainly relied on descriptive evidence (M. Economou, Madianos, Peppou, 
Theleritis, & Stefanis, 2012; Fountoulakis, Grammatikopoulos, Koupidis, Siamouli, & Theodorakis, 2012; 
Fountoulakis, Savopoulos, et al., 2013; Fountoulakis, Siamouli, et al., 2013; Kondilis, Ierodiakonou, Gavana, 
Giannakopoulos, & Benos, 2013). 
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share of the sample that reported suicidal ideation increased from 2.4% to 6.7% between 
2008 and 2011, with this increase being driven by male respondents (M. Economou et al., 
2013). However, an update of this study suggested that the prevalence of suicidal ideation 
gradually declined to the pre-crisis level, down to 2.6% in 2013. Similar results are also 
reported for the one-month prevalence of suicidal attempt (M. Economou et al., 2016). 
Contrary to these findings, a recent paper did not show a significant difference in the 
prevalence of diagnosed mental health problems (depression or anxiety disorders) between 
2010 and 2015 (Filippidis et al., 2017). However, the authors interpreted this finding with 
caution, and noted that the counterintuitive finding can be possibly attributed to under-
diagnosed cases during economic recession. 
These studies have concentrated on adult physical and mental health, without 
considering potential effects of economic distress on child and newborn health. At the 
moment of writing this chapter, there are two short reports that examine the link between 
economic recession and child mortality in Greece. Using a descriptive analysis, a paper 
noted an increase in stillbirths in Greece during 2009-2010, potentially associated with the 
onset of the economic crisis (Vlachadis & Kornarou, 2013). Another study did not find 
evidence of rising infant mortality and stillbirth rate between the pre- and post-crisis 
periods (Michas, Varytimiadi, Chasiotis, & Micha, 2014).  
 
4.3. Literature review 
4.3.1. Determinants of birth outcomes 
Previous evidence shows that BW is essentially determined by the rate of 
intrauterine growth and the gestational duration (Abu-Saad & Fraser, 2010; Goldenberg & 
Culhane, 2007; Kramer, 2003), with both of them being influenced by various factors. In 
this section, we will group and briefly summarize the most important determinants of birth 
outcomes, as suggested by various studies in medical and social science literature.  
The determinants of adverse birth outcomes can be broadly categorized into the 
following categories: (a) genetic and constitutional characteristics (newborn gender, race, 
additional genetic factors); (b) parental sociodemographic and psychological 
characteristics (age, marital status, income, educational level, occupation, maternal stress 
and psychological situation) (Blumenshine et al., 2010; Kogan, 1995); (c) obstetric factors 
(parity, previous obstetric history) (Goldenberg et al., 2008); (d) nutrition and lifestyle 
factors (consumption of specific proteins and vitamins, physical exercise, smoking, 
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drinking) (Chomitz et al., 1995; Ramakrishnan, 2004) and (e) prenatal care utilisation 
(intensity of doctor visits for prenatal care, timing and quality of visits) (Kramer, 1987).  
Based on this classification, it appears that some genetic and constitutional 
characteristics influence fetal growth and could lead to adverse birth outcomes. For 
example, some chromosomal anomalies are associated with intrauterine growth 
retardation, resulting in lower BW. Additionally, various studies document a relationship 
between maternal weight and birth weight (Bernabé et al., 2004), and also show that race 
may influence birth outcomes (Goldenberg et al., 2008).  
A second set of factors affecting birth outcomes relates to sociodemographic and 
psychological characteristics. According to a comprehensive literature review, there is a 
well-established socioeconomic gradient in birth outcomes, with infants born to high-SES 
mothers having better birth outcomes (Blumenshine et al., 2010). The nexus between 
parental socioeconomic status and BW appears to be strong and robust to different 
socioeconomic proxies, such as income, education and occupation (Conley & Bennett, 
2001; Kogan, 1995). Another strand of the literature reveals that neighbourhood 
socioeconomic characteristics also affect birth outcomes (Luo et al., 2006; Pearl et al., 
2001). For instance, a few studies have indeed found evidence for the contextual effects of 
income inequality on birth outcomes (Huynh et al., 2005; Nkansah-Amankra et al., 2010). 
Additionally, a growing body of evidence shows a rather counterintuitive finding regarding 
the link between immigration status and newborn health. In particular, most studies find 
that children born to immigrant mothers tend to be healthier and generally have better 
perinatal outcomes. This finding is known as the “healthy immigrant effect” and can be 
possibly attributed to selection, since the immigrant mothers generally tend to be younger 
and healthier (Guendelman et al., 1999; Janevic et al., 2011). Apart from the 
socioeconomic factors affecting BW, various studies elucidate potential relationships 
between demographic characteristics and BW. For instance, evidence suggests that 
maternal age is strongly associated with birth outcomes (Love et al., 2010), and mothers 
aged less than 18 and more than 35 years old are more likely to give birth to children with 
lower BW (Lee et al., 1988). Last, babies born to unmarried mothers generally tend to have 
poorer newborn health (Conley & Bennett, 2001; Holt et al., 1997; Phung et al., 2003).  
Third, a series of obstetric factors, and obstetric history in general, influence the 
probability of preterm birth and LBW. For instance, primiparity relates to increased 
probability of preterm birth and LBW. However, parity and birth outcomes are essentially 
characterized by a U-shaped relationship, given that the risk of LBW and adverse birth 
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outcomes also increases after the fourth pregnancy (Bernabé et al., 2004). Evidence from 
the medical literature also indicates that previous miscarriages further raise the probability 
of adverse birth outcomes (Basso et al., 1998; Thom et al., 1992). 
A fourth set of determinants relates to lifestyle and nutritional habits. For example, 
maternal smoking is among the most crucial preventable risk factors for intrauterine 
growth retardation and LBW (Hellerstedt et al., 1997; Wang et al., 1997), and has an 
independent and strong effect on birth outcomes, even after adjusting for socioeconomic 
characteristics and other potential confounders (Bouckaert, 2000). In this context, there are 
several biological mechanisms that potentially explain the link between maternal exposure 
to smoke and birth outcomes (Bernabé et al., 2004). A strand of the literature has also 
linked drinking alcohol with adverse birth outcomes (Jaddoe et al., 2007; Larroque et al., 
1993), with the magnitude of the effect depending on the level of alcohol consumption 
(Mills et al., 1984). Last, maternal nutrition appears to be a significant predictor of birth 
outcomes, since consumption of specific nutrients and several nutritional habits influence 
placental and fetal growth (Godfrey et al., 1996)  
Last, most evidence indicates that adequate prenatal care utilization is associated 
with higher BW (Donaldson & Billy, 1984; Rous et al., 2004), and can decrease the 
probability of LBW and preterm birth (Alexander & Kotelchuck, 2001; Kogan, Alexander, 
Kotelchuck, & Nagey, 1994). Apart from its impact on birth weight and the length of 
gestation, lack of prenatal care utilization is also linked with greater rates of perinatal 
mortality and morbidity (Herbst, Mercer, Beazley, Meyer, & Carr, 2003). 
 
4.3.2. Stressful events and birth outcomes 
An increasing body of evidence shows that conditions during the prenatal period 
are associated with birth indicators, with maternal stress and psychosocial situation during 
pregnancy largely affecting fetal development. In this section, we will briefly review some 
key studies on the impact of exogenous and stressful events on newborn health indicators. 
With this in mind, various studies show that in utero exposure to exogenous events (e.g. 
terrorist attacks, natural disasters) affect birth outcomes (Hedegaard et al., 1996), and/or 
birth defects (Carmichael, Shaw, Yang, Abrams, & Lammer, 2007).  
In this context, some papers have examined the impact of terrorist attacks on birth 
outcomes, with most studies focusing on the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. In 
particular, findings from the medical and epidemiological literature support that the 9/11 
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attack was generally associated with worse birth outcomes in New York, such as lower 
BW and shorter length of gestation (Lederman et al., 2004). Apart from the negative 
effects in New York, women in California were also found to be more likely to give birth 
to LBW children in the period after the 9/11 attack (Lauderdale, 2006). Using data from 
Dutch infants, another paper showed that children who were in utero during the 9/11 attack 
were lighter compared to non-exposed children, and explained this finding on the basis of 
the stress generated by the extensive media coverage (Smits, Krabbendam, de Bie, Essed, 
& van Os, 2006). Likewise, a few studies also indicated that this terrorist attack affected 
secondary sex ratio due to male fetal loss (Bruckner, Catalano, & Ahern, 2010; R. 
Catalano, Bruckner, Marks, & Eskenazi, 2006). Although most studies have indeed noted 
that the 9/11 attack led to poorer newborn health, a strand of the literature showed 
insignificant or mixed results (El-Sayed, Hadley, & Galea, 2008; Endara et al., 2001; 
Eskenazi, Marks, Catalano, Bruckner, & Toniolo, 2007). Apart from the terrorist attack on 
the World Trade Center, the impact of terrorism and/or violence on birth indicators has 
been analysed using different case studies. For example, children who experienced in utero 
exposure to the landmine explosions in Colombia weighted 8.7 grams less than their 
siblings (Camacho, 2008). Similarly, a recent paper showed that intrauterine exposure to 
ETA terrorism in the early months of gestation had a strong negative impact on BW, 
increased the prevalence of LBW and reduced the percentage of infants without 
complications during pregnancy (Quintana-Domeque & Ródenas-Serrano, 2017). Mansour 
and Rees (2012) also showed that intrauterine exposure to conflict-related fatality early in 
the pregnancy is linked with greater risk of LBW, with the effect of the intrauterine 
exposure during the third trimester being somewhat weaker (Mansour & Rees, 2012). 
These empirical findings are further supported by recent studies that have also examined 
the effects of exposure to violence (captured by local homicide rates) on birth outcomes in 
Latin American countries (R. Brown, 2018; Foureaux Koppensteiner & Manacorda, 2016). 
Both articles found that intrauterine exposure to violence during the first trimester is 
associated with lower BW, higher probability of LBW and greater risk of prematurity, with 
the effects being stronger for the infants born to low-SES mothers. Contrary to these 
findings, another analysis noted that prenatal exposure to violence in Mexico led to greater 
BW and decreased the proportion of LBW infants (Torche & Villarreal, 2014).   
Another body of the literature has examined whether exposure to natural disasters 
during pregnancy impacts health at birth. For example, increasing evidence reveals that 
intrauterine exposure to earthquakes results in lower BW and increases the proportion of 
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LBW infants, with the effect being stronger for mothers exposed to the earthquake during 
the first trimester of gestation (Kim, Carruthers, & Harris, 2017; Tan et al., 2009; Torche, 
2011). In the same spirit, some other papers indicate that intrauterine exposure to 
Hurricane Katrina increased the risk of LBW (Callaghan et al., 2007; Xiong et al., 2008), 
whereas Tong et al. (2011) found that children born to mothers who experienced the 
catastrophic flood in North Dakota had greater risk of LBW and preterm delivery (Tong, 
Zotti, & Hsia, 2011). A comprehensive analysis found that exposure to hurricanes impacts 
the probability of abnormal conditions for infants in the USA, while the results for the 
effects on BW and pregnancy length were rather mixed (Currie & Rossin-Slater, 2013). 
Another strand of the literature also shows that prenatal exposure to weather shocks leads 
to lower length of pregnancy and reduced BW, with the effects being stronger for those 
being exposed in the second and early third trimester (Simeonova, 2011). These findings 
are further confirmed by some other papers, which also document a relationship between 
weather shocks during pregnancy and newborn health (Andalón, Azevedo, Rodríguez-
Castelán, Sanfelice, & Valderrama-González, 2016; Deschênes, Greenstone, & Guryan, 
2009). 
 
4.3.3. Economic performance and birth outcomes 
Although the impact of intrauterine exposure to exogenous and stressful events on 
newborn health has been extensively discussed in medical and social science literature, the 
relationship between economic climate during gestation and birth outcomes has attracted 
less interest (Eiríksdóttir et al., 2013). According to a review, the empirical findings about 
the newborn health effects of economic adversity are contradictory and rather 
inconclusive, and further empirical work is thus needed on this topic (Margerison Zilko, 
2010). The discrepancy in existing evidence can possibly be attributed either to different 
methodologies or to different behavioural responses to economic crises and shocks (Miller 
& Urdinola, 2010).  
A strand of the literature shows that economic contraction improves newborn 
health, or does not report evidence of a significant link between economic conditions 
during gestation and birth outcomes. For instance, a widely quoted paper employed data 
from the USA and explored the link between unemployment rate and child health. It found 
that infants born during periods of recession generally have a lower rate of LBW and fewer 
congenital malformations (R. Dehejia & Lleras-Muney, 2004). According to their findings, 
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the observed newborn health improvements can be mainly attributed to the changes in the 
composition of women who conceive, and the changes in health-promoting behaviours 
during periods of economic contraction. In a similar spirit, another study focused on an 
unexpected wage cut policy in Romania, and also found evidence of improved birth 
outcomes for the children exposed to the unexpected shock (Bejenariu & Mitrut, 2013). 
Evidence from Sweden indicates that economic conditions are not significantly associated 
with BW and the probability of LBW (Van Den Berg & Modin, 2013). Likewise, Joyce 
(1990) used monthly aggregate data from New York City, and found no evidence of a 
relationship between unemployment rate and the percentage of LBW infants (Joyce, 1990). 
In contrast to the previous literature, some studies indicate that BW is essentially 
procyclical. Based on individual-level data for live births, previous work on Argentina’s 
economic crisis in the early 2000s pointed out that intrauterine exposure to macroeconomic 
fluctuations is associated with lower BW and greater probability of LBW (Bozzoli & 
Quintana-Domeque, 2014). According to this analysis, the BW loss associated with this 
crisis was approximately 30 grams. The study also showed that BW responds differently to 
prenatal economic conditions depending on maternal socioeconomic status, and also 
provided plausible explanations for these findings. Another paper tested the relationship 
between regional unemployment rate and newborn health in Argentina, and showed that 
higher unemployment is associated with reduced fetal growth rate, especially for better-
educated parents (G. L. Wehby, Gimenez, & López-Camelo, 2017). However, this paper 
concluded that increasing unemployment reduces BW and raises the probability of LBW 
for the children born to better-educated parents. Contrary to both studies using data from 
Argentina, an article about the Peruvian crisis did not report any heterogeneous effects of 
the economic crisis on birth outcomes across different socioeconomic groups (Gutierrez, 
2017).  
A recent study focused on the financial crisis in Iceland and compared the birth 
indicators of children exposed to the banking collapse of October 2008 during gestation, 
with those of children who were in utero in 2007 (Olafsson, 2016).  The study’s empirical 
strategy implied that the exposure to the banking collapse was the only difference between 
the two cohorts. According to its findings, exposure to the financial crisis affected birth 
outcomes, especially for the children exposed to the shock during the first trimester of 
pregnancy. Another article examined the same case study, and concluded similar results 
(Eiríksdóttir et al., 2013). In particular, the article showed that the risk of LBW and small 
for gestational age (SGA) was significantly higher for the children born during the post-
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crisis period, with the effect being somewhat greater for the infants of younger and 
unemployed women. Nonetheless, this analysis did not reveal a significant difference in 
the probability of preterm birth between the period before and after the financial collapse.  
The economic recessions in Latin America and Iceland were deep and severe, and 
this potentially explains the increasing interest for these countries. The existing literature, 
however, has also examined similar research questions using data from some other 
countries. For example, a study employed quarterly data for live births in Norway and 
Sweden, and reported a positive relationship between male unemployment rate and the 
incidence of LBW (R Catalano et al., 1999). Furthermore, Varea et al. (2016) showed that 
the prevalence of LBW significantly increased following the recent economic crisis in 
Spain (Varea, Terán, Bernis, Bogin, & González-González, 2016). Using micro-level data 
from the Netherlands, another study found a small, but statistically significant, effect of 
unemployment rate on BW, but not on the risk of LBW (Alessie et al., 2017).  
Apart from the effects on BW and the risk of LBW, a strand of the literature has 
also tested whether economic contraction impacts secondary sex ratio (i.e. the ratio of male 
to female births). Using data from East and West Germany over the period 1946-1999, 
Catalano (2003) found that economic recession is linked with a reduction in secondary sex 
ratio, while sex ratio in East Germany was at its lowest during the economic recession in 
1991 (R. A. Catalano, 2003b). Another study drew on Swedish data and time-series 
analysis and also reported similar results (R. A. Catalano & Bruckner, 2005). 
 
4.4. Methods 
4.4.1. Data 
This study is based on administrative data from National Vital Statistics, collected 
by the Hellenic Statistical Authority. The main advantage of our dataset is that it includes 
all births (838,700 births) over the period 2008-2015 in Greece, and it provides 
information about birth outcomes, gestational characteristics and parental 
sociodemographic variables.  
In addition to the administrative data, we also rely on publicly available data for the 
monthly seasonally adjusted ESI (Eurostat, 2018a). In particular, the ESI is a survey-based 
and composite indicator, and its construction relies on the weighted aggregation of the 
following confidence indicators: (a) industrial confidence indicator (weight: 40%), (b) 
service confidence indicator (weight: 30%), (c) consumer confidence indicator (weight: 
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20%), (d) construction confidence indicator (weight: 5%), and (e) retail trade confidence 
indicator (weight: 5%) (Eurostat, 2009, 2018a; Silgoner, 2007). Different from other 
economic variables, the ESI contains information about the current economic climate 
according to economic agents, and it also incorporates relevant expectations about future 
trends. Thus, compared to standard measures such as GDP, industrial production, or 
unemployment rate, the ESI captures relevant economic information more quickly (Gelper 
& Croux, 2010).  
 
4.4.2. Dependent variable 
The main dependent variable is BW (measured in grams), and we also use some 
additional birth outcomes such as pregnancy length, foetal growth rate and binary 
indicators for LBW, preterm birth, macrosomia, stillbirth and the probability of maleness 
in newborns. LBW is an established medical term that refers to newborns who weigh less 
than 2,500 grams, and fetal growth is defined as BW divided by gestational age (in weeks) 
(S. E. Black et al., 2007; G. Wehby, Dave, & Kaestner, 2016). In addition, preterm birth 
occurs when the duration of the pregnancy is less than 37 weeks, while macrosomic babies 
are those weighing more than 4,000 grams at birth. We include macrosomia as a dependent 
variable as it is linked to long-term health consequences such as obesity, hypertension and 
diabetes (Zhang, Decker, Platt, & Kramer, 2008). Lastly, based on a strand of the literature 
suggesting that exposure to population stressors is associated with reduced odds of male 
birth (R. A. Catalano, 2003a; R. A. Catalano & Bruckner, 2005), we modeled the 
probability of male birth to test whether unfavourable economic conditions impacted the 
sex ratio.   
 
4.4.3. Independent variables 
The independent variable of interest is based on a monthly measure of business 
cycle fluctuations. Using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter of the log-transformed ESI, we 
construct variables that capture the cyclical component of the ESI for each month of 
pregnancy (Bozzoli & Quintana-Domeque, 2014). HP filter is an established technique that 
distinguishes the cyclical component from the smooth trend of a time-series variable 
(Hodrick & Prescott, 1997), and has been generally used in various empirical studies 
(Angelini & Mierau, 2014; Avendano, Moustgaard, & Martikainen, 2017; Leist, Hessel, & 
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Avendano, 2014). In order to select the smoothing parameter of the HP filter, we rely on 
the approach proposed by Ravn and Uhlig (Ravn & Uhlig, 2002). 
We control for three variables (i.e. one for each trimester of pregnancy), since 
economic fluctuations or other exogenous events may influence birth outcomes differently 
depending on their occurrence in a trimester of pregnancy (Camacho, 2008; Torche, 2011; 
Zhu et al., 2010). Each of the three variables corresponds to the average cyclical 
component of the (a) first, second, and third month of pregnancy (for the first trimester), 
(b) fourth, fifth, and sixth month of pregnancy (for the second trimester), and (c) seventh, 
eighth, and ninth month of pregnancy (for the third trimester).  
Based on some seminal epidemiological studies for the determinants of birth 
outcomes (Goldenberg et al., 2008; Kramer, 1987; Parker et al., 1994), we further control 
for several regressors, such as marital status, maternal age, education, employment, 
nationality, number of previous children, multiple birth and newborn gender. Lastly, our 
models contain month-of-birth fixed effects (FE), year-of-birth FE, day-of-week FE and 
prefecture FE. More details on the variable definition are shown in the Appendix Table C1.  
To test the robustness of our results, we use a monthly measure of economic 
uncertainty (EPU) instead of the ESI. The EPU is compiled from textual analysis of digital 
archives of major newspapers, and it reflects the frequency of articles with key terms 
related to the economy, uncertainty and policy (Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2016). A 
comprehensive description of the data collection and construction of the Greek version of 
the EPU can be found in Hardouvelis et al. (2018)48 (Hardouvelis, Karalas, Karanastasis, 
& Samartzis, 2018). Recent literature has employed this index to test the impact of 
economic uncertainty on adult health in the UK (Antonakakis & Gupta, 2017; Vandoros, 
Avendano, & Kawachi, 2018, 2019). In our case, EPU and ESI are negatively correlated 
(ρ=-0.38, p-value=0.0001). The negative correlation coefficient is expected since ESI falls 
while EPU tends to increase as economic activity declines (Hardouvelis et al., 2018). In 
this context, we test the robustness of our results even after employing an alternative 
economic indicator, which is only modestly correlated with the ESI. 
 
	48 In constructing this index, Hardouvelis et al. (2018) relied on articles from four major Greek newspapers 
(i.e. “To Vima”, “Ta Nea”, “Kathimerini”, “Naftemporiki”). 
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4.4.4 Empirical strategy 
The first part of our analysis relies on both linear and non-linear empirical 
specifications. Our main model is linear, and the regression coefficients are estimated by 
OLS. The main specification is given by the following expression:  
 !"!,#,$,% = $& + $'&'(#,$ + $()'(#,$ + $)''(#,$ + $**! + +% + ,# + -$ + .!,#,$,%  
(1) 
where, !"!,#,$,% denotes the birth weight of an infant i who was born at month m and year y by a 
mother who lives in a region r. &'(#,$ measures the average cyclical component in the first trimester  )'(#,$ measures the average cyclical component in the second trimester  ''(#,$ measures the average cyclical component in the third trimester  *! is the vector of several sociodemographic, gestational and other variables  +% is a region FE term ,# is a month-of-birth FE term -$ is a year-of-birth FE term .!,#,$,% is the error term 
We also employ linear regression models using pregnancy length and foetal growth 
rate as outcome variables, and logistic regression models for the binary indicators (LBW, 
preterm birth, macrosomia, stillbirth and the probability of maleness in a newborn). In this 
case, the regression coefficients are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).  
To examine potential heterogeneity in the relationship between economic 
conditions during gestation and newborn health indicators, we stratify the sample by 
parental education, which is a proxy for family socioeconomic status. After stratifying the 
sample, we then estimate Equation (1) for newborns whose parents have both completed 
university education (high-SES) and for children of parents with a lower educational level 
(low-SES).   
The potential changes in the cohort composition of women49 who become pregnant 
motivate the third part of our analysis (Hypothesis 3), in which we explore whether 	49 There are several methodological issues arising from potential selection into pregnancy. Simply put, there 
might be changes on the type of women who conceive and give birth (i.e. the composition of pregnant 
women), associated with the adverse economic conditions. 
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economic conditions during preconception period are associated with the type of women 
who actually conceive. In doing so, we define preconception period as the three months 
prior to the first trimester of pregnancy (Quintana-Domeque & Ródenas-Serrano, 2017). 
We thus estimate the following model: 
 /01(!,#,$,% = 2& + 2'3(4/56/#,$ + +% + ,# + -$ + 7!,#,$,%  (2) 
 /01(!,#,$,%  corresponds to parental characteristic (e.g. maternal education, age, 
nationality, employment status, marital status, total number of births) of a child i, who was 
conceived at month m and year y by a mother who lives in a region r. 
 3(4/56/#,$ measures economic conditions in the preconception period. 
 
As pointed out above, the characteristics of mothers who conceive and give birth 
during recessions might differ from those of mothers who conceive in stable economic 
periods. In order to examine our last hypothesis and address potential selection into 
pregnancy, we conduct a propensity score matching (PSM) (R. H. Dehejia & Wahba, 
2002; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). PSM aims to construct a control group of untreated 
observations, which have the similar observable characteristics as those exposed to the 
treatment (Blundell & Dias, 2000). Using propensity score as the single source of 
information for the matching process, the main advantage of this technique is that it 
overcomes the “curse of dimensionality” (Becker & Ichino, 2002; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1983). In this case, we employ a nearest neighbour algorithm and match each treated 
observation with an observation from the control group that has the closest propensity 
score (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Garrido et al., 2014). This practically implies that each 
birth of a child exposed in utero to the crisis is paired with the single most similar 
observation from the comparison group.  
We compare the BW of two cohorts: (a) children born before October 2009 (i.e. 
before the manifestation of the Greek crisis), and (b) children who were conceived before 
but born after the onset of the crisis (thus, they were exposed to the crisis during the 
prenatal period). The latter cohort is the treatment group, consisting of children conceived 
before October 2009 and born after October 2009. In particular, we define this cohort as a 
treatment group, since the effects of the crisis were not evident and had not fully kicked in 
at the time of conception (Chrysoloras, 2013; Geanakoplos, 2014; Matsaganis, 2013; 
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Zettelmeyer et al., 2013). This group of children, however, experienced intrauterine 
exposure to the economic crisis. Comparing the two cohorts thus allows us to consider 
selection into pregnancy associated with maternal characteristics (Bozzoli & Quintana-
Domeque, 2014).  
As indicated above, we assume that the Greek crisis began in October 2009.50 This 
is a reasonable assumption if one considers the broader political and social environment in 
Greece in 2009. First, a large body of academic evidence and policy reports corroborate 
that the Greek crisis became evident in October 2009 (Geanakoplos, 2014; Gibson, Hall, et 
al., 2014; Lane, 2012; Provopoulos, 2014; Zettelmeyer et al., 2013). Second, there were no 
signs of large-scale fiscal consolidation and potential salary cuts until late 2009, and 
households did not expect or experience substantial changes in their income, employment 
prospects and living conditions. According to the EU-SILC data, for example, 
deterioration in average household income and perceived financial difficulties did not 
occur in 2008 and 2009 (Eurostat, 2019c). Therefore, households did not face significant 
financial concerns that could affect their fertility decisions at that time. Third, the 
unemployment rate did not significantly deviate from the historical rates until late 2009, 
before which it was generally comparable with the corresponding OECD and EU average 
(OECD, 2019).  The trend in sovereign debt yields, which started increasing in late 2009 
(see Figure C1 in the Appendix C), provides further evidence for the timing of the crisis 
onset. We also use other key dates to test the robustness of our results. Instead of October 
2009, the alternative dates used were as follows: (a) December 2009, when credit rating 
agencies downgraded Greek bonds and the government announced several reforms; (b) 
January 2010, when the government announced a plan to reduce the budget deficit; and (c) 
April 2010, when the Greek government actually signed the bailout agreement. 
 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Newborn health and business cycle fluctuations during pregnancy 
The ESI sharply dropped during the period of economic crisis, and after some signs 
of recovery in 2013-2014, it again decreased in 2015 (more details are presented in the 
Appendix Table C2). In general, the descriptive evidence indicates that BW can be 	50  After the elections in October 2009, the new government announced that Greece faced significant 
economic problems, and that fiscal deficit was much larger than initially stated by the outgoing government. 
After this adverse development, the then Prime Minister stated that the Greek economy was in “intensive 
care”. In early December, a credit rating agency downgraded Greece’s credit rating from A- to BBB+. 
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regarded as procyclical. Indeed, the average BW dropped during the period of economic 
crisis, while some other birth indicators, such as LBW and preterm birth, also deteriorated. 
From a descriptive perspective, the procyclicality of BW is further documented in Figure 
4.1, which essentially presents the evolution of the annual average ESI and the average 
BW of the newborns born in each year.  
 
Figure 4. 1: Average birth weight and Economic Sentiment Indicator (2008-2015) 
 
 
Apart from presenting some descriptive evidence, this section explores the 
relationship between business cycle volatility during the trimesters of gestation and birth 
outcomes. Therefore, we focus on the cyclical part of the ESI, and examine whether and 
how business cycle fluctuations are associated with birth outcomes at different trimesters 
of pregnancy. As explained above, we employ different variables for each trimester of 
pregnancy, since evidence suggests that intrauterine exposure to adverse or stressful events 
may affect birth outcomes differently, depending on the stage of gestation (Camacho, 
2008; Olafsson, 2016; Torche, 2011). 
In this context, Table 4.1 presents the main findings of our analysis. In particular, 
Model 1 presents the OLS estimates of Equation (1), using BW as a dependent variable. 
Our analysis shows a strong association between economic conditions in the first and third 
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pregnancy trimesters and BW, while showing a weaker relationship with fluctuations in the 
second trimester. We also find a strong negative association between business cycle 
variation during gestation and the probability of LBW. According to Model 3, the 
probability of LBW is countercyclical with reference to business cycle variation in the first 
and third pregnancy trimesters, but this does not apply to economic volatility during the 
second trimester. For example, a 10% reduction of the detrended ESI (i.e. a 0.1. change in 
logarithmic scale) during the first trimester of pregnancy would decrease BW by 12.6 
grams. Controlling for a variable capturing the economic fluctuations during the whole 
period of gestation, a similar deterioration of economic conditions during the whole 
pregnancy period is associated with a BW loss of 22.1 grams and an increase in the 
probability of LBW by 0.87 percentage points. Similarly, Models 5 and 6 show that the 
gestational length and the probability of preterm birth are associated with the economic 
climate during the first and third trimesters; a finding that further validates our initial 
hypotheses regarding the link between economic fluctuations during gestation and 
newborn health. Therefore, the results are consistent and suggest that birth outcomes 
respond to business cycle fluctuations mainly in the first and third trimesters, while the 
corresponding fluctuations in the second trimester are either weak or insignificant. To 
provide another example, our estimates suggest that a negative economic fluctuation of 
10% would be expected to raise the probability of preterm birth by 1.16 percentage points. 
We also perform additional analyses using four alternative birth indicators as 
dependent variables: the risk of macrosomia, the probability of stillbirth, the probability of 
male birth and fetal growth rate. In particular, our findings also reveal that business cycle 
volatility in the first pregnancy trimester is linked with the risk of macrosomia. Although 
some studies show that economic decline affects the sex ratio, our analysis does not 
support this finding. We do not find a statistically significant link between economic 
fluctuations during gestation and the probability of male birth, regardless of the trimester 
of pregnancy. Last, Model 10 (Table 4.1) shows that business cycle variation in the first 
and last trimesters is linked with fetal growth rate (i.e. BW divided by gestational age). 
As reported by in Table 4.1, boys are, on average, 128 grams heavier than girls. 
Additionally, children born to married mothers tend to be heavier, and being married is 
also associated with a lower probability of LBW, preterm birth and stillbirth. Our analysis 
also reveals that maternal age is negatively associated with BW, and positively linked with 
the risk of LBW, preterm birth and stillbirth. Further, a socioeconomic gradient in newborn 
health is also documented, since parental educational attainment generally appears to be a 
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statistically significant determinant of birth outcomes. Lastly, we show that infants of 
Greek women are more likely to have LBW and are generally lighter than other children. 
Although this finding seems counterintuitive, it is consistent with the so-called “healthy 
migrant effect”51 (Wingate & Alexander, 2006).  
In general, our results are robust across different specifications, and the sensitivity 
analysis is presented in Table C3 in Appendix C. We also perform a placebo test, and 
control for economic conditions in the postnatal period, expecting that newborn health 
does not relate to economic climate in the period after pregnancy. We indeed find that 
business cycle volatility in the postnatal period is not associated with BW and the risk of 
LBW (see Columns 2 and 4 in Table 4.1). This finding further strengthens our results 
regarding the relationship between prenatal economic fluctuations and birth outcomes. 
Lastly, we estimate Equation (1) using the following: (a) the EPU instead of the ESI 
(regression estimates are presented in Appendix C, Table C4); (b) the ESI, without 
employing a HP filter (Table C5 in Appendix C); and (c) a Butterworth filter instead of an 
HP filter (Angelini & Mierau, 2014; Gómez, 2001) (Table C6 in Appendix C). Our results 
are robust and consistent, even after changing the measure of the economic climate and 
detrending technique.  
	51  The prevailing explanation for this empirical observation relates to the fact that migrants might be 
healthier prior to conception. Healthier women -who are more likely migrate and be mobile- are expected to 
give birth to children with better birth outcomes. 
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Table 4. 1: Business cycle fluctuations and birth outcomes, 2008-2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 BW BW LBW LBW Pregnancy 
length 
Preterm 
birth 
Macrosomia Stillbirth Male Fetal growth 
           
BC 1st trimester 125.8*** 127.6*** -1.066*** -1.059*** 0.625*** -0.820*** 0.365** -0.302 0.0479 2.489*** 
 (22.58) (24.59) (0.212) (0.216) (0.116) (0.247) (0.178) (0.638) (0.0615) (0.545) 
BC 2nd trimester 42.95** 38.87* 0.00522 -0.0108 0.110 -0.229 0.428 -1.221** 0.0730 0.665 
 (17.76) (19.82) (0.190) (0.200) (0.0951) (0.213) (0.261) (0.594) (0.0823) (0.402) 
BC 3rd trimester 60.28*** 63.97*** -0.505*** -0.490*** 0.548*** -0.541*** 0.142 -0.192 0.00259 0.889** 
 (14.84) (17.29) (0.140) (0.134) (0.0872) (0.181) (0.190) (0.743) (0.0664) (0.341) 
BC 9 months after 
birth 
 -10.29  -0.0415       
  (19.05)  (0.115)       
Married 98.43*** 98.42*** -0.558*** -0.558*** 0.188*** -0.451*** 0.235*** -0.757*** 0.0313*** 2.285*** 
 (6.588) (6.592) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0220) (0.0285) (0.0658) (0.0461) (0.0104) (0.136) 
25-29 -3.099 -3.094 0.0833*** 0.0833*** -0.0757*** 0.0177 0.100*** 0.0936 -0.00307 0.0503 
 (2.989) (2.989) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0117) (0.0203) (0.0276) (0.0716) (0.00925) (0.0686) 
30-34 -20.76*** -20.76*** 0.209*** 0.209*** -0.214*** 0.155*** 0.0658** 0.149** -0.00999 -0.135 
 (3.535) (3.536) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0141) (0.0179) (0.0286) (0.0718) (0.00891) (0.0828) 
35-39 -45.99*** -45.99*** 0.377*** 0.377*** -0.383*** 0.356*** 0.0216 0.444*** -0.00742 -0.466*** 
 (3.382) (3.382) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0177) (0.0230) (0.0275) (0.0668) (0.0101) (0.0827) 
Over 40 -120.9*** -120.9*** 0.745*** 0.745*** -0.699*** 0.752*** -0.181*** 0.681*** -0.0262*** -1.860*** 
 (3.931) (3.932) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0254) (0.0253) (0.0548) (0.0804) (0.0101) (0.0966) 
Lower secondary 
education 
27.26*** 27.27*** -0.151*** -0.151*** 0.0349* -0.197*** 0.101*** -0.0894 -0.00410 0.642*** 
 (5.287) (5.289) (0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0193) (0.0341) (0.0309) (0.0656) (0.00984) (0.122) 
Upper secondary 
education 
43.61*** 43.61*** -0.323*** -0.323*** 0.0121 -0.228*** 0.0869*** -0.237*** -0.00652 1.142*** 
 (5.748) (5.748) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0252) (0.0331) (0.0329) (0.0718) (0.00910) (0.125) 
University 
education 
67.88*** 67.89*** -0.460*** -0.460*** 0.0651* -0.316*** 0.104*** -0.568*** 0.00129 1.676*** 
 (5.147) (5.150) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0355) (0.0433) (0.0269) (0.0849) (0.0106) (0.117) 
Total children 19.85*** 19.85*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.0718*** 0.00475 0.116*** -0.0129 0.00335 0.698*** 
 (1.901) (1.901) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.00607) (0.00763) (0.0121) (0.0295) (0.00288) (0.0539) 
Multiple birth -958.3*** -958.3*** 3.639*** 3.639*** -3.015*** 3.160*** -4.900*** 1.539*** -0.0556*** -20.50*** 
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 (4.245) (4.243) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0360) (0.0236) (0.374) (0.0480) (0.0104) (0.0829) 
Male 128.2*** 128.2*** -0.330*** -0.330*** -0.0421*** 0.0709*** 0.818*** 0.131***  3.422*** 
 (1.776) (1.775) (0.00985) (0.00985) (0.00421) (0.00657) (0.0162) (0.0421)  (0.0530) 
Greek nationality -118.0*** -118.0*** 0.395*** 0.395*** -0.276*** 0.284*** -0.645*** -0.101 -0.0188*** -2.495*** 
 (3.409) (3.410) (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0323) (0.0318) (0.0239) (0.0828) (0.00574) (0.128) 
Employment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3,031*** 3,030*** -1.786*** -1.788*** 38.502*** -1.897*** -3.950*** -4.603*** 0.0615*** 78.28*** 
 (7.940) (8.229) (0.0670) (0.0682) (0.0758) (0.0885) (0.0699) (0.144) (0.0153) (0.270) 
           
Observations 800,970 800,970 800,970 800,970 805,105 805,105 800,970 810,410 807,244 799,668 
R-squared 0.189 0.189   0.171     0.161 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.5.2. Heterogeneity across socioeconomic groups 
The second hypothesis of this study examines potential heterogeneity in the 
relationship between business cycle variation during pregnancy and newborn health, 
depending on socioeconomic status. In doing so, we split our sample by parental 
educational level, which is a proxy for socioeconomic status. We thus estimate Equation 
(1) for a group of children whose parents have both completed university education (i.e. 
children born to high-SES families), and for a group of children whose both parents have 
attended up to upper secondary education.  
According to Table 4.2, the BW of children born to low-SES families is responsive 
to economic volatility during the first and third trimesters. As shown in Columns 1 and 3, 
we do not report similar findings for babies born to high-SES families. Only first-trimester 
economic conditions matter for the BW of children born to high-SES families (significant 
at a 10% level). Again, using education as a proxy for socioeconomic status, our findings 
for the probability of LBW infants born to low- and high-SES families are similar 
(Columns 3 and 7 in Table 4.2). Additionally, as shown in Appendix Tables C7 and C8, 
our results are robust after using different indicators of economic climate and detrending 
techniques. Using the EPU as an indicator of economic uncertainty and conditions, for 
example, we find that BW of children born to low-SES families is responsive to business 
cycle variation in the first and third pregnancy trimesters, whereas only first-trimester 
economic climate matter for the BW of newborns of higher socioeconomic groups.  
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Table 4. 2: Business cycle fluctuations and birth outcomes, by parental education 
 High-SES Low-SES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 BW BW LBW LBW BW BW LBW LBW 
         
BC 1st trimester 79.35* 78.45* -0.841** -0.799** 180.1*** 184.7*** -1.370*** -1.378*** 
 (40.96) (39.89) (0.357) (0.359) (28.44) (30.71) (0.241) (0.244) 
BC 2nd trimester 46.47 48.76 0.151 0.0416 20.57 11.04 -0.00413 0.0134 
 (42.59) (45.91) (0.367) (0.390) (27.05) (24.68) (0.218) (0.215) 
BC 3rd trimester 35.48 33.72 -0.222 -0.132 109.6*** 119.1*** -0.751*** -0.769*** 
 (41.53) (40.47) (0.383) (0.374) (20.12) (24.09) (0.217) (0.230) 
BC 9 months after birth  6.054  -0.293  -22.93  0.0437 
  (32.80)  (0.248)  (24.79)  (0.169) 
Married 27.49** 27.47** -0.315*** -0.315*** 65.43*** 65.47*** -0.399*** -0.399*** 
 (11.46) (11.44) (0.104) (0.104) (10.42) (10.42) (0.0708) (0.0708) 
25-29 -6.699 -6.703 0.0297 0.0299 2.060 2.072 0.0175 0.0175 
 (11.79) (11.80) (0.103) (0.103) (3.733) (3.731) (0.0264) (0.0264) 
30-34 -30.40*** -30.40*** 0.166* 0.167* -15.65*** -15.65*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 
 (10.41) (10.41) (0.0978) (0.0977) (4.262) (4.262) (0.0308) (0.0308) 
35-39 -62.09*** -62.09*** 0.350*** 0.350*** -39.99*** -39.98*** 0.322*** 0.322*** 
 (10.84) (10.84) (0.0900) (0.0899) (4.676) (4.675) (0.0329) (0.0329) 
Over 40 -146.6*** -146.6*** 0.804*** 0.805*** -115.8*** -115.8*** 0.695*** 0.695*** 
 (11.28) (11.29) (0.101) (0.101) (5.039) (5.038) (0.0379) (0.0379) 
Total children 39.66*** 39.66*** -0.281*** -0.281*** 14.13*** 14.12*** -0.0940*** -0.0940*** 
 (1.582) (1.585) (0.0182) (0.0182) (2.156) (2.156) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
Multiple birth -969.4*** -969.4*** 3.838*** 3.838*** -948.5*** -948.5*** 3.566*** 3.566*** 
 (4.840) (4.843) (0.0225) (0.0225) (5.260) (5.261) (0.0232) (0.0232) 
Male 130.4*** 130.4*** -0.366*** -0.366*** 129.1*** 129.1*** -0.337*** -0.337*** 
 (3.845) (3.849) (0.0204) (0.0205) (1.264) (1.264) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
Greek nationality -63.42*** -63.42*** 0.136** 0.136** -116.8*** -116.8*** 0.347*** 0.348*** 
 (5.783) (5.783) (0.0689) (0.0689) (3.404) (3.404) (0.0232) (0.0232) 
Employment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Day of week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3,104*** 3,104*** -1.996*** -2.007*** 3,094*** 3,093*** -2.101*** -2.098*** 
 (19.41) (19.03) (0.223) (0.225) (13.51) (13.67) (0.0862) (0.0891) 
         
Observations 156,794 156,794 156,794 156,794 438,889 438,889 438,889 438,889 
R-squared 0.236 0.236   0.177 0.177   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.5.3. Economic conditions and fertility decisions across population groups 
We next investigate whether economic conditions during preconception period are 
associated with maternal characteristics of women who give birth (i.e. the type of women 
who conceive). In doing so, we define preconception period as the three months prior to 
the first pregnancy trimester (Margerison-Zilko, 2014; Quintana-Domeque & Ródenas-
Serrano, 2017), and estimate Equation (2). This analysis allows us to identify potential 
changes in the cohort composition of mothers who conceive.  
 
Table 4. 3: Economic fluctuations during preconception period and parental characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Married Maternal 
age 
Greek High 
educated 
Number of 
children 
Out of 
labour 
market 
       
BC 
(preconcept
ion period) 
-0.284** 0.212 -0.0721 -0.206** 0.289*** 0.172** 
 (0.127) (0.180) (0.103) (0.0998) (0.0731) (0.0840) 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
cut1 
    0.132***  
     (0.0201)  
Constant 
cut2 
    1.992***  
     (0.0384)  
Constant 
cut3 
    3.490***  
     (0.0577)  
Constant 2.942*** 31.64*** 1.248*** -0.856***  -0.811*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0417) (0.0199) (0.0360)  (0.0240) 
       
Observatio
ns 
835,364 835,364 835,364 807,244 835,364 835,364 
R-squared  0.045     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
According to Table 4.3, there is a negative association between economic 
fluctuations during preconception period and the probability that women who conceive are 
married. This implies that the deterioration of economic climate is associated with a 
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greater probability that those who are getting pregnant are married. Given that being 
married is positively linked with BW, economic adversity induces a kind of positive 
selection into pregnancy. In the same vein, our analysis shows that women who conceive 
during periods of economic adversity are more likely to be better-educated. In contrast, we 
do not obtain evidence for a relationship between business cycle fluctuations during 
preconception period and maternal age, or the probability that pregnant women are Greek.  
 
4.5.4. Addressing selection issues  
As shown above, economic recession influences fertility decision differently across 
population groups, giving rise to changes in the cohort of women who give birth. In other 
words, women who conceive during recessions appear to have different characteristics 
than women who conceive during periods of economic normality. To address this issue, we 
employ a PSM analysis and compare the BW of two specific cohorts of children, as 
described in the Methods section. We compare the cohort of children born before October 
of 2009 with children who were conceived before but born after October 2009 (i.e. 
children born between October 2009 and June 2010). The latter cohort was thus exposed to 
the economic crisis during the prenatal period, but their mothers could not have expected 
the extent and severity of the recession when they conceived.  
Table 4.4 (Panel A) shows that BW dropped by 12 grams following the economic 
crisis. After splitting the sample by parental socioeconomic position, we find that BW 
decreased by approximately 18 grams for children of lower socioeconomic background, 
whereas the treatment effect for babies in more privileged families is not statistically 
significant. We also employ an alternative matching process and show that the results are 
very similar (see Panel B in Table 4.3); the BW loss amounted to 11 grams, with the effect 
being almost 18 grams for the low-SES infants and insignificant for their high-SES 
counterparts. 
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Table 4. 4: Propensity score matching analysis for the impact of economic crisis on BW 
Panel A: NN 1:1 with replacement 
Group ATT  Standard error t -statistic 
Total -12.0*** 2.28 -5.26 
Low-SES -17.6*** 2.92 -6.03 
High SES -0.8 5.56 -0.14 
Panel B: NN 3:1 with replacement 
Group ATT  Standard error t -statistic 
Total -11.1*** 2.25 -4.94 
Low-SES -17.8*** 2.89 -6.17 
High SES 4.3 5.50 0.79 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Apart from the baseline estimates, we conduct robustness checks using alternative 
key dates: (a) December 2009, when credit rating agencies downgraded Greek bonds and 
the government announced several reforms, (b) January 2010, when the government 
announced a plan to reduce the budget deficit; and (c) April 2010, when the Greek 
government actually signed the bailout agreement. 
Table 4.5 shows the additional estimates, derived from our robustness checks. 
According to the first scenario, for example, the BW loss ranges between 18 and 19 grams, 
and is greater among children born to lower-SES families. Similar to the baseline 
estimates, the corresponding change in BW following the economic crisis is not 
statistically significant among the high-SES newborns. According to Table 4.4, the BW 
loss from the economic crisis ranges between 18.4 and 21.9 grams. The corresponding loss 
for children born to low-SES families is greater: between 22.1 and 26.5 grams. Lastly, 
these results confirm our baseline findings for children born to high-SES families.  
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Table 4. 5: Propensity score matching analysis for the impact of economic crisis on BW (robustness checks) 
Panel A: NN 1:1 with replacement 
 December 2009 January 2010 April 2010 
 ATT Standard 
error 
t -statistic ATT Standard 
error 
t -statistic ATT Standard 
error 
t -statistic 
Total -19.1*** 2.25 -7.11 -18.7*** 2.22 -8.40 -21.9*** 2.19 -9.97 
Low-SES -22.1*** 2.89 -7.65 -22.8*** 2.85 -8.00 -25.0*** 2.83 -8.81 
High SES -6.8 5.45 -1.24 -6.1 5.35 -1.13 -7.9 5.25 -1.51 
Panel B: NN 3:1 with replacement 
 December 2009 January 2010 April 2010 
 ATT Standard 
error 
t -statistic ATT Standard 
error 
t -statistic ATT Standard 
error 
t -statistic 
Total -18.4*** 2.22 -8.30 -18.8*** 2.19 -8.60 -21.5*** 2.16 -9.95 
Low-SES -22.1*** 2.86 -7.74 -23.2*** 2.82 -8.21 -26.5*** 2.80 -9.46 
High SES -4.5 5.40 -0.84 -6.0 5.29 -1.13 -9.2* 5.20 -1.77 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.6. Discussion 
During the last years, the health effects of the Greek crisis attracted much interest 
and triggered a vigorous debate in the public health community, mainly due to the intense 
and prolonged economic recession. Despite the growing evidence regarding the health 
effects of recession in Greece and other European countries, the findings are “still unclear 
and fragmented”, while the existing empirical work has not adequately addressed several 
types of bias52 (Parmar et al., 2016). 
Our analysis employs a large administrative dataset for 838,700 births (i.e. all 
deliveries during the study period in Greece), and focuses on newborn health. Apart from 
serving as health indicators, birth outcomes can also be regarded as inputs in a health 
production function that approximates the initial endowment of “human health capital”. 
The variables we examine are individual-level health indicators, but contrary to most 
variables used in previous micro-level studies (e.g. self-reported health indicators) they do 
not suffer from measurement error.  
The first hypothesis examines the association between economic fluctuations and 
birth outcomes, which can be mainly explained by two main mechanisms. First, economic 
distress changes the quantity and quality of maternal nutrition, which in turn affects 
intrauterine growth (Bernabé et al., 2004). In households experiencing financial 
constraints, maternal access to nutritious food may be compromised, resulting in food 
insecurity during pregnancy (Brinkman et al., 2010; Studdert et al., 2001). Second, 
economic recession and financial difficulties lead to increased psychosocial stress and 
depression, which can also precipitate LBW (Hedegaard et al., 1996).  
A strand of the literature maintains that these mechanisms change with gestational 
stage. In particular, BW is particularly sensitive to nutrition and dietary changes during the 
third trimester of pregnancy (Almond, Hoynes, & Schanzenbach, 2011; Stein & Lumey, 
2000). For instance, Almond et al. (2011) showed that children whose mothers were 
exposed to a food stamp programme in the third pregnancy trimester had greater levels of 
BW. Apart from nutrition, BW has also been found to be responsive to maternal stress, 
especially when the stress appears early in the pregnancy (Camacho, 2008; Paarlberg et al., 
1999; Torche, 2011). In this context, the finding that BW responds to economic volatility 	52 Several types of bias potentially threaten the robustness of the findings from a methodological perspective. 
Parmar et al. (2016) identified the following types of bias in the existing literature regarding health effects of 
economic crisis in Europe: confounding bias, measurement error in exposure variable, time bias, ecological 
fallacy, selection bias and sample representativeness and measurement error in dependent variable. 
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in the first and third trimesters of gestation could reflect the influence of psychosocial 
stress and maternal nutrition respectively.  
Our results are consistent with a study on Argentina’s crisis in the early 2000s 
(Bozzoli & Quintana-Domeque, 2014), but not with evidence for the 2008 financial 
collapse in Iceland (Eiríksdóttir et al., 2013). In Iceland, babies exposed to the financial 
collapse during the first trimester tended to be lighter; this was not the case for those 
exposed in other trimesters. This may be because the short-term economic slowdown in 
Iceland did not precipitate changes in maternal nutrition, which would have been reflected 
in the BW of the children exposed in the third trimester (Olafsson, 2016).  
We also focus on some additional perinatal outcomes. For instance, there is strong 
evidence for an association between first- and third-trimester economic conditions and 
pregnancy length and foetal growth. Likewise, economic contraction during these 
trimesters raises the risk of preterm birth. Contrary to some studies providing evidence that 
the secondary sex ratio falls during periods of economic contraction (R. A. Catalano, 
2003a; R. A. Catalano & Bruckner, 2005), our findings suggest that business cycle 
volatility during pregnancy is not associated with the probability of having a male child.  
After splitting the sample by SES, we test our second hypothesis and show that 
business cycle variation during the first and last trimesters of gestation matter for the BW 
and the risk of LBW in children born to low-SES households. However, this is not the case 
for the BW of newborns in high-SES families, which is only responsive to the first-
trimester economic volatility. This difference could be attributed to nutritional deprivation, 
which mostly affects low-SES households. In contrast, privileged households are able to 
smooth consumption and are not expected to suffer from food insecurity during economic 
recession (Bozzoli & Quintana-Domeque, 2014). On the other hand, low-SES households 
tend to experience more severe financial challenges during economic recessions, which 
could influence nutritional habits and compromise the quantity and quality of food 
(Bonaccio et al., 2017; Brinkman et al., 2010). In Greece, recent data show that more than 
half of poor households cannot afford to consume meat, chicken, fish or nutrionally 
equivalent vegetables. For the non-poor households, the corresponding percentage was 
only 1.8% (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2017).  
This analysis also finds that business cycle volatility during the first trimester is 
associated with LBW for infants in both lower and higher SES groups. This result could be 
attributed to the pyschosocial stress from economic volatility that appears to affect both 
socioeconomic groups. Nonetheless, it seems that the impact is – again - much stronger for 
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the children of lower socioeconomic background. In general, the effects of economic 
downturns on stress and mental health tend to be more detrimental among lower 
socioeconomic groups (R. A. Catalano & Bruckner, 2005; Hauksdottir et al., 2013; World 
Health Organization, 2011), having potential implications for newborn health. This 
potentially explains why the BW of low-SES newborns is more responsive to first-
trimester economic conditions than that of their high-SES counterparts. 
As explained in the third hypothesis of this study, fertility tends to decline during 
economic recessions due to financial hardship and increased uncertainty (Cherlin, 
Cumberworth, Morgan, & Wimer, 2013; Schneider, 2015). What is interesting, however, is 
that business cycle volatility might influence the fertility decisions differently across 
population groups, having potential implications for the cohort composition of women who 
get pregnant (Chevalier & Marie, 2017). For example, a study showed that Black mothers 
were likely to have a higher socioeconomic status during economic downturns, while they 
found the opposite in the case of White mothers (R. Dehejia & Lleras-Muney, 2004). Our 
findings reveal that economic adversity during the preconception period increases the 
probability that women who conceive are better-educated. Likewise, we show that 
economic downturn during the preconception period decreases the probability that women 
who conceive are economically inactive (i.e. out of the labour market, e.g. as students, 
housewives, retired or unemployed). There are several potential interpretations for these 
findings. Low-SES families may have experienced credit constraints and significant losses 
in their already low income, and may thus be unable to afford the costs of childbearing 
(Schneider & Hastings, 2015). They also have fewer savings and financial reserves to cope 
with the shock associated with income loss (Lusardi et al., 2011). Indeed, a strand of the 
literature suggests that financial security is probably the most significant factor influencing 
conception and timing of childbearing (Roberts, Metcalfe, Jack, & Tough, 2011; Tough, 
Benzies, Fraser-Lee, Newburn-Cook, & Newburn-Cook, 2007). On the other hand, some 
studies suggest that family formation and fertility decisions do not merely depend on 
household financial situation, and they do not report evidence of fertility drop among 
disadvantaged women (Edin & Reed, 2005; Gibson-Davis, 2009). These findings could 
potentially be explained on the basis of the opportunity costs of childbearing.53 Besides, 	53 In particular, high-SES women may face greater opportunity costs of childbearing, given they earn higher 
wages. Therefore, they may have incentives to increase their labour market attachment under the fear of 
unemployment and avoid childbearing during economic recessions. On the contrary, low-SES women have 
lower probability of having or finding a good job during economic downturn, a fact that reduces the 
opportunity cost of childbearing. According to this approach, the opportunity costs of having children 
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low-SES women may structure their lives around childbearing, especially in a recessionary 
environment with fewer opportunities for social mobility and career development 
(Schneider & Hastings, 2015; Sobotka et al., 2011). In any case, our findings strongly 
support the notion that economic contraction during preconception period increases the 
probability that women who conceive tend to have higher socioeconomic status.  
In our fourth hypothesis, we employ a PSM and address potential selection issues 
by comparing two cohorts: children born before October 2009, and children who were 
conceived before but born after October 2009. In this context, the expected impact of 
correcting for selection is to find larger effect estimates.   
Our findings suggest that newborns exposed to the crisis while in utero tend to be 
lighter; this is mostly driven by infants in low-SES families. In particular, the estimated 
BW loss for the children born to low-SES parents is greater, whereas the corresponding 
loss for newborns in high-SES families is insignificant. We thus document that although 
mothers who conceive and give birth during recession tend to have higher SES and are 
more likely to be married, the negative impact of recession exceeds and outweighs the 
effects induced by positive selection into motherhood.  
The estimated effect is not negligible. Among children born to low-SES families, 
the BW loss associated with the economic crisis is 18-27 grams, whereas the BW loss for 
all newborns is 12-22 grams. To put this in context, we benchmark these findings against 
the impact of other stressors and risk factors on BW. For instance, Camacho (2008) found 
that stress from landmine explosions in Colombia led to a significant decline in BW that 
approximated 8.7 grams. Another study showed that infants exposed to ten or more bomb 
casualties in the early months of pregnancy tended to be approximately 10 grams lighter 
(Quintana-Domeque & Ródenas-Serrano, 2017). The estimated BW effects from prenatal 
exposure to terrorist attacks ranged between 5 and 15 grams (R. Brown, 2014), while 
another study found a slightly larger BW loss of 8-19 grams (Eccleston, 2011). Intrauterine 
exposure to floods was associated with a BW loss of 17.9 grams, which was the greatest 
BW loss associated with various natural disasters (Simeonova, 2011). Our estimated BW 
loss is similar to the BW loss associated with family bereavement in Sweden (11 grams) 
(Persson & Rossin-Slater, 2016), but it is half of the BW loss associated with bereavement 
in Norway (Sandra E Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2016). Several studies have also 	
directly relates to the value of parental time, which is largely determined by wage (Friedman, Hechter, & 
Kanazawa, 1994). Contrary to some empirical evidence (including our findings) this approach suggests that 
low-SES women may increase their fertility during periods of economic adversity (Sobotka et al., 2011). 
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examined the effects of maternal smoking on BW. For example one study found that 
smoking reduces BW by 57 grams (Tominey, 2007), while other studies showed a larger 
BW loss, approximating 100 grams (Abrevaya, 2006; Wüst, 2010). Thus, the estimated 
impact of economic crisis on BW is approximately 10–20% that of maternal smoking. This 
effect is much greater for the children born to low-SES families.  
Compared to other major economic crises, the estimated BW loss is quite 
moderate. Evidence from Argentina suggests that the BW loss associated with the 2001 
crisis approximated 30 grams (Bozzoli & Quintana-Domeque, 2014). Additionally, 
children exposed to the collapse of the Icelandic economy in 2008 during the first 
pregnancy trimester were approximately 66 grams lighter (Olafsson, 2016). However, the 
exposure to the collapse during the second and third pregnancy trimesters did not affect 
infants’ BW.  
Several policy implications emanate from our findings. In terms of equality of 
opportunity, children born to low-SES parents are at a disadvantage, since family 
background is associated with several future outcomes, such as educational attainment and 
earnings (Ermisch & Francesconi, 2001; Jerrim, 2015). Based on our findings, they also 
have poorer birth outcomes, a fact that further intensifies their socioeconomic 
disadvantage. On top of that, children born to low-SES families are more severely hit by 
the crisis, and their health appears to be more sensitive to business cycle volatility. Thus, 
low-SES children are born with a poor initial endowment that deteriorates even further in 
the presence of economic recession.  
Hence, the effects of economic crisis on birth outcomes are relatively more 
detrimental for the children of poorer families, resulting is a widening of the BW gap 
between infants of lower and higher socioeconomic groups. This could in turn exacerbate 
future socioeconomic and health inequalities and hinder social mobility as a result of the 
long-term impact of poor birth outcomes on adult health status, educational attainment, 
labour market outcomes and earnings (S. E. Black et al., 2007). Conley and Bennett (2000) 
have aptly described the aforementioned phenomena as “an intergenerational loop of social 
inequality and low birth weight” that incorporates biological aspects into the discussion on 
the intergenerational transmission of poverty (Conley & Bennett, 2000). 
A potential policy response to address socioeconomic disparities in newborn health, 
reduce the differential impact of the economic crisis on birth outcomes and prevent the 
long-term effects on adult outcomes could focus on improving the nutritional status of the 
most vulnerable prospective mothers. For example, the state could introduce a targeted 
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programme that provides or subsidizes specific nutrients and healthy foods (e.g. through 
vouchers), contributes to nutritional education, and aims at improving pregnant women’s 
nutritional habits and healthy behaviours. Empirical evidence from similar programmes 
suggests that such initiatives are generally successful in improving newborn health 
indicators54 (Bitler & Currie, 2005; El-Bastawissi, Peters, Sasseen, Bell, & Manolopoulos, 
2007; Hoynes, Page, & Stevens, 2011; Kowaleski-Jones & Duncan, 2002).  
Our study has some limitations. First, we do not know the extent to which each 
mother has been exposed to the adverse effects of the crisis. This is a common limitation in 
studies that have examined the effects of exogenous wide-scale events on birth outcomes 
(Carlson, 2015; Quintana-Domeque & Ródenas-Serrano, 2017). Unlike bereavement, for 
example, economic crisis is not a stressor in and of itself. Therefore, we rely on economic 
climate indicators during pregnancy to carry out our assessment. Second, similar to most 
studies using administrative data, we do not control for mode of delivery, health 
behaviours, or prenatal care utilization due to data limitations. This might not be a serious 
problem, however, since all pregnant women in Greece have free access to a 
comprehensive programme of prenatal care. Third, a richer dataset would allow us to 
investigate the impact of economic fluctuations on additional birth indicators, such as 
neonatal diseases, Apgar scores, and congenital malformations. Fourth, there might be 
price and compositional effects during the crisis, which cannot be identified and tested due 
to data availability constraints. Last, our study particularly examines the Greek recession. 
Generally speaking, the health effects of recessions may differ depending on the country 
context, extent and severity of the recession, and protective role of the welfare state (De 
Vogli, 2014; Suhrcke & Stuckler, 2012; Toffolutti & Suhrcke, 2014). Hence, our findings 
should be interpreted with caution and discussed along with evidence from other countries, 
especially when drawing generalised conclusions about the effects of recession on 
newborn health. 
 
	54 For instance, participation to the WIC programme is associated with increased BW and a reduction in the 
share of LBW (Bitler & Currie, 2005; El-Bastawissi et al., 2007; Hoynes et al., 2011; Kowaleski-Jones & 
Duncan, 2002). Likewise, another study showed that enrolment to a Food Stamp Programme during 
pregnancy was associated with increased BW in the USA, and the effects was much greater for the children 
born to the most vulnerable families (Almond et al., 2011). Apart from health benefits, evidence suggests that 
such programmes generate substantial savings during the first 60 days after pregnancy, exceeding the 
corresponding costs (Avruch & Cackley, 1995; Devaney, Bilheimer, & Schore, 1992). 
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4.7. Conclusion 
Many studies have explored the effects of the recent crisis on adult health but not 
on newborn health. Considering the recession’s effects on newborn health in Greece is 
particularly interesting, mainly because of the unprecedented duration and intensity of the 
Greek economic crisis. The National Vital Statistics provide a comprehensive dataset with 
individual-level information about objective indicators of newborn health. This data serves 
as the basis of our study and has allowed us to contribute to the literature on the health 
consequences of the European crisis. We find that economic uncertainty and conditions 
during pregnancy are associated with newborn health indicators. In particular, the risk of 
LBW and preterm birth is countercyclical with reference to business cycle volatility in the 
first and third trimesters of gestation. Our analysis also reveals heterogeneity in the 
association between prenatal economic conditions and birth outcomes across 
socioeconomic groups.  Birth indicators of lower-SES children are responsive to economic 
conditions during the first and third trimesters of gestation, whereas those of higher-SES 
newborns respond to economic volatility only in the first trimester. Our findings further 
suggest that economic climate also influences fertility decision differently across different 
population groups. For example, women who conceive and give birth during recession 
tend to have higher SES and are more likely to be married. To account for selection into 
motherhood, we employ a PSM and find that, during pregnancy, maternal exposure to 
economic crisis is linked with a BW loss that is driven by the low-SES children. The 
estimated BW loss is not statistically significant for children of high-SES families. 
Therefore, in addition to the socioeconomic gradient in newborn health, there is also a 
clear socioeconomic differential in the impact of economic recession on newborn health. In 
other words, children born to low-SES families were hit more severely by the recent 
economic recession, and they bear greater health costs. These findings have social policy 
implications, as they suggest the possibility of widening health and socioeonomic 
inequalities over time, in light of the nexus between newborn health and future health and 
socioeconomic outcomes.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions  	
The consequences of the recent recession on the core dimensions of health system 
performance have attracted much interest across European countries during the last years 
(Thomson et al., 2014).  Indeed, the effect of the recent economic crisis has been generally 
characterized as a “health system shock” (Mladovsky et al., 2012) with subsequent 
consequences for health system performance, population health, and the demand for and 
supply of health care. In this context, the health policy responses in Europe were quite 
heterogeneous, reflecting not only the variation in the severity and duration of the 
economic recession but also the different public policy priorities across European countries 
(Karanikolos et al., 2013; Maresso et al., 2014). 
The Greek crisis is a particularly interesting case study from both a macroeconomic 
and health system perspective. First, it is possibly the most severe and prolonged economic 
downturn among developed countries in the post-war period, with the GDP loss exceeding 
25% over the last decade (Andriopoulou et al., 2017; Meghir et al., 2017). Second, and in 
contrast to the other European countries that eventually graduated from their adjustment 
programmes, Greece signed three successive EAPs, all of which were characterized by 
strict fiscal adjustment and substantial conditionality (Pagoulatos, 2018). In particular, the 
cyclically adjusted fiscal consolidation accounted for more than 20% of potential GDP 
during 2009-2016 (Giannitsis & Zografakis, 2018; Tsakloglou, 2019), resulting in the 
largest and fastest economic adjustment in the OECD. Third, the economic crisis brought 
about wide and unprecedented social effects (OECD, 2014). Consistently higher than 20% 
until 2017, the unemployment rate reached 27.5%, with almost three out of four of 
unemployed persons being long-term unemployed. Additionally, various social indicators 
(e.g. poverty rate, material deprivation rate) dramatically deteriorated (Hellenic Statistical 
Authority, 2017; Kaplanoglou & Rapanos, 2016). Last, Greece implemented a number of 
policy responses and fiscal retrenchment in health care, with various implications for the 
health sector and for some core dimensions of health system performance (Economou et 
al., 2014).  
This thesis comprises of three studies regarding the impact of the Greek crisis on 
the health sector, aiming to provide evidence and answers to policy-relevant topics, with a 
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particular focus on the responses to and implications of the crisis across different 
socioeconomic groups. As shown in Figure 1.3, Chapter 2 sheds light on decision-making 
and the relevant responses to the crisis with regard to HHE and demand for health care. It 
thus explores how household spending behaviour towards health care has changed across 
different household types and socioeconomic groups in the face of an economic shock and 
the relevant health policy responses. Focusing on the heavy users of health services, 
Chapter 3 concentrates on the potential implications of the crisis in terms of financial 
protection, and elaborates on the extent to which financial protection against OOPE has 
changed among older households during the Greek crisis. The objective of Chapter 4 is 
twofold. It first examines how economic climate influences fertility decisions and 
responses across population groups. Further, it studies the relationship between economic 
conditions and uncertainty during pregnancy and newborn health in different 
socioeconomic groups, testing whether inequalities in birth outcomes have increased 
during the economic crisis.  
 
5.1. Summary and contribution of the studies 
5.1.1. Household responses and spending behaviour towards health care 
In light of an unprecedented economic crisis and a large-scale fiscal adjustment, the 
Greek households experienced the “triple hit” of public budget cuts, increased user 
charges, and lower disposable income and household purchasing power. In Chapter 2, the 
analysis of how households behaved in the face of this economic shock (and the associated 
“triple hit”) reveals that the introduction of the EAP is associated with a lower probability 
of spending on health care and lower HHE. Further, we show that the introduction of the 
EAP modifies the association between income and HHE. Consistent with the evidence 
from micro-level studies (Getzen, 2000), we show that the income elasticity of HHE is 
below unity, demonstrating that health care is a technical necessity. In other words, HHE 
increases (decreases) less than proportionally in response to an income increase (decrease). 
This finding implies that household spending for health care is not a voluntary, 
discretionary and deliberate choice (Lépine, 2015). Instead, it is incurred either due to 
health shocks and poor health or as households’ response to improving access to health 
services within a fragmented health system that does not ensure the accessible and timely 
provision of high-quality care (Davaki & Mossialos, 2005; Economou et al., 2017). 
Our analysis reveals a statistically significant increase in the income elasticity of 
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HHE between the pre- and post-EAP periods, suggesting that Greek households exhibit 
greater consumption responses to changes in their income during the post-EAP period. We 
also show that a proportionally similar change in income is associated with a higher 
change in the probability of incurring HHE in the post-EAP period (relative to the pre-EAP 
period). These findings show that households’ decisions to spend on health care as well as 
the level of HHE became more sensitive to income changes after the introduction of the 
EAP, and imply a change in household behaviour towards health care. OOPE for health 
care is more elastic and is generally considered to be less “necessary” in the post-EAP 
period. This can be interpreted from a theoretical perspective, considering that households 
are expected to reduce unnecessary use of health services and non-essential payments due 
to financial distress (Yang et al., 2001), while some patients may shift to public services 
aiming to avoid OOPE  (H. Waters et al., 2003a; Yang et al., 2001).  
In examining the second hypothesis of this study, we concentrate on different 
household types, and confirm that HHE is income inelastic regardless of socioeconomic 
status or degree of vulnerability. However, there are heterogeneous responses of HHE to 
income changes across different household types, with the HHE of lower SES households 
being relatively less income elastic. Therefore, lower socioeconomic groups exhibit lower 
flexibility in HHE as income changes than higher SES households. The heterogeneous 
consumption responses to income changes can possibly be attributed to the different 
composition of medical goods and services consumed by each household type and their 
relative costs. For example, the payments for some health care goods and services (e.g. 
cost-sharing for pharmaceuticals) cannot be easily avoided or substituted by shifting to the 
public sector. In addition, this result possibly mirrors some structural barriers to accessing 
health services for the poorer population groups (Zare et al., 2013; Zavras et al., 2016), and 
also reflects the fact that low-SES individuals tend to have lower health status and greater 
health care needs. 
We also examine the changes in income elasticity of HHE across different 
household types. Contrary to the more privileged groups, lower SES households did not 
become more sensitive to income changes in the post-EAP period. Those households 
appear to be more “protective” about their health care consumption than their richer 
counterparts, and this intensified in the post-EAP, during which HHE became more elastic 
for higher socioeconomic groups, but not for less-privileged households. As described in 
Chapter 2, this finding reflects the different composition of HHE across household types 
and the fact that some categories of HHE (e.g. payments for pharmaceuticals, user charges) 
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cannot be easily substituted or avoided by shifting to public services during periods of 
economic distress. In the same vein, we find that income elasticity only increased among 
the households in the top quantiles of the HHE distribution, indicating that contrary to 
those at the bottom, high spenders are those who actually became more sensitive to income 
changes during the post-EAP period. In sum, our findings reveal that HHE did not become 
more responsive to income changes among lower SES groups and households that spend 
relatively less on health care.  
Last, we employ additional measures to capture household welfare instead of 
household income. We show that HHE is more responsive to permanent income shocks 
compared to current income variations.  In addition, by using consumption expenditure and 
the CWI, we present strong evidence of greater sensitivity in the post-EAP period, a 
finding that further validates our baseline results. 
 Generally speaking, although economic crisis and adjustment generally pose 
significant challenges to health financing, there is scant evidence regarding decision-
making and the households’ health care consumption responses to an economic shock. 
Even less is known about how HHE responds to income changes before and after large-
scale economic adjustment and shocks, albeit some studies have examined the 
responsiveness of HHE to income changes (Chaze, 2005; Getzen, 2000; Zare et al., 2013). 
Using various empirical techniques, this chapter systematically studies this largely 
unexplored topic, and contributes to the literature in various ways. First, it contributes to a 
better understanding of how household spending behaviour towards health care changes in 
the face of an economic adjustment and the relevant health policy measures. Second, it 
elaborates on the heterogeneous consumption responses across different household types 
and socioeconomic groups, and between the low and high spenders. This is particularly 
important, given that households tend to have different composition of health payments, 
diverse needs for medical care and differ in what they can afford during periods of 
economic shock. Third, this study further employs various measures of current and 
permanent income, and identifies how HHE responds to different measures of household 
welfare. Fourth, although estimates of the income elasticity of HHE generally tend to 
ignore potential endogeneity concerns (Trivedi, 2002; Zare et al., 2013), we relax this 
assumption and also employ an IV approach to further test the robustness of our findings. 
Lastly, it also contributes to the existing literature for the Greek health system. Although 
OOPE has traditionally been a major financing source for the Greek health system 
(Economou et al., 2017; Mossialos et al., 2005), the household characteristics associated 
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with the probability of spending for health care and the level of HHE have not been 
examined from an empirical perspective. This study also fills this gap, by providing 
evidence for the determinants of HHE and the income elasticity across different 
households types.  
 
5.1.2. Implications for financial protection among older households  
 Chapter 3 uncovers the potential changes and implications in terms of financial 
protection against health payments during the economic crisis in Greece. Given the 
significant household income loss and the recent health policy responses to the crisis, the 
extent to which the Greek population is financially protected against the risk of illness is a 
matter of great importance for health system performance assessment (Maresso et al., 
2014; OECD, 2016). This chapter particularly concentrates on older people, many of 
whom can be considered as high-need, high-cost patients with complex multimorbidities. 
In general, older population has greater health needs and costs but fewer financial 
resources to cover them, struggles to face the increased financial strain during economic 
downturns, and is also more susceptible to health shocks and the adverse effects of the 
crisis (Bierman, 2014; Fenge et al., 2012; Lyberaki & Tinios, 2018). Therefore, there are 
significant and rising concerns for the financial protection of this group, especially in a 
country where the population is rapidly ageing, such as Greece (United Nations, 2017).  
Our analysis indicates that the headcount and overshoot of CHE more than doubled 
among older households over 2007-2015. According to our baseline results, for example, 
the incidence of CHE increased from 5.83% to almost 14% during the study period. 
Controlling for various confounders, the odds of facing CHE for a household in 2015 are 
more than twice the odds of financial catastrophe in 2007. In addition, the overshoot of 
CHE also increased suggesting that the average extent by which OOPE exceeds the 
corresponding threshold also increased. The findings are generally robust to different 
thresholds of CHE, and can be explained in light of the broader household financial 
situation and the relevant health policy responses during the economic recession. 
After splitting the sample by SES, we find that the incidence of financial 
catastrophe increased across all groups over the period we examined, with the low-income 
households being disproportionately affected. Among the poorest households, the 
headcount increased from 6% to almost 22% during the period of the crisis. On the 
contrary, the respective change among the richest group (i.e. households in the top 
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quintile) has been somewhat lower. Considering that the percentage of population with 
unmet health needs also increased over the study period (Eurostat, 2018d), the incidence of 
CHE could have been even greater in the absence of financial barriers to access (Moreno-
Serra et al., 2011). It thus appears that a large share of the low-income older households 
faces a “bad trade-off”; they either encounter the risk of CHE, or face unmet medical needs 
and barriers to accessing health care.  
Further, we find that the rate of CHE is higher among households with chronic or 
multimorbid patients compared to those without chronic patients. In light of this, it appears 
that the health system cannot adequately protect those with poor health status, especially 
after the onset of the economic crisis. For instance, more than one out of ten elderly 
households with multimorbid patients incured financial catastrophe due to health payments 
in 2007, with the respective figure being more than 20% in 2015. As discussed in Chapter 
4, the high rate of CHE among households with chronic patients, as well as the significant 
increase during 2007-2015, can possibly be explained by several features of the Greek 
health system (e.g. weak primary care, lack of comprehensive chronic disease 
management), and the lack of a thorough strategy to protect chronic patients from the 
financial burden of OOPE.  
Our analysis also focuses on the breadown of CHE by type of health expenditure. 
As shown in Figure 3.1, CHE was mainly due to inpatient and nursing care before the 
onset of the crisis, followed by outpatient care and medicines. During the period we 
examined, the contribution of household pharmaceutical spending to CHE substantially 
increased; a finding that is linked with the cost-sharing reforms and the changes in 
pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement system (Economou et al., 2017; Gouvalas et al., 
2016). However, the contribution of inpatient care to CHE diminished during the study 
period, possibly because households shifted to public services and became less willing to 
pay informal payments in hospitals (Economou, 2015; Souliotis et al., 2016). 
Last, we employ logistic regression and selection models and examine which 
household types tend to incur financial catastrophe due to health payments. Our estimates 
show that the households in the top quintile are less likely to face CHE than their poorer 
counterparts, suggesting that low-income groups are less protected against the financial 
risk of ill health. What is interesting, however, is that although the odds of CHE do not 
significantly differ across consumption quintiles in 2007, we do find a clear socioeconomic 
differential in the probability of CHE in 2015. As discussed in Chapter 3, these findings 
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raise substantial distributional and equity concerns, suggesting widening inequalities in the 
risk of CHE across socioeconomic groups following the Greek crisis.  
This chapter makes some distinct contributions to the literature about financial 
protection in health. First, it systematically examines the changes in financial protection 
for the older population during a period of economic recession. Although this group 
comprises of high-need, high-cost patients and is highly vulnerable during recessions, there 
is no comprehensive evidence for the extent to which the incidence and intensity of CHE 
have changed over the period of the recent economic crisis. This study fills this gap in the 
literature using data from Greece, which arguably has been harder hit by the recent 
recession in Europe. Second, we particularly focus on the implications of the crisis in 
terms of financial protection across different population groups, and also provide plausible 
interpretations for these findings. This is important, given that health policy responses to 
the crisis may have different impact across population groups and socioeconomic strata 
(Kondilis, Giannakopoulos, et al., 2013; Stuckler et al., 2017). Third, we identify which 
types of expenditure are the main drivers of the overall CHE among older households, and 
how they have changed over the period of recession. From a methodological perspective, 
this study also employs regression models and estimators that take into consideration 
potential selection issues, originating from the fact that some households may not be able 
to afford health payments, having financial barriers to access (S. Brown et al., 2014; 
Kawabata et al., 2002). This is particularly relevant for the Greek case, given that the 
proportion of people reporting unmet needs and barriers to accessing health care has 
significantly increased during the period examined (Eurostat, 2018d; Kentikelenis et al., 
2014) 
 
5.1.3. Fertility responses and implications for newborn health 
 Focusing on newborn health is particularly important, since it is strongly associated 
with various health and socioeconomic outcomes during childhood and adulthood (S. E. 
Black et al., 2007; Blumenshine et al., 2010). Thus, health at birth can be considered as an 
input in a health production function that essentially approximates the initial endowment of 
“human health capital”. In light of these remarks, Chapter 4 examines how economic 
climate influences fertility decisions and responses across different population groups, and 
also studies the potential link between economic conditions during pregnancy and newborn 
health across different socioeconomic groups.  
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Our analysis demonstrates a strong association between economic conditions in the 
first and third trimesters of gestation and the BW, while showing a weaker relationship 
between economic climate in the second trimester and BW. In addition, the probability of 
LBW is countercyclical with reference to business cycle volatility in the first and third 
trimesters of pregnancy. We also find similar results for the length of pregnancy and the 
probability of preterm birth, and further validate our initial hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between prenatal economic conditions and birth outcomes. These results are 
generally robust and consistent, even after changing the measure of the economic climate 
and detrending technique. As discussed in Chapter 4, our results can be possibly 
interpreted by two main mechanisms: (a) changes in quantity and quality of maternal 
nutrition and (b) increased psychosocial stress and depression during periods of economic 
decline.  
After splitting the sample by SES, we show that business cycle variation during the 
first and last trimesters matters for the BW and the risk of LBW in infants of low-SES 
households. Nonetheless, the BW of high-SES newborns is only responsive to economic 
conditions in the first trimester. This difference can be attributed to nutritional deprivation 
and dietary changes during economic recession, which mostly affects low-SES households 
(Bonaccio et al., 2017; Brinkman et al., 2010). On the contrary, high-SES households can 
smooth consumption and are not expected to suffer from food deprivation and insecurity 
during periods of economic decline.  
Economic volatility might influence fertility decisions differently across population 
groups, having potential implications for the cohort composition of women who become 
pregnant (Chevalier & Marie, 2017). With this in mind, we find that economic downturn 
during the preconception period raises the probability that women who conceive are better-
educated and married. These findings can be interpreted, considering that low-SES 
families may be unable to afford the costs of childbearing due to credit constraints and 
significant income loss during the crisis (Schneider & Hastings, 2015).  
After accounting for potential selection into pregnancy, we find that newborns 
exposed to the crisis while in utero tend to be lighter, with the effect being mainly driven 
by the infants of low-SES parents. In particular, the estimated BW loss for the low-SES 
children is greater, whereas the corresponding loss for newborns of high-SES families is 
insignificant. Hence, in addition to the socioeconomic gradient in health at birth, there is 
also a socioeconomic differential on the impact of economic recession on newborn health. 
In other words, children born to low-SES families are hit more severely by the recent 
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economic downturn and bear greater health costs, resulting in a widening of the BW gap 
between infants of lower and higher socioeconomic groups. 
In this context, this chapter contributes to the evidence on the health effects of 
recessions in various ways. In contrast to previous evidence, which concentrates on the 
relationship between unemployment and birth indicators, we also employ some “soft” 
economic indicators, aiming to investigate the link between economic climate and 
uncertainty during pregnancy and newborn health. Therefore, this analysis captures the 
overall economic climate, expectations and uncertainty, which are not directly reflected by 
standard measures of economic activity such as GDP and unemployment rate (Gelper & 
Croux, 2010). Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper documenting 
widening inequalities in newborn health during recessions, arising from a socioeconomic 
differential in an economic crisis’ impact on newborn health. Third, we employ various 
detrending techniques to capture the cyclical component of the economic indicators, and 
test the robustness of our findings. Fourth, this study investigates how economic climate 
during preconception period might influence the type of women who conceive, testing for 
potential selection into pregnancy. Fifth, we address potential selection due to 
compositional changes on the type of women who conceive, and further employ various 
robustness checks. Lastly, our analysis relies on a large administrative dataset from 
Greece, a country that faced a severe and protracted economic downturn. Examining the 
Greek case is important, since previous evidence concentrated on shorter recessions with 
lesser economic and social impact.  
 
5.2. Limitations 
As discussed in the individual chapters, there are some limitations that should be 
taken into account when discussing and interpreting the findings of this thesis. Given that 
each study employs different data sources and empirical methods, the detailed limitations 
are fully presented in the corresponding chapters. In this section, we thus summarize the 
main data and methodological limitations.  
The first empirical study (Chapter 2) relies on household-level data from the Greek 
HBS. Although HBS adequately captures some key aspects about household income and 
expenditure patterns, it does not include a rich set of health variables and indicators. 
Hence, we do not control for an indicator of health status due to data availability 
restrictions.  This is a common limitation in studies using household data (Amuedo-
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Dorantes & Pozo, 2011; Okunade et al., 2010; Zare et al., 2013), since it is difficult to 
approximate health status at the household level and most budget surveys do not include 
detailed information about respondents’ health status. Instead, we control for proxies for 
the need for health care at the household level, focusing on the groups considered to be 
heavy users of health services. Furthermore, household expenditure and income data are 
self-reported and may thus be affected by various factors, such as the level of 
disaggregation, recall period and question framing (Heijink, Xu, Saksena, & Evans, 2011; 
Lu, Chin, Li, & Murray, 2009). However, no systematic differences in data reporting are 
expected, since the survey design and methodology remained unchanged over the period 
we examined (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2015). Additionally, the aggregate nature of 
the EAP as well as the cross-sectional design of the surveys do not allow us to employ 
quasi-experimental approaches or estimate potential causal effects. Therefore, the 
interpretation of associations as causal relationships should be made with caution. Further, 
the impact of each of the “triple hits” cannot be disentangled and tested separately, due to 
lack of relevant data. Last, although our IV has been extensively tested and generally 
performs well, finding a perfect IV is always a challenging empirical task. It is thus 
important to interpret these results taking these limitations into account. It is encouraging, 
however, that the findings remain robust to different empirical techniques and indicators of 
household welfare.   
 Using data from SHARE, Chapter 3 focuses on financial protection in health 
among older households. Although SHARE follows respondents over time, it is not 
possible to exploit the relevant longitudinal information due to limited data availability. 
Therefore, we cannot identify whether OOPE persists over time, or explore how OOPE 
affects household spending patterns in general (WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2018b). 
Additionally, we only employed data from Waves 2 and 6 (before and after the onset of the 
crisis) to conduct this analysis, since Greece did not participate in the other waves (Börsch-
Supan et al., 2013; SHARE Release Guide, 2018). We cannot thus adjust for underlying 
trends or other time-related factors, which could influence OOPE and the probability of 
CHE. Furthermore, we do not have access to information on how households finance their 
consumption or cope with excessive OOPE. Examining these aspects is an interesting 
exercise, since both have significant implications on household consumption and welfare 
in the long run. 
In the last empirical chapter, we rely on a large administrative dataset that includes 
information for all births over the period 2008-2015 in Greece. Similar to most datasets of 
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this kind, the Greek Vital Statistics do not include information for the mode of delivery, 
health behaviours, and prenatal care utilization. Furthermore, in order to examine the 
potential heterogeneous impact by socioeconomic group, we only solely on education as a 
proxy for SES due to limited data availability for other socioeconomic measures. Although 
education is a reliable and widely employed indicator for socioeconomic status 
(Galobardes, Shaw, Lawlor, Lynch, & Davey Smith, 2006; Oakes & Rossi, 2003), 
stratifying the sample by other variables could serve as an additional robustness check. In 
any case, we conducted various analyses and tests, all of which confirmed our baseline 
findings. In addition, although we employ various indicators of newborn health, we cannot 
examine the potential impact of economic conditions on some additional birth outcomes, 
such as neonatal diseases, Apgar scores, and congenital malformations. Last, from a 
methodological perspective, we do not know the extent to which each mother has been 
exposed to the adverse effects of the crisis. This is a common limitation in studies that 
have examined the impact of exogenous wide-scale events on birth outcomes (Carlson, 
2015; Quintana-Domeque & Ródenas-Serrano, 2017). Unlike bereavement, for example, 
economic crisis is not a stressor in and of itself. Therefore, we rely on various economic 
climate and uncertainty indicators during pregnancy to carry out our assessment.  
 
5.3. Further research 
 This thesis examines policy-relevant topics regarding the impact of the Greek crisis 
on the health sector. However, a number of research and policy-relevant questions remain 
unanswered. This section elaborates on research areas worth further investigation.  
First, although this thesis examines household behaviour and demand for health 
care during the crisis, it only focuses on HHE. Exploring trends in hospitalizations and 
primary care visits could significantly improve our understanding of how households 
modified and adjusted their health care demand and utilization during the crisis. However, 
a thorough analysis of this kind requires access to detailed records for patients admitted to 
Greek hospitals. An integrated dataset for primary care visits and hospital admissions 
would also allow us to examine potential substitution effects between different types of 
care and to identify changes in household behaviour and health care consumption 
responses for different types of care during the crisis.  
Second, more empirical work is needed in order to improve our understanding 
regarding the implications of the crisis on financial protection. Currently, most available 
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datasets do not include information for unmet needs and barriers to access health services, 
although their consideration is particularly important for a comprehensive study of CHE 
(WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2018b). With this in mind, a comprehensive dataset 
that includes information on household expenditure and unmet needs would substantially 
improve financial protection measurement. This is important, especially when measuring 
CHE during periods with significant changes in the frequency of unmet health needs. 
Another direction for future research relates to the mechanisms that households 
employ when dealing with high OOPE and financial catastrophe. In particular, household 
coping strategies are worth further exploration, since the ways through which health care is 
financed (e.g. savings, borrowing, selling assets, cutting down other types of consumption) 
have various implications on household consumption and welfare in the long run.  
Furthermore, although we examine trends in financial protection among households 
with patients suffering from chronic conditions, more work is needed on this front. 
Investigating the extent to which patients in each disease category are protected against the 
financial risks of ill health could allow us to better identify those incurring excessive 
OOPE and to design targeted policy measures to improve equity in health financing.  
Third, there are still some gaps in the literature on the health effects of the Greek –
and European - crisis, since a substantial body of the existing evidence is subject to various 
types of bias including ecological inference fallacy and measurement error (Parmar et al., 
2016). By employing micro-level data and objective health indicators, we provide evidence 
for the impact of the recession on health at birth and address some of these types of bias. 
However, there is significant ground for further research on the impact of recession on 
adult health status. In particular, using micro-level data for mortality and morbidity would 
allow us to make inferences at an individual level and control for several confounders, 
avoid aggregation bias, and also elaborate on potential heterogeneity in the impact of 
business cycle fluctuations on adult health across socioeconomic groups. Furthermore, 
another understudied topic worth further exploration relates to the medium- and long-term 
health consequences of economic conditions at birth and during early life.  
Going beyond the scope of this thesis, various challenges associated with the 
availability and improvement of data sources need to be addressed in Greece. First, a 
longitudinal survey that includes variables about health status, health-related behaviours, 
patient satisfaction and responsiveness, insurance status and health expenditure and 
utilization could provide valuable data needed to address important research questions and 
various methodological challenges, some of which have been discussed in this thesis. 
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Second, an integrated administrative and clinical dataset for primary care visits and 
hospital admissions would allow us to further study household behaviour towards health 
care, and also track potential changes in some other health system performance elements, 
such as health service outcomes, efficiency and productivity. Third, patient-level registries, 
combined and integrated with other datasets, could also serve as an important source of 
information to examine questions about morbidity, mortality and health and clinical 
outcomes for specific population sub-groups and conditions in the Greek setting. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Material to Chapter 2 
Table A. 1: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
Health expenditure The total household spending for health 
care 
Independent variables 
Income Continuous variable for annual net 
household income 
Economic adjustment programme =1 if year is 2010-2015, =0 if year is 
2008-2009 
Male =1 if household head is male, =0 if 
female 
Age 15-34 =1 if age≥15 and age≤34, =0 otherwise 
Age 35-44 =1 if age≥35 and age≤44, =0 otherwise 
Age 45-54 =1 if age≥45 and age≤54, =0 otherwise 
Age 55-64 =1 if age≥55 and age≤64, =0 otherwise 
Age 65-74 =1 if age≥65 and age≤74, =0 otherwise 
Age≥75 =1 if age≥75, =0 otherwise 
Divorced =1 if household head is divorced, =0 
otherwise 
Married =1 if married, =0 otherwise 
Never married =1 if never married, =0 otherwise 
Widowed =1 if widowed, =0 otherwise 
Insurance  =1 if beneficiary of any type of insurance 
(either public or private), =0 if no 
insurance 
No formal education =1 if household head has no formal 
education, =0 otherwise 
Primary and lower secondary education 
(ISCED level 1, 2) 
=1 if highest education level is primary or 
lower secondary education, =0 otherwise 
Upper- and post-secondary education 
(ISCED level 3, 4) 
=1 if highest education level is upper or 
post- secondary education, =0 otherwise 
Tertiary education (ISCED level 5, 6) =1 if highest education level is tertiary 
education, =0 otherwise 
Worker =1 if household head is worker, 
0=otherwise 
Self-employed =1 if self-employed, 0=otherwise 
Farmer =1 if farmer, 0=otherwise 
Unemployed =1 if unemployed, 0=otherwise 
Retired =1 if retired, 0=otherwise 
Other inactive =1 if other inactive, 0=otherwise 
Household size The number of household members 
Household members under 4 years old The number of household members aged 
under 4 years old 
Household members over 65 years old The number of household members aged 
over 65 years old 
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Densely populated (at least 500 
inhabitants/km2) 
=1 if densely populated, =0 otherwise 
Intermediate (between 100 and 499 
inhabitants/km2) 
=1 if intermediate, =0 otherwise 
Sparsely populated (less than 100 
inhabitants/km2) 
=1 if sparsely populated, =0 otherwise 
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Table A. 2: Summary statistics 
Variables Total sample Non-zero 
expenditure 
Zero 
expenditure 
Health expenditure 1367,65 
(2267,49) 
1575,53 
(2365,49) 
0 
(0) 
Income 25100,40 
(19771,53) 
25908,57 
(20394,11)  
19783,65 
(13924,31)  
Male 0,72 
(0,45) 
0,72 
(0,45) 
0,72 
(0,45) 
Age 15-34 0,09 
(0,29) 
0,08 
(0,27) 
0,20 
(0,40) 
Age 35-44 0,15 
(0,36) 
0,15 
(0,36) 
0,19 
(0,39) 
Age 45-54 0,18 
(0,38) 
0,17 
(0,37) 
0,23 
(0,42) 
Age 55-64 0,18 
(0,39) 
0,18 
(0,39) 
0,19 
(0,39) 
Age 65-74 0,19 
(0,39) 
0,21 
(0,40) 
0,11 
(0,31) 
Age≥75 0,20 
(0,40) 
0,22 
(0,41) 
0,08 
(0,27) 
Divorced 0,06 
(0,23) 
0,05 
(0,22) 
0,08 
(0,27) 
Married 0,65 
(0,48) 
0,67 
(0,47) 
0,55 
(0,50) 
Never married 0,12 
(0,32) 
0,10 
(0,29) 
0,25 
(0,43) 
Widowed 0,18 
(0,38) 
0,19 
(0,39) 
0,12 
(0,32) 
Insurance 0,96 
(0,19) 
0,97 
(0,16) 
0,90 
(0,30) 
No formal education 0,13 
(0,34) 
0,14 
(0,34) 
0,08 
(0,28) 
Primary and lower secondary 
education 
0,39 
(0,49) 
0,40 
(0,49) 
0,37 
(0,48) 
Upper- and post-secondary 
education 
0,29 
(0,45) 
0,28 
(0,45) 
0,36 
(0,48) 
Tertiary education 0,19 
(0,39) 
0,19 
(0,39) 
0,18 
(0,39) 
Worker 0,29 
(0,45) 
0,28 
(0,45) 
0,40 
(0,49) 
Self-employed 0,11 
(0,32) 
0,11 
(0,32) 
0,11 
(0,31) 
Farmer 0,04 
(0,20) 
0,04 
(0,19) 
0,04 
(0,21) 
Unemployed 0,04 
(0,20) 
0,04 
(0,19) 
0,09 
(0,29) 
Retired 0,40 0,43 0,24 
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(0,49) (0,50) (0,42) 
Other inactive 0,11 
(0,31) 
0,11 
(0,31) 
0,12 
(0,32) 
Household size 2,47 
(1,26) 
2.49 
(1,25) 
2,35 
(1,31) 
Household members under 4 
years old 
0,11 
(0,37) 
0,11 
(0,38) 
0,08 
(0,31) 
Household members over 65 
years old 
0,64 
(0,78) 
0,69 
(0,79) 
0,32 
(0,61) 
Densely populated (at least 500 
inhabitants/km2) 
0,45 
(0,50) 
0,45 
(0,50) 
0,52 
(0,50) 
Intermediate (between 100 and 
499 inhabitants/km2) 
0,19 
(0,39) 
0,19 
(0,39) 
0,18 
(0,38) 
Sparsely populated (less than 
100 inhabitants/km2) 
0,35 
(0,48) 
0,36 
(0,48) 
0,31 
(0,46) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A note on the GLM specification tests, measures of goodness of fit and model 
performance. 
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Based on the existing literature (e.g. Manning et al., 2005; Jones, 2010), we employ some 
specification tests in order to identify the optimal distributional family, and the appropriate 
link function. For the identification of the family distribution, we used a modified Park 
test. Given that the literature on the techniques for choosing the optimal GLM link function 
is rather mixed, we rely on three tests (i.e. Pregibon link test, Pearson correlation test, 
modified Hosmer and Lemshow test) (Manning et al., 2005). Table A3 indeed confirms 
that Gamma distribution is the optimal distributional family, whereas log is the appropriate 
link function. 
 
Table A. 3: GLM specification tests for distributional family and link function 
Results of the Modified Park test 
Coefficient: 1.815 
Family Chi2 p-value 
Gamma 3.43 0.0639 
Poisson 66.67 0.0000 
Inverse Gaussian or Wald 140.92 0.0000 
Gaussian NLLS 330.62 0.0000 
Results of the GLM link tests 
Pearson correlation test - 0.1661 
Pregibon test - 0.0561 
Modified Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test 
- 0.3999 
 
Our analysis further presents evidence regarding measures of goodness of fit and model 
performance. In doing so, we rely on several measures, such as R squared, root mean 
squared error, mean absolute prediction error, and mean prediction error (Jones, 2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A. 4: Measures of goodness of fit and model performance 
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Model Mean Squared Error 
(x106) 
Root Mean Squared 
Error 
Mean Absolute 
Prediction Error 
MTPM 
(Gamma) 
4.77 2182.94 1177.72 
TPM (OLS) 4.80 2191.45 1182.86 
MTPM 
(Poisson) 
4.75 2178.69 1177.69 
OLS 4.85 2201.23 1288.16 
GLM (Gamma) 4.77 2184.47 1180.81 
GLM (Poisson) 4.75 2179.58 1178.90 
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Table A. 5: Single-equation models for household health expenditure (GLM, OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GLM (Gamma) OLS  GLM (Poisson) 
EAP -1.373*** -0.901*** -2.258*** 
 (0.349) (0.289) (0.426) 
Income 0.454*** 0.405*** 0.488*** 
 (0.031) (0.026) (0.036) 
Interaction (EAP x Income) 0.118*** 0.075*** 0.208*** 
 (0.034) (0.029) (0.042) 
Male -0.085** -0.060** -0.062* 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.034) 
35-44 0.028 -0.017 -0.015 
 (0.050) (0.040) (0.052) 
45-54 0.015 0.014 -0.062 
 (0.050) (0.042) (0.054) 
55-64 0.164*** 0.124*** 0.095* 
 (0.053) (0.044) (0.056) 
65-74 0.094 0.081 0.079 
 (0.067) (0.052) (0.074) 
75+ 0.160** 0.194*** 0.146* 
 (0.070) (0.055) (0.075) 
Primary/lower secondary 
education 
-0.067** -0.079*** -0.082*** 
 (0.030) (0.024) (0.031) 
Upper and post-secondary 
education 
0.057 0.017 0.040 
 (0.038) (0.029) (0.039) 
Higher education 0.151*** 0.107*** 0.084* 
 (0.043) (0.034) (0.045) 
Intermediate population density -0.004 -0.006 -0.024 
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 (0.029) (0.023) (0.030) 
Sparsely populated 0.029 0.030 0.014 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.029) 
Household size 0.097*** 0.048 0.063 
 (0.037) (0.032) (0.039) 
Household size squared -0.011** -0.004 -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Divorced -0.052 -0.073 -0.021 
 (0.057) (0.046) (0.059) 
Never married -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.185*** 
 (0.050) (0.039) (0.059) 
Widowed -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.117*** 
 (0.043) (0.036) (0.041) 
Members aged below 4 0.225*** 0.154*** 0.207*** 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.030) 
Members aged more than 65 0.152*** 0.122*** 0.126*** 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) 
Self-employed 0.243*** 0.142*** 0.203*** 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.037) 
Farmer 0.111** 0.037 0.112** 
 (0.052) (0.047) (0.052) 
Unemployed 0.092 0.019 0.059 
 (0.068) (0.050) (0.072) 
Retired 0.285*** 0.211*** 0.217*** 
 (0.040) (0.030) (0.043) 
Other inactive 0.371*** 0.235*** 0.272*** 
 (0.051) (0.037) (0.050) 
Insured 0.162** 0.026 0.130* 
 (0.072) (0.055) (0.075) 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.128*** 2.472*** 1.988*** 
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 (0.315) (0.266) (0.359) 
Observations 31,940 27,878 31,940 
R-squared  0.113  
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Table A. 6: Income elasticity of household health expenditure (without controlling for education) 
 Total period Pre-EAP Post-EAP Significant difference 
(pre-post) 
Probability semi-elasticity 
Probability 
semi-elasticity 
0.053 0.036 0.059 Yes 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)  
Unconditional income elasticity 
Main model 
TPM (logit, 
GLM Gamma) 
0.57 0.51 0.59 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
TPM (logit, 
OLS) 
0.55 0.49 0.56 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
TPM (logit, 
GLM Poisson) 
0.67 0.53 0.71 Yes 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
GLM Gamma 0.58 0.52 0.60 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
OLS 0.49 0.45 0.50 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
GLM Poisson 0.68 0.54 0.73 Yes 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
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Table A. 7: Income elasticity of household health expenditure (including a quadratic term for income) 
 Total period Pre-EAP Post-EAP Significant 
difference 
(pre-post) 
Probability semi-elasticity 
Probability semi-
elasticity 
0.060 0.029 0.073 Yes 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)  
Unconditional income elasticity 
Main model 
TPM (logit, GLM 
Gamma) 
0.56 0.45 
 
0.60 
 
Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
TPM (logit, OLS) 0.54 0.42 0.57 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)  
TPM (logit, GLM 
Poisson) 
0.57 0.45 0.61 Yes 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)  
GLM Gamma 0.59 0.46 0.63 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  
OLS 0.49 0.41 0.52 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)  
GLM Poisson 0.59 0.46 0.63 Yes 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  
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Table A. 8: Modified two-part models (sensitivity analyses) 
 MTPM (logit, 
Gamma) 
MTPM (logit, 
Gamma) 
MTPM (logit, 
Gamma) 
MTPM (logit, 
Gamma) 
MTPM (logit, 
Gamma) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Participat
ion 
equation 
Expendit
ure 
equation 
Participat
ion 
equation 
Expendit
ure 
equation 
Participat
ion 
equation 
Expendit
ure 
equation 
Participat
ion 
equation 
Expendit
ure 
equation 
Participat
ion 
equation 
Expendit
ure 
equation 
EAP -1.990*** -0.633** -1.969** -0.867*** -2.170*** -0.932*** -2.339*** -0.961*** -0.828 -0.611** 
 (0.721) (0.312) (0.772) (0.324) (0.779) (0.324) (0.773) (0.323) (0.724) (0.277) 
Log income 0.478*** 0.485*** 0.471*** 0.460*** 0.387*** 0.433*** 0.330*** 0.415*** 0.513*** 0.453*** 
 (0.066) (0.025) (0.071) (0.028) (0.073) (0.029) (0.073) (0.029) (0.070) (0.025) 
EAP x Log 
income 
0.147** 0.057* 0.139* 0.078** 0.157** 0.084*** 0.173** 0.086*** 0.025 0.048* 
 (0.073) (0.031) (0.077) (0.032) (0.078) (0.032) (0.077) (0.032) (0.073) (0.028) 
Male     -0.315*** -0.022 -0.311*** -0.021 -0.310*** -0.067** 
     (0.064) (0.031) (0.064) (0.031) (0.060) (0.026) 
35-44     0.138* -0.039 0.113 -0.051 0.225*** 0.017 
     (0.073) (0.047) (0.073) (0.047) (0.073) (0.039) 
45-54     -0.047 -0.121*** -0.066 -0.131*** 0.187** 0.044 
     (0.073) (0.044) (0.073) (0.044) (0.075) (0.040) 
55-64     0.130 -0.015 0.153* -0.008 0.425*** 0.143*** 
     (0.082) (0.047) (0.083) (0.047) (0.083) (0.041) 
65-74     0.661*** 0.042 0.726*** 0.063 0.627*** 0.094* 
     (0.102) (0.053) (0.105) (0.052) (0.130) (0.050) 
75+     1.154*** 0.090* 1.240*** 0.117** 1.098*** 0.214*** 
     (0.112) (0.053) (0.115) (0.053) (0.144) (0.052) 
Intermediat
e 
population 
density 
        0.059 -0.009 
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         (0.057) (0.022) 
Sparsely 
populated 
        -0.123** 0.013 
         (0.059) (0.022) 
Household 
size 
      0.222*** 0.051 0.195*** 0.035 
       (0.071) (0.035) (0.068) (0.031) 
Household 
size 
squared 
      -0.019* -0.002 -0.030*** -0.004 
       (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) 
Divorced     -0.361*** -0.088* -0.204** -0.039 -0.159 -0.076* 
     (0.092) (0.049) (0.102) (0.052) (0.100) (0.046) 
Never 
married 
    -0.666*** -0.237*** -0.444*** -0.174*** -0.328*** -0.244*** 
     (0.062) (0.043) (0.081) (0.047) (0.081) (0.038) 
Widowed     -0.431*** -0.187*** -0.283*** -0.143*** -0.152 -0.127*** 
     (0.087) (0.034) (0.096) (0.038) (0.096) (0.035) 
Members 
aged below 
4 
        0.624*** 0.170*** 
         (0.071) (0.027) 
Members 
aged more 
than 65 
        0.297*** 0.121*** 
         (0.065) (0.020) 
Self-
employed 
  0.387*** 0.188*** 0.363*** 0.186*** 0.365*** 0.188*** 0.327*** 0.130*** 
   (0.067) (0.034) (0.068) (0.034) (0.068) (0.034) (0.070) (0.028) 
Farmer   0.343*** 0.110** 0.312*** 0.097** 0.303*** 0.089* 0.178 -0.002 
   (0.105) (0.048) (0.106) (0.049) (0.106) (0.048) (0.111) (0.047) 
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Unemploye
d 
  0.123 0.090 0.090 0.094 0.082 0.092 0.037 -0.004 
   (0.090) (0.065) (0.089) (0.064) (0.090) (0.063) (0.090) (0.050) 
Retired   0.901*** 0.286*** 0.406*** 0.221*** 0.430*** 0.234*** 0.283*** 0.180*** 
   (0.056) (0.025) (0.073) (0.038) (0.074) (0.038) (0.072) (0.029) 
Other 
inactive 
  1.013*** 0.225*** 0.697*** 0.257*** 0.719*** 0.269*** 0.423*** 0.155*** 
   (0.085) (0.038) (0.098) (0.046) (0.099) (0.046) (0.080) (0.034) 
Uninsured    0.677*** -0.006 0.524*** -0.026 0.557*** -0.007 0.467*** -0.003 
   (0.086) (0.066) (0.086) (0.066) (0.087) (0.065) (0.085) (0.053) 
Primary/lo
wer 
secondary 
education 
  -0.342*** -0.051* -0.153* -0.048* -0.147* -0.046*   
   (0.078) (0.026) (0.081) (0.026) (0.081) (0.026)   
Upper and 
post-
secondary 
education 
  -0.445*** 0.051 -0.141 0.074** -0.121 0.083**   
   (0.083) (0.032) (0.088) (0.033) (0.089) (0.033)   
Higher 
education 
  -0.321*** 0.095*** 0.041 0.129*** 0.083 0.145***   
   (0.092) (0.037) (0.097) (0.038) (0.099) (0.038)   
Constant -2.497*** 2.501*** -3.066*** 2.605*** -1.988*** 2.986*** -1.967*** 3.001*** -4.103*** 2.046*** 
 (0.663) (0.258) (0.719) (0.284) (0.739) (0.292) (0.737) (0.293) (0.701) (0.257) 
           
Observatio
ns 
33,088 33,088 32,405 32,405 32,405 32,405 32,405 32,405 32,617 32,617 
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Table A. 9: Regression models for household health expenditure (using consumption expenditure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TPM 
(Logit, GLM Gamma) 
TPM 
(Logit, OLS) 
TPM 
(Logit, GLM Poisson) 
GLM 
Gamma 
OLS GLM 
Poisson 
EAP -4.030*** -1.476*** -4.030*** -1.320*** -4.030*** -
2.255*** 
-2.180*** -1.320*** -2.678*** 
 (0.765) (0.266) (0.765) (0.252) (0.765) (0.353) (0.283) (0.252) (0.361) 
Expenditure 0.930*** 0.687*** 0.930*** 0.692*** 0.930*** 0.685*** 0.792*** 0.692*** 0.760*** 
 (0.075) (0.027) (0.075) (0.024) (0.075) (0.033) (0.028) (0.024) (0.034) 
Interaction 
(EAP x 
Expenditure) 
0.371*** 0.147*** 0.371*** 0.131*** 0.371*** 0.227*** 0.211*** 0.131*** 0.266*** 
 (0.077) (0.027) (0.077) (0.025) (0.077) (0.035) (0.028) (0.025) (0.036) 
Male -0.411*** -0.065** -0.411*** -0.103*** -0.411*** -0.068** -0.135*** -0.103*** -0.110*** 
 (0.064) (0.029) (0.064) (0.026) (0.064) (0.032) (0.032) (0.026) (0.033) 
35-44 0.198** 0.018 0.198** 0.019 0.198** 0.001 0.072 0.019 0.031 
 (0.077) (0.043) (0.077) (0.038) (0.077) (0.049) (0.046) (0.038) (0.050) 
45-54 0.169** 0.035 0.169** 0.067* 0.169** -0.013 0.096** 0.067* 0.016 
 (0.080) (0.044) (0.080) (0.039) (0.080) (0.050) (0.046) (0.039) (0.051) 
55-64 0.453*** 0.204*** 0.453*** 0.225*** 0.453*** 0.175*** 0.307*** 0.225*** 0.226*** 
 (0.088) (0.047) (0.088) (0.041) (0.088) (0.053) (0.049) (0.041) (0.054) 
65-74 0.641*** 0.134** 0.641*** 0.182*** 0.641*** 0.160** 0.245*** 0.182*** 0.215*** 
 (0.136) (0.057) (0.136) (0.050) (0.136) (0.072) (0.061) (0.050) (0.073) 
75+ 1.224*** 0.256*** 1.224*** 0.372*** 1.224*** 0.274*** 0.420*** 0.372*** 0.374*** 
 (0.153) (0.061) (0.153) (0.053) (0.153) (0.072) (0.065) (0.053) (0.074) 
Primary/lower 
secondary 
education 
-0.275*** -0.141*** -0.275*** -0.145*** -0.275*** -
0.117*** 
-0.194*** -0.145*** -0.142*** 
 (0.084) (0.027) (0.084) (0.024) (0.084) (0.030) (0.031) (0.024) (0.031) 
Upper and -0.397*** -0.094*** -0.397*** -0.121*** -0.397*** -0.056 -0.164*** -0.121*** -0.093** 
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post-secondary 
education 
 (0.093) (0.034) (0.093) (0.029) (0.093) (0.037) (0.039) (0.029) (0.038) 
Higher 
education 
-0.363*** -0.101*** -0.363*** -0.097*** -0.363*** -0.081* -0.165*** -0.097*** -0.114*** 
 (0.105) (0.038) (0.105) (0.033) (0.105) (0.041) (0.043) (0.033) (0.042) 
Intermediate 
population 
density 
0.011 -0.025 0.011 -0.017 0.011 -0.041 -0.016 -0.017 -0.035 
 (0.059) (0.024) (0.059) (0.021) (0.059) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021) (0.029) 
Sparsely 
populated 
-0.146** 0.036 -0.146** 0.023 -0.146** 0.012 0.030 0.023 0.003 
 (0.063) (0.024) (0.063) (0.021) (0.063) (0.027) (0.026) (0.021) (0.028) 
Household size -0.063 -0.090*** -0.063 -0.090*** -0.063 -0.087** -0.079** -0.090*** -0.082** 
 (0.073) (0.031) (0.073) (0.030) (0.073) (0.035) (0.034) (0.030) (0.037) 
Household size 
squared 
-0.011 0.004 -0.011 0.005 -0.011 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Divorced -0.228** -0.067 -0.228** -0.113** -0.228** -0.051 -0.092* -0.113** -0.076 
 (0.102) (0.048) (0.102) (0.044) (0.102) (0.053) (0.053) (0.044) (0.055) 
Never married -0.328*** -0.138*** -0.328*** -0.220*** -0.328*** -0.107* -0.218*** -0.220*** -0.169*** 
 (0.083) (0.044) (0.083) (0.037) (0.083) (0.057) (0.048) (0.037) (0.060) 
Widowed -0.204** -0.096*** -0.204** -0.122*** -0.204** -
0.106*** 
-0.118*** -0.122*** -0.118*** 
 (0.099) (0.036) (0.099) (0.035) (0.099) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.039) 
Members aged 
below 4 
0.649*** 0.174*** 0.649*** 0.177*** 0.649*** 0.165*** 0.264*** 0.177*** 0.222*** 
 (0.072) (0.028) (0.072) (0.026) (0.072) (0.028) (0.030) (0.026) (0.028) 
Members aged 
more than 65 
0.398*** 0.187*** 0.398*** 0.192*** 0.398*** 0.165*** 0.238*** 0.192*** 0.193*** 
 (0.067) (0.022) (0.067) (0.019) (0.067) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.024) 
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Self-employed 0.198*** 0.108*** 0.198*** 0.065** 0.198*** 0.114*** 0.139*** 0.065** 0.134*** 
 (0.070) (0.032) (0.070) (0.027) (0.070) (0.036) (0.034) (0.027) (0.036) 
Farmer 0.155 0.047 0.155 -0.006 0.155 0.056 0.067 -0.006 0.068 
 (0.114) (0.047) (0.114) (0.046) (0.114) (0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.051) 
Unemployed 0.054 0.034 0.054 -0.018 0.054 0.050 0.020 -0.018 0.031 
 (0.089) (0.055) (0.089) (0.047) (0.089) (0.063) (0.059) (0.047) (0.065) 
Retired 0.341*** 0.199*** 0.341*** 0.201*** 0.341*** 0.167*** 0.266*** 0.201*** 0.199*** 
 (0.076) (0.034) (0.076) (0.028) (0.076) (0.041) (0.036) (0.028) (0.042) 
Other inactive 0.645*** 0.201*** 0.645*** 0.221*** 0.645*** 0.176*** 0.312*** 0.221*** 0.231*** 
 (0.100) (0.041) (0.100) (0.035) (0.100) (0.047) (0.044) (0.035) (0.048) 
Insured 0.389*** 0.011 0.389*** 0.020 0.389*** -0.011 0.181*** 0.020 0.117* 
 (0.086) (0.056) (0.086) (0.051) (0.086) (0.065) (0.063) (0.051) (0.069) 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -7.344*** 0.528** -7.344*** -0.100 -7.344*** 0.571* -0.860*** -0.100 -0.451 
 (0.741) (0.269) (0.741) (0.243) (0.741) (0.336) (0.285) (0.243) (0.342) 
          
Observations 31,941 27,879 31,941 27,879 31,941 27,879 31,941 27,879 31,941 
R-squared        0.168  
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Table A. 10: Regression models for household health expenditure (using CWI) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TPM 
(Logit, GLM Gamma) 
TPM 
(Logit, OLS) 
TPM 
(Logit, GLM Poisson) 
GLM 
Gamma 
OLS GLM 
Poisson 
EAP -5.666*** -2.524*** -5.666*** -2.425*** -5.666*** -
3.592*** 
-3.543*** -2.425*** -4.214*** 
 (0.941) (0.353) (0.941) (0.328) (0.941) (0.463) (0.376) (0.328) (0.472) 
CWI 0.922*** 0.766*** 0.922*** 0.757*** 0.922*** 0.788*** 0.864*** 0.757*** 0.873*** 
 (0.089) (0.035) (0.089) (0.031) (0.089) (0.042) (0.036) (0.031) (0.042) 
Interaction 
(EAP x CWI) 
0.520*** 0.246*** 0.520*** 0.235*** 0.520*** 0.354*** 0.340*** 0.235*** 0.411*** 
 (0.094) (0.035) (0.094) (0.033) (0.094) (0.046) (0.037) (0.033) (0.047) 
Male -0.398*** -0.051* -0.398*** -0.094*** -0.398*** -0.059* -0.121*** -0.094*** -0.101*** 
 (0.064) (0.029) (0.064) (0.026) (0.064) (0.032) (0.031) (0.026) (0.033) 
35-44 0.165** -0.004 0.165** -0.008 0.165** -0.030 0.047 -0.008 -0.005 
 (0.076) (0.044) (0.076) (0.039) (0.076) (0.049) (0.046) (0.039) (0.050) 
45-54 0.110 -0.015 0.110 0.017 0.110 -0.076 0.041 0.017 -0.053 
 (0.079) (0.044) (0.079) (0.040) (0.079) (0.050) (0.046) (0.040) (0.051) 
55-64 0.350*** 0.116** 0.350*** 0.141*** 0.350*** 0.076 0.207*** 0.141*** 0.115** 
 (0.088) (0.046) (0.088) (0.042) (0.088) (0.053) (0.049) (0.042) (0.054) 
65-74 0.510*** 0.023 0.510*** 0.077 0.510*** 0.028 0.119* 0.077 0.066 
 (0.135) (0.058) (0.135) (0.051) (0.135) (0.071) (0.062) (0.051) (0.072) 
75+ 1.057*** 0.119* 1.057*** 0.246*** 1.057*** 0.118 0.265*** 0.246*** 0.196*** 
 (0.150) (0.061) (0.150) (0.053) (0.150) (0.072) (0.066) (0.053) (0.074) 
Primary/lower 
secondary 
education 
-0.230*** -0.111*** -0.230*** -0.131*** -0.230*** -
0.109*** 
-0.153*** -0.131*** -0.135*** 
 (0.084) (0.026) (0.084) (0.024) (0.084) (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) (0.031) 
Upper and 
post-secondary 
-0.316*** -0.055* -0.316*** -0.099*** -0.316*** -0.050 -0.110*** -0.099*** -0.087** 
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education 
 (0.092) (0.034) (0.092) (0.029) (0.092) (0.037) (0.037) (0.029) (0.038) 
Higher 
education 
-0.269** -0.068* -0.269** -0.081** -0.269** -0.088** -0.115*** -0.081** -0.123*** 
 (0.104) (0.038) (0.104) (0.033) (0.104) (0.042) (0.042) (0.033) (0.043) 
Intermediate 
population 
density 
0.027 -0.013 0.027 -0.006 0.027 -0.033 0.000 -0.006 -0.027 
 (0.059) (0.024) (0.059) (0.022) (0.059) (0.029) (0.026) (0.022) (0.029) 
Sparsely 
populated 
-0.139** 0.046* -0.139** 0.032 -0.139** 0.023 0.041 0.032 0.014 
 (0.062) (0.024) (0.062) (0.021) (0.062) (0.027) (0.026) (0.021) (0.028) 
Household size -0.023 -0.086*** -0.023 -0.086*** -0.023 -
0.095*** 
-0.068** -0.086*** -0.091*** 
 (0.072) (0.031) (0.072) (0.030) (0.072) (0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.035) 
Household size 
squared 
-0.012 0.005 -0.012 0.006 -0.012 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Divorced -0.217** -0.045 -0.217** -0.090** -0.217** -0.020 -0.070 -0.090** -0.045 
 (0.102) (0.049) (0.102) (0.044) (0.102) (0.054) (0.053) (0.044) (0.056) 
Never married -0.340*** -0.154*** -0.340*** -0.231*** -0.340*** -0.121** -0.237*** -0.231*** -0.186*** 
 (0.083) (0.044) (0.083) (0.038) (0.083) (0.056) (0.047) (0.038) (0.058) 
Widowed -0.228** -0.090** -0.228** -0.125*** -0.228** -0.100** -0.116*** -0.125*** -0.114*** 
 (0.099) (0.036) (0.099) (0.035) (0.099) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.040) 
Members aged 
below 4 
0.640*** 0.164*** 0.640*** 0.172*** 0.640*** 0.162*** 0.253*** 0.172*** 0.220*** 
 (0.072) (0.029) (0.072) (0.026) (0.072) (0.028) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) 
Members aged 
more than 65 
0.375*** 0.172*** 0.375*** 0.178*** 0.375*** 0.161*** 0.219*** 0.178*** 0.192*** 
 (0.065) (0.022) (0.065) (0.019) (0.065) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.025) 
Self-employed 0.243*** 0.121*** 0.243*** 0.077*** 0.243*** 0.100*** 0.161*** 0.077*** 0.118*** 
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 (0.070) (0.032) (0.070) (0.028) (0.070) (0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.036) 
Farmer 0.218* 0.085* 0.218* 0.024 0.218* 0.075 0.113** 0.024 0.091* 
 (0.113) (0.048) (0.113) (0.046) (0.113) (0.049) (0.051) (0.046) (0.051) 
Unemployed 0.129 0.088 0.129 0.030 0.129 0.093 0.085 0.030 0.075 
 (0.090) (0.057) (0.090) (0.048) (0.090) (0.063) (0.061) (0.048) (0.066) 
Retired 0.342*** 0.212*** 0.342*** 0.208*** 0.342*** 0.174*** 0.281*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 
 (0.076) (0.035) (0.076) (0.029) (0.076) (0.041) (0.036) (0.029) (0.042) 
Other inactive 0.674*** 0.234*** 0.674*** 0.238*** 0.674*** 0.196*** 0.352*** 0.238*** 0.257*** 
 (0.100) (0.042) (0.100) (0.035) (0.100) (0.047) (0.046) (0.035) (0.048) 
Insured 0.339*** -0.060 0.339*** -0.036 0.339*** -0.078 0.096 -0.036 0.048 
 (0.087) (0.058) (0.087) (0.052) (0.087) (0.066) (0.065) (0.052) (0.070) 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -7.363*** -0.229 -7.363*** -0.712** -7.363*** -0.375 -1.559*** -0.712** -1.477*** 
 (0.883) (0.345) (0.883) (0.305) (0.883) (0.417) (0.365) (0.305) (0.425) 
          
Observations 31,940 27,878 31,940 31,940 31,940 31,940 31,940 27,878 31,940 
R-squared        0.154  
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Figure A. 1: Out-of-pocket expenditure (% of GDP) in selected European countries, 1995-
2014 
 
 
Figure A. 2: Mean household health expenditure in Greece, 2008-2015 
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A note on the construction of the asset index 
In order to construct the wealth index, we relied on household data from the HBS. 
Based on the existing literature, we conducted a principal component analysis to aggregate 
the available household indicators into an index (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Vyas & 
Kumaranayake, 2006).  
Given that Greece is a high-income country, the indicators and assets included in 
the wealth index are not similar to the ones used for the construction of similar indices for 
low- and middle-income countries (Foubert et al., 2014; E. E. Freeman et al., 2013; 
Nikoloski & Mossialos, 2013). Indeed, Tsakloglou and Panopoulou (1998) and Ferguson 
et al. (2003) have used assets as proxies for household welfare and provided relevant 
details for the variables that could be used for the construction of an index in Greece 
(Ferguson et al., 2003; Tsakloglou & Panopoulou, 1998).  
The variables we used for the construction of the index were the following: house 
ownership without financial obligations (e.g. mortgage), hot water, central heating, car 
ownership, washing machine, more than two television sets, personal computer, second 
house ownership, and area per equivalent member (binary variables that equals 1 if the 
area per member is more than 30 square meters).  
 
A note on the construction of the CWI 
As pointed above, income and expenditure suffer from several drawbacks, as they cannot 
capture the concept of “permanent income hypothesis”. Building on the existing literature, 
we use a latent variable approach to construct a composite welfare indicator (CWI), which 
essentially captures the concept of permanent income (R. H. Abul Naga & Burgess, 1997; 
R. M. Abul Naga, 1994). In particular, our analysis mainly relies on a previous work by 
Mitrakos and Tsakloglou, who estimated a composite welfare indicator, using a dataset 
from a previous wave Greek HBS (2004/5) (Mitrakos & Tsakloglou, 2010). In this section, 
we present the methodology we used for constructing this indicator. 
Denote ! = ($!, $", … . , $#)′ as the vector of the welfare indicators in the HBS. These 
indicators are associated with the CWI (i.e. the proxy for permanent income *$. If we let + = (+!, +", … . , +#) be the vector of parameters, and , = (-!, -", … . , -#) be the vector of 
the error terms, then the relationship between the available welfare indicators and the CWI 
is given by the following expression:  ! = +*$ + ,					(1) 
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Following Mitrakos and Tsakloglou, we assume both *$  and ,  follow a normal 
distribution, such that *$	~	2(3$, 4$")  and ,	~	5(0, 7) . Then, !  is also normally 
distributed, such that !~	2(+3$, ++′4$" + 7)  Given the relationship in (1), the conditional 
distribution of *$ given ! is the following: 
 *$|$	~	2	 93$ +	:%!&	:''(!	;< − +3$>, :%!%! − :%!&	:''(!	:'%!?					(2) 
 
where,  :%!%! = ABC;*$, *$> = 4$" , :%!&  is the (1$D)  variance-covariance matrix of *$	 and ! , :'%!  is the (D$1)  variance-covariance matrix, and :&&  is the variance-
covariance matrix of the variables of the vector !. 
 
Based on (2) , the predictor of the CWI that minimizes the MSE is the following:  
 E;*$F!> = 	3$ +	:%!&	:''(!	;< − +3$>				(3) 
According to (3), the CWI is a linear function of the variables included in !. In addition, 
the expression presented in (3) suggests that the relative weights of the variables included 
in ! reflect the covariance between *$ and !. 
 
Given that income and expenditure are log-normally distributed, we assume that the 
logarithm of income H	and the logarithm of consumption I  are given by the following 
expressions:  H = H$ + H)													(4) 
and, I = K + H$ + I)						(5) 
where H) and I) are the residuals in (4) and (5) respectively. Last, following the arguments 
by Mitrakos and Tsakloglou (2010), we further assume that ABC;H$, H)> = ABC;H$, I)> =ABC(H) , I)). 
 
Using (4) and (5), and taking into considerations the assumptions for the covariance, one 
can conclude to the following system of equations, which have 3 unknown parameters:  
 CMN(H) = 4$" + -*					(6) 
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CMN(I) = 4$" + -+ 					(7) ABC(H, I) = 4$"					(8)					 
Based on (1), (3), (4), and (5), the CWI of each household is given by the following 
expression:  
 E;*$F!> = 3* + 4$"	;4$" + -*>;4$" + -+> − (4$")"	 [-+(H − 3*) + -*(I − 3+)]		(9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 253	
Appendix B: Supplementary Material to Chapter 3 
Table B. 1: Distribution-sensitive measures of catastrophic health payments (defined as % 
of total household expenditure) 
Threshold: 5%  Pre Post 
Concentration Index (HQ) -0.113 -0.063 
Rank-weighted head count 40.37 59.38 
Concentration Index (O) -0.036 -0.090 
Rank-weighted overshoot 3.12 6.38 
   
Threshold: 10%  Pre Post 
Concentration Index (HQ) -0.142 -0.120 
Rank-weighted head count 21.12 38.08 
Concentration Index (O) 0.038 -0.090 
Rank-weighted overshoot 1.64 4.00 
   
Threshold: 15%  Pre Post 
Concentration Index (HQ) -0.131 -0.156 
Rank-weighted head count 11.21 23.96 
Concentration Index (O) 0.154 -0.061 
Rank-weighted overshoot 0.87 2.49 
   
Threshold: 20%  Pre Post 
Concentration Index (HQ) 0.010 -0.166 
Rank-weighted head count 5.77 15.79 
Concentration Index (O) 0.287 -0.003 
Rank-weighted overshoot 0.46 1.51 
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Table B. 2: Headcount and overshoot of catastrophic health expenditure, by education level 
 No education/Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education  
Threshold: 5%  Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 45.28 65.92 28.70 51.40 23.71 47.20 
 (1.57) (1.42) (1.83) (1.72) (2.40) (2.15) 
Overshoot 3.94 7.86 2.28 5.05 1.67 3.99 
 (0.23) (0.31) (0.27) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29) 
       
Threshold: 10% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 24.90 43.22 13.13 29.31 9.60 27.00 
 (1.36) (1.41) (1.35) (1.53) (1.61) (1.89) 
Overshoot 2.22 5.16 1.31 3.13 0.92 2.22 
 (0.19) (0.27) (0.22) (0.25) (0.21) (0.23) 
       
Threshold: 15% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 14.10 27.86 6.00 17.51 4.76 14.70 
 (1.08) (1.24) (0.98) (1.28) (1.09) (1.42) 
Overshoot 1.29 3.41 0.85 2.01 0.57 1.24 
 (0.15) (0.23) (0.18) (0.20) (0.16) (0.18) 
       
Threshold: 20% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Head count 7.66 18.77 4.20 11.93 3.44 8.00 
 (0.77) (1.07) (0.87) (1.07) (0.90) (1.07) 
Overshoot 0.78 2.25 0.60 1.26 0.38 0.72 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.12) (0.14) 
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Table B. 3: Incidence and intensity of catastrophic health payments among households with chronic patients 
Thresho
ld 
Cancer Diabetes Hypertension Heart attack Stroke Chronic Lung 
disease 
Alzheimer 
5% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
HQ 58.50 82.31 57.86 79.61 49.16 69.26 64.16 79.88 69.16 76.46 63.22 78.64 58.76 89.54 
 (6.97) (4.01) (2.89) (1.81) (1.72) (1.25) (2.75) (1.88) (5.28) (3.93) (4.55) (2.90) (10.37) (3.90) 
O 8.81 11.51 5.80 10.08 4.05 7.78 7.14 10.84 8.32 13.09 6.77 10.83 12.33 17.42 
 (1.74) (1.10) (0.55) (0.48) (0.26) (0.29) (0.62) (0.55) (1.38) (1.32) (0.89) (0.88) (3.71) (1.91) 
               
10% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
HQ 43.54 63.39 34.01 55.10 23.69 43.74 37.81 57.20 39.96 60.68 41.95 59.15 47.98 79.36 
 (6.75) (4.59) (2.81) (2.16) (1.43) (1.31) (2.73) (2.37) (5.57) (4.40) (4.64) (3.39) (10.50) (4.73) 
O 6.43 7.90 3.47 6.73 2.29 5.03 4.59 7.45 5.47 9.67 4.14 7.47 9.48 13.22 
 (1.51) (0.99) (0.48) (0.43) (0.22) (0.25) (0.54) (0.49) (1.24) (1.20) (0.76) (0.79) (3.39) (1.81) 
               
15% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
HQ 34.43 39.49 21.36 38.16 12.65 28.06 24.07 42.14 28.02 46.27 24.12 38.16 42.37 63.40 
 (6.34) (4.35) (2.43) (2.07) (1.08) (1.17) (2.37) (2.31) (5.07) (4.56) (3.95) (3.26) (10.44) (5.34) 
O 4.47 5.39 2.15 4.43 1.43 3.28 3.03 4.94 3.82 7.02 2.55 5.10 7.16 9.80 
 (1.30) (0.85) (0.40) (0.36) (0.18) (0.21) (0.46) (0.41) (1.07) (1.05) (0.63) (0.68) (3.07) (1.68) 
               
20% Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
HQ 24.06 29.91 10.37 24.32 8.11 18.50 15.55 28.24 19.59 32.03 13.69 28.25 29.77 44.68 
 (5.67) (4.00) (1.70) (1.78) (0.87) (1.00) (2.03) (2.07) (4.49) (4.32) (3.15) (3.05) (9.75) (5.39) 
O 3.02 3.65 1.41 2.88 0.92 2.13 2.06 3.20 2.66 5.04 1.67 3.50 5.34 7.20 
 (1.11) (0.70) (0.34) (0.30) (0.15) (0.18) (0.39) (0.34) (0.91) (0.89) (0.50) (0.57) (2.76) (1.53) 
*HQ: Headcount, O: Overshoot, Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table B. 4: Determinants of the probability of incurring catastrophic health payments (Waves 2 and 6) 
 Wave 2 Wave 6 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 CHE 
(threshold: 
5%) 
CHE 
(threshold: 
10%) 
CHE 
(threshold: 
15%) 
CHE 
(threshold: 
20%) 
CHE 
(threshold: 
5%) 
CHE 
(threshold: 
10%) 
CHE 
(threshold: 
15%) 
CHE 
(threshold: 
20%) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
         
Unmarried -0.210 -0.181 0.088 0.006 -0.533** -0.258 -0.173 -0.024 
 (0.268) (0.350) (0.455) (0.530) (0.213) (0.230) (0.250) (0.300) 
Divorced -0.385 -0.525 -0.894 -0.594 -0.432** -0.107 -0.058 -0.146 
 (0.367) (0.385) (0.661) (0.740) (0.195) (0.203) (0.232) (0.270) 
Widowed -0.247 -0.191 -0.093 -0.492 -0.205 0.009 0.005 -0.126 
 (0.197) (0.256) (0.378) (0.360) (0.162) (0.163) (0.174) (0.189) 
Male -0.166 -0.145 -0.213 -0.101 -0.024 -0.007 -0.070 -0.195 
 (0.142) (0.173) (0.235) (0.262) (0.111) (0.113) (0.122) (0.141) 
Age 0.044 -0.033 -0.009 0.065 -0.028 -0.109* -0.102 -0.114 
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.105) (0.121) (0.054) (0.055) (0.064) (0.076) 
Age squared -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Second quintile -0.149 -0.067 -0.160 -0.153 -0.369** -0.412*** -0.254 -0.446** 
 (0.158) (0.190) (0.246) (0.322) (0.149) (0.145) (0.156) (0.181) 
Third quintile -0.016 -0.053 0.013 0.263 -0.293* -0.265* -0.319** -0.400** 
 (0.174) (0.216) (0.283) (0.348) (0.154) (0.148) (0.161) (0.185) 
Fourth quintile -0.260 -0.425* -0.451 0.071 -0.683*** -0.712*** -0.607*** -0.417** 
 (0.191) (0.236) (0.328) (0.375) (0.156) (0.160) (0.179) (0.205) 
Fifth quintile -0.487** -0.255 -0.065 0.597 -0.746*** -0.838*** -0.793*** -0.813*** 
 (0.208) (0.254) (0.313) (0.388) (0.159) (0.167) (0.184) (0.207) 
Primary education -0.020 -0.368** -0.524** -0.610** -0.012 -0.076 -0.055 -0.440*** 
 (0.174) (0.187) (0.223) (0.279) (0.135) (0.129) (0.138) (0.160) 
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Secondary 
education 
-0.147 -0.510** -0.713** -0.367 -0.042 -0.057 0.062 0.074 
 (0.199) (0.225) (0.279) (0.329) (0.125) (0.119) (0.130) (0.146) 
Tertiary education -0.307 -0.768*** -0.823** -0.481 0.025 0.121 0.193 -0.029 
 (0.237) (0.294) (0.370) (0.407) (0.144) (0.140) (0.157) (0.193) 
Employed or self-
employed 
-0.090 -0.145 -0.471 -0.332 -0.186 -0.388** -0.507** -0.517* 
 (0.160) (0.218) (0.315) (0.349) (0.136) (0.154) (0.206) (0.272) 
Unemployed -0.868 -0.112 0.225 0.732 -0.697*** -0.505* 0.030 0.224 
 (0.665) (0.709) (0.869) (1.114) (0.244) (0.265) (0.280) (0.325) 
Homemaker -0.092 -0.167 -0.166 -0.215 -0.085 -0.077 -0.061 -0.096 
 (0.148) (0.184) (0.231) (0.310) (0.133) (0.129) (0.140) (0.163) 
Other 0.517* 1.153*** 0.885** 0.927** 0.165 0.439** 0.492** 0.484** 
 (0.311) (0.315) (0.377) (0.431) (0.225) (0.206) (0.205) (0.211) 
Household size  0.147 0.144 0.093 -0.354 -0.421* -0.183 -0.042 -0.292 
 (0.236) (0.323) (0.422) (0.379) (0.219) (0.219) (0.259) (0.284) 
Household size 
squared 
-0.052 -0.059 -0.041 0.022 0.038 -0.008 -0.028 0.011 
 (0.037) (0.053) (0.066) (0.055) (0.036) (0.036) (0.045) (0.052) 
Member with 
multimorbidity 
0.707*** 0.470*** 0.487*** 0.402** 0.811*** 0.697*** 0.638*** 0.621*** 
 (0.099) (0.123) (0.143) (0.188) (0.077) (0.077) (0.088) (0.112) 
Member with long-
standing activity 
limitation 
0.686*** 0.842*** 0.838*** 0.968*** 0.795*** 0.766*** 0.748*** 0.758*** 
 (0.118) (0.153) (0.208) (0.273) (0.108) (0.103) (0.114) (0.136) 
Hospitalized 
member 
1.375*** 1.742*** 1.925*** 2.199*** 0.982*** 0.958*** 0.898*** 0.957*** 
 (0.209) (0.203) (0.232) (0.232) (0.186) (0.150) (0.138) (0.148) 
Constant -2.846 -0.770 -2.312 -6.225 1.797 3.241 1.525 1.487 
 (2.303) (2.616) (3.793) (4.447) (1.909) (2.021) (2.377) (2.778) 
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Observations 2,258 2,258 2,258 2,258 3,294 3,294 3,294 3,294 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For binary variables, the reference category is the complementary group. The reference categories for the other variables are married, first expenditure quintile, no 
education, retired for marital status, total household expenditure, education and employment status respectively.  
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Table B. 5: Determinants of the probability of incurring catastrophic health payments (Waves 2 and 6), Sartori selection estimator 
 Wave 2 Wave 6 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 CHE 
(threshold 
20%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
5%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
10%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
15%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
20%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
20%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
5%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
10%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
15%) 
CHE 
(threshold 
20%) 
 Selection Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome Selection Outcome Outcome Outcome Outcome 
           
Unmarried -0.198 -0.186 -0.131 -0.051 0.001 -0.507*** -0.165 -0.058 -0.058 -0.071 
 (0.172) (0.151) (0.178) (0.222) (0.273) (0.136) (0.115) (0.119) (0.133) (0.148) 
Divorced -0.325** -0.390*** -0.284 -0.507* -0.211 -0.207 -0.127 -0.008 0.016 -0.017 
 (0.157) (0.150) (0.187) (0.277) (0.319) (0.129) (0.103) (0.108) (0.120) (0.136) 
Widowed -0.161 -0.262** -0.182 -0.190 -0.201 -0.246** -0.099 0.022 0.005 -0.084 
 (0.125) (0.103) (0.120) (0.147) (0.183) (0.106) (0.081) (0.082) (0.090) (0.101) 
Male -0.092 -0.110 -0.096 -0.124 -0.047 -0.161** -0.056 -0.039 -0.053 -0.095 
 (0.087) (0.075) (0.088) (0.108) (0.132) (0.076) (0.058) (0.059) (0.066) (0.074) 
Age 0.077** -0.014 -0.032 -0.003 0.015 0.027 -0.036 -0.070** -0.066** -0.076** 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.038) (0.049) (0.060) (0.038) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.036) 
Age 
squared 
-0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Second 
quintile 
0.118 -0.156* -0.060 -0.084 -0.092 0.059 -0.153** -0.192*** -0.138* -0.247*** 
 (0.111) (0.092) (0.103) (0.124) (0.161) (0.095) (0.075) (0.074) (0.078) (0.088) 
Third 
quintile 
0.303** -0.087 -0.074 -0.010 0.172 0.351*** -0.075 -0.062 -0.131 -0.187** 
 (0.123) (0.101) (0.114) (0.136) (0.167) (0.107) (0.078) (0.075) (0.080) (0.089) 
Fourth 
quintile 
0.277** -0.203* -0.266** -0.279* 0.075 0.050 -0.308*** -0.356*** -0.297*** -0.172* 
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 (0.129) (0.107) (0.125) (0.155) (0.181) (0.102) (0.080) (0.080) (0.087) (0.095) 
Fifth 
quintile 
0.384*** -0.364*** -0.195 -0.146 0.142 0.186* -0.344*** -0.427*** -0.426*** -0.403*** 
 (0.135) (0.114) (0.133) (0.165) (0.197) (0.107) (0.082) (0.083) (0.091) (0.102) 
Primary 
education 
0.172 -0.041 -0.276*** -0.348*** -0.334** 0.024 -0.005 -0.086 -0.069 -0.271*** 
 (0.128) (0.098) (0.102) (0.113) (0.135) (0.104) (0.076) (0.073) (0.077) (0.086) 
Secondary 
education 
0.143 -0.057 -0.307*** -0.438*** -0.334** 0.014 -0.093 -0.115* -0.051 -0.019 
 (0.141) (0.110) (0.119) (0.141) (0.168) (0.085) (0.065) (0.065) (0.071) (0.077) 
Tertiary 
education 
0.010 -0.154 -0.433*** -0.435** -0.261 0.132 -0.022 0.016 0.110 -0.004 
 (0.152) (0.125) (0.142) (0.174) (0.205) (0.099) (0.076) (0.077) (0.085) (0.096) 
Employed 
or self-
employed 
-0.106 -0.145 -0.096 -0.204 -0.162 -0.083 -0.219*** -0.217*** -0.222** -0.248** 
 (0.102) (0.091) (0.112) (0.150) (0.185) (0.095) (0.074) (0.080) (0.094) (0.112) 
Unemploye
d 
-0.284 -0.280 0.246 0.377 0.491 -0.333** -0.458*** -0.263* 0.068 0.045 
 (0.299) (0.309) (0.332) (0.405) (0.518) (0.151) (0.134) (0.142) (0.153) (0.174) 
Homemak
er 
0.079 -0.107 -0.142 -0.127 -0.087 -0.091 -0.096 -0.061 -0.025 -0.055 
 (0.105) (0.083) (0.095) (0.116) (0.145) (0.096) (0.070) (0.070) (0.076) (0.084) 
Other 0.015 0.438** 0.737*** 0.538*** 0.490** 0.179 0.140 0.302*** 0.339*** 0.367*** 
 (0.245) (0.194) (0.187) (0.195) (0.219) (0.170) (0.120) (0.110) (0.110) (0.114) 
Household 
size  
0.005 0.000 -0.022 -0.082 -0.140 -0.244* -0.201* -0.147 -0.122 -0.310** 
 (0.151) (0.133) (0.162) (0.193) (0.223) (0.143) (0.108) (0.117) (0.133) (0.144) 
Household 
size 
squared 
-0.013 -0.018 -0.017 -0.003 0.010 0.033 0.016 0.007 0.004 0.034 
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 (0.023) (0.021) (0.026) (0.030) (0.033) (0.024) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) 
Member 
with 
multimorb
idity 
0.486*** 0.413*** 0.273*** 0.266*** 0.233*** 0.427*** 0.451*** 0.420*** 0.363*** 0.340*** 
 (0.072) (0.051) (0.058) (0.071) (0.086) (0.059) (0.040) (0.041) (0.045) (0.051) 
Member 
with long-
standing 
activity 
limitation 
0.294*** 0.392*** 0.417*** 0.394*** 0.389*** 0.273*** 0.501*** 0.499*** 0.461*** 0.442*** 
 (0.091) (0.066) (0.075) (0.092) (0.114) (0.082) (0.057) (0.055) (0.059) (0.067) 
Hospitalize
d member 
0.354** 0.821*** 1.032*** 1.127*** 1.209*** 0.224* 0.561*** 0.554*** 0.546*** 0.534*** 
 (0.159) (0.101) (0.097) (0.102) (0.113) (0.130) (0.092) (0.078) (0.076) (0.079) 
Constant -2.047 -0.004 0.224 -1.135 -2.659 0.380 1.693 2.113** 1.171 1.389 
 (1.338) (1.185) (1.414) (1.808) (2.239) (1.318) (1.032) (1.052) (1.166) (1.307) 
           
Observatio
ns 
2,258 2,258 2,258 2,258 2,258 3,294 3,294 3,294 3,294 3,294 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For binary variables, the reference category is the complementary group. The reference categories for the other variables are married, first expenditure quintile, no 
education, retired for marital status, total household expenditure, education and employment status respectively
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Appendix C: Supplementary Material to Chapter 4 
 
Table C. 1: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
BW Birth weight in grams 
LBW =1 if BW<2,500 
=0 if BW>=2,500 
Preterm birth =1 if pregnancy length<37 
=0 if pregnancy length>=37 
Stillbirth =1 if born dead 
=0 if born alive 
Fetal growth Birth weight divided by gestational age 
(in weeks) 
Independent variables 
Business cycle fluctuation in the first 
trimester 
Continuous variable for the economic 
fluctuations during the first trimester of 
pregnancy 
Business cycle fluctuation in the second 
trimester 
Continuous variable for the economic 
fluctuations during the second trimester 
of pregnancy 
Business cycle fluctuation in the third 
trimester 
Continuous variable for the economic 
fluctuations during the third trimester of 
pregnancy 
Married =1 if married or living with partner, =0 
otherwise 
Age 15-24 =1 if age≥15 and age≤24, =0 otherwise 
Age 25-29 =1 if age≥25 and age≤29, =0 otherwise 
Age 30-34 =1 if age≥30 and age≤34, =0 otherwise 
Age 35-39 =1 if age≥35 and age≤39, =0 otherwise 
Age≥40 =1 if age≥40, =0 otherwise 
Up to primary education =1 if highest educational level is primary 
education, =0 otherwise 
Lower secondary education =1 if highest educational level is lower 
secondary education, =0 otherwise 
Upper secondary education =1 if highest educational level is upper 
secondary education, =0 otherwise 
University education =1 if highest educational level is 
university education, =0 otherwise 
Total children Continuous variable with the total 
number of deliveries by the pregnant 
woman 
Multiple birth =1 if multiple birth, =0 otherwise 
Male =1 if male, =0 otherwise 
Greek nationality  =1 if mother is Greek, =0 otherwise 
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Table C. 2: Summary statistics for birth outcomes and Economic Sentiment Indicator 
(2008-2015) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
BW (in 
grams) 
3147.1 3135.8 3124.5 3125.1 3123.8 3115.9 3127.2 3126.5 
LBW 
(%) 
 
8.61 9.13 9.60 9.30 9.37 9.61 9.59 9.49 
Preterm birth 
(%) 
 
9.83 10.51 11.44 11.22 11.02 11.69 11.78 11.54 
Pregnanc
y length 
38.21 38.20 38.17 38.18 38.14 38.10 38.09 38.10 
Macroso
mia 
3.29 3.19 3.06 3.05 2.99 2.78 3.03 2.94 
Male (%) 51.54 51.60 51.53 51.57 51.49 51.47 51.42 51.49 
Stillbirth 
(%) 
0.33 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.34 
ESI 100.00 82.7 82.9 81.6 80.9 91.6 100.5 89.7 
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Table C. 3: Regression estimates for birth weight (sensitivity analysis) 
 Total High-SES Low-SES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)^ (5) (6) (7) (8)^ (9) (10) (11) (12)^ 
 BW BW BW BW BW BW BW BW BW BW BW BW 
             
EC 1st 
trimester 
115.6*** 129.2*** 163.7*** -16.18*** 79.40* 80.01* 76.73 -19.28*** 178.8*** 180.5*** 233.9*** -14.83*** 
 (20.57) (22.22) (26.99) (2.432) (40.93) (41.20) (58.25) (5.395) (28.41) (28.35) (35.25) (3.266) 
EC 2nd 
trimester 
52.83*** 43.48** 48.20** -2.448 46.29 53.23 72.08 -2.175 20.72 18.68 5.447 2.875 
 (18.09) (18.09) (21.27) (2.718) (42.47) (42.53) (54.68) (4.345) (27.22) (27.45) (34.40) (4.205) 
EC 3rd 
trimester 
57.94*** 64.33*** 79.13*** -7.310*** 35.56 35.26 -2.038 -1.009 110.2*** 111.7*** 158.4*** -15.44*** 
 (14.61) (14.80) (17.19) (1.688) (41.45) (40.76) (44.56) (3.859) (20.10) (20.22) (27.92) (2.341) 
Marital 
status 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Age Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Number of 
children 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Multiple 
birth 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Male Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Greek Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of 
birth FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month of 
birth FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of week 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3,045*** 3,097*** 3,051*** 3,231*** 3,103*** 3,108*** 3,122*** 3,278*** 3,100*** 3,140*** 3,080*** 3,291*** 
 (6.056) (8.223) (7.277) (9.952) (18.77) (12.59) (17.38) (20.81) (13.57) (7.378) (17.63) (17.10) 
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Observation
s 
826,218 800,970 800,970 800,970 156,794 156,794 156,794 156,794 438,889 438,889 438,889 438,889 
R-squared 0.188 0.184 0.037 0.191 0.236 0.232 0.037 0.238 0.176 0.175 0.039 0.179 
^ Columns 4, 8 and 12 present the estimates for the baseline regression model, using unemployment rate as a proxy for economic conditions during pregnancy. 
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Table C. 4: Robustness checks using Economic Policy Uncertainty Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 BW LBW Pregnancy 
length 
Preterm birth Macrosomia Stillbirth Male Foetal growth 
         
EC 1st trimester -37.12*** 0.225*** -0.205*** 0.330*** -0.134*** 0.445*** -0.000880 -0.644*** 
 (4.401) (0.0416) (0.0208) (0.0381) (0.0332) (0.132) (0.0133) (0.114) 
EC 2nd trimester 3.160 -0.0653** -0.00874 0.0163 -0.00130 -0.0259 -0.00536 0.127 
 (3.911) (0.0329) (0.0199) (0.0474) (0.0357) (0.199) (0.0149) (0.0947) 
EC 3rd trimester -10.81** 0.0938*** -0.104*** 0.149*** 0.0141 0.196 0.0146 -0.148 
 (4.201) (0.0348) (0.0204) (0.0441) (0.0334) (0.186) (0.0160) (0.113) 
Individual 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month of birth 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3,253*** -3.069*** 40.05*** -4.265*** -3.324*** -7.534*** 0.0353 81.64*** 
 (29.27) (0.305) (0.222) (0.354) (0.270) (1.248) (0.112) (0.962) 
         
Observations 800,970 800,970 805,105 805,105 800,970 810,410 807,244 799,668 
R-squared 0.189  0.171     0.161 
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Table C. 5: Robustness checks using Economic Sentiment Indicator (without HP filter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 BW LBW Pregnancy 
length 
Preterm birth Macrosomia Stillbirth Male Foetal growth 
         
EC 1st trimester 152.6*** -1.227*** 0.793*** -1.157*** 0.433*** -0.801 0.0388 2.883*** 
 (20.63) (0.217) (0.113) (0.231) (0.157) (0.578) (0.0564) (0.495) 
EC 2nd trimester 27.90 0.0784 0.0184 -0.0897 0.371 -1.016* 0.0732 0.428 
 (17.72) (0.190) (0.0945) (0.209) (0.259) (0.587) (0.0818) (0.397) 
EC 3rd trimester 95.42*** -0.706*** 0.758*** -0.929*** 0.283 -0.682 0.00178 1.453*** 
 (13.44) (0.134) (0.0918) (0.187) (0.180) (0.697) (0.0633) (0.314) 
Individual 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month of birth 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1,764*** 6.724*** 31.30*** 8.100*** -8.936*** 6.885** -0.458 56.42*** 
 (107.0) (0.828) (0.692) (1.253) (0.922) (3.321) (0.294) (2.280) 
         
Observations 800,970 800,970 805,105 805,105 800,970 810,410 807,244 799,668 
R-squared 0.189  0.172     0.161 
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Table C. 6: Robustness checks using Economic Sentiment Indicator (with Butterworth filter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 BW LBW Pregnancy 
length 
Preterm birth Macrosomia Stillbirth Male Foetal growth 
         
EC 1st trimester 129.9*** -1.096*** 0.655*** -0.822*** 0.364* -0.354 0.0519 2.547*** 
 (23.91) (0.216) (0.119) (0.254) (0.186) (0.668) (0.0645) (0.572) 
EC 2nd trimester 45.63** -0.00888 0.122 -0.253 0.447 -1.230** 0.0740 0.718* 
 (17.80) (0.191) (0.0947) (0.214) (0.262) (0.588) (0.0828) (0.402) 
EC 3rd trimester 59.29*** -0.500*** 0.548*** -0.499*** 0.113 -0.248 0.00491 0.858** 
 (15.71) (0.142) (0.0861) (0.182) (0.195) (0.741) (0.0686) (0.359) 
Individual 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month of birth 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3,033*** -1.802*** 38.51*** -1.916*** -3.938*** -4.614*** 0.0625*** 78.32*** 
 (7.943) (0.0663) (0.0762) (0.0884) (0.0689) (0.143) (0.0151) (0.271) 
         
Observations 800,970 800,970 805,105 805,105 800,970 810,410 807,244 799,668 
R-squared 0.189  0.171     0.161 
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Table C. 7: Economic conditions during pregnancy and birth outcomes among low-SES families 
 EPU ESI without HP filter ESI with Butterworth filter 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BW LBW BW LBW BW LBW 
EC 1st trimester -41.11*** 0.258*** 209.4*** -1.567*** 182.9*** -1.385*** 
 (5.640) (0.0561) (25.53) (0.234) (30.46) (0.249) 
EC 2nd trimester 7.183 -0.0688 3.162 0.0864 24.71 -0.0285 
 (4.352) (0.0419) (27.61) (0.219) (26.89) (0.218) 
EC 3rd trimester -14.62** 0.107** 154.4*** -1.029*** 105.9*** -0.725*** 
 (6.554) (0.0531) (18.64) (0.209) (21.32) (0.224) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3,340*** -3.618*** 1,411*** 9.408*** 3,098*** -2.124*** 
 (43.43) (0.440) (167.8) (1.299) (13.48) (0.0866) 
       
Observations 438,889 438,889 438,889 438,889 438,889 438,889 
R-squared 0.177  0.177  0.177  
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Table C. 8: Economic conditions during pregnancy and birth outcomes among high-SES families 
 EPU ESI without HP filter ESI with Butterworth filter 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BW LBW BW LBW BW LBW 
EC 1st trimester -31.85*** 0.175** 94.00** -0.919*** 86.29** -0.882** 
 (10.59) (0.0713) (41.03) (0.355) (41.18) (0.359) 
EC 2nd trimester -5.502 -0.0161 37.59 0.185 47.06 0.150 
 (9.013) (0.0887) (42.70) (0.369) (42.47) (0.366) 
EC 3rd trimester -9.178 0.152** 50.74 -0.279 37.93 -0.233 
 (5.858) (0.0702) (41.39) (0.359) (41.08) (0.385) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3,327*** -3.484*** 2,268*** 2.653 3,105*** -2.003*** 
 (54.54) (0.647) (218.9) (1.644) (19.10) (0.223) 
       
Observations 156,794 156,794 156,794 156,794 156,794 156,794 
R-squared 0.236  0.236  0.236  
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Figure C. 1: Long-term interest rate of government bonds maturing in 10 years 
 
Source: OECD 
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